Chan, Kenddrick

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G7 Information CentreG20 Information CentreScholarly Publications and PapersMultilateralism in the Digital Age:How to Make Progress on Global Digital GovernanceKenddrick Chan, Head, Digital IR in the Information Age project, LSE IDEAS"Wild West" is a term commonly used to describe the digital domain. Yet it is not an entirely inaccuratecharacterisation, considering how countries operate in cyberspace. While there are agreed-upon norms that seekto ensure states behave responsibly, those norms are ultimately voluntary in nature. Despite governmentssignalling their agreement over the need to avoid the catastrophic security, economic, social, and humanitarianconsequences that might inadvertently result from cyber operations, they continue to utilise the digital domain forgrey zone operations and pursue both military and industrial applications of digital technologies to gain acompetitive advantage over each other. In the first three months of 2023 alone, approximately 38 'significantcyber incidents' were detected – a rate of one attack occurring every two days. Seemingly innocuous AItechnologies such as Generative AI (ChatGPT and DALL-E are popular examples) have already sparkeddiscussions about a new frontier in information warfare. The rapid place of digital technology development,coupled with its possible military and societal implications, have led to calls for multilateral institutions and fora toarrive at a legally binding instrument that would establish codes of conduct for operating in cyberspace.Global AI governance is different from global digital governanceHowever, despite the efforts of the UN and other multilateral organisations, such a compact remains elusive.Rather than bringing states together, efforts at global digital governance appear to be in danger of producing theopposite. Two reasons stand behind this development. The first is one of terminology, where AI governance oftengets conflated with, or lumped under, global digital governance. This is something commonly reflected at themultilateral level, such as the recently released G7 Hiroshima Leaders' Communiqué. Issues of AI governancerevolve around the application of machine learning, and global discussions on the topic are largely (but notexclusively) concerned with avoiding unintended biases, increasing accountability of AI decision-making,establishing 'guardrails' to ensure that AI does not 'go rogue' but functions within its intended parameters. This isto ensure that, insofar international security is concerned, that the use of AI in military applications remains boundby ethical guidelines. This is distinct from its thematic cousin, global digital governance. Efforts at global digitalgovernance, as far as international security is concerned, are intended to secure the stability of cyberspacethough the promulgation of norms, if not rules, of conduct. It involves asking questions that are of a broader andmore traditional nature, such as what constitutes critical infrastructure, how might cyber-attacks or intrusions bedefined and attributed, how to implement mechanisms for states for information exchange, or what 'responsiblestate conduct' might look like. It is not difficult to see why global AI governance can be easily conflated with globaldigital governance. Both fall under the 'digital' umbrella and involve asking what sorts of standards and bestpractices ought to be in place to avoid negative outcomes – such as, in the case of AI, a rogue AI that makesinflammatory statements at best and at worst, constitutes the next weapon of mass destruction. However, agreat deal of confusion can be mitigated by delineating the two issues spheres and should be the first step of anymultilateral effort towards them.Multilateral initiatives are often fragmented with various overlapsThe second reason behind the lacklustre showing of multilateral efforts to unite states around a global legallybinding compact is the classic case of 'too many cooks'. There are multiple parallel initiatives in existence, all ofwhich compete for policymaking attention and risk diverging energy away from what should have been a coherentand cohesive effort. At the UN alone, there are multiple panels, groups, and initiatives that work independently ofeach other, leading to potential overlaps between their work. Given their relatively broad ambit, it would beunsurprising to find that there are overlaps between their work. Having a coherent and streamlined workingstructure would be much more beneficial to the effort. Such fragmentation of efforts also extends to othermultilateral initiatives, some of which appear to reflect wider geopolitical tensions. The G7's recent call for theestablishment of the Hiroshima AI process builds upon the work of the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), whichcommits itself to 'advancing multi-stakeholder approaches' regarding AI. It is widely regarded as the mostcomprehensive state-led initiative, whose membership has grown from 15 states since its establishment in 2020 to29 at time of writing. However, most of its members are part of the 'West', with states from the Global South largelymissing. This raises questions of whether such a 'Global Partnership' contributes to global digital governanceefforts, or to their fragmentation. The same questions can be levied at Chinese-led parallel initiatives that havesprouted up – such as the World Internet Conference – given that they slant heavily towards China's approachto digital governance rather than being reflective of a truly global effort.Multilateral discussions should reflect different national prioritiesMultilateral efforts at global digital governance therefore need to be more streamlined and inclusive than theycurrently are. While developed states may be the most active when it comes to pushing for progress on globaldigital governance and dominate agenda-setting, this is not to say that the concerns of the developing states ofthe Global South should not be tabled for discussion. States vary in terms of their stage of digital development andhave different national conditions, such as having different types of digital infrastructure, robustness of regulatoryframeworks, or even level of human capital (e.g., digital literacy, technical competence). National prioritiesregarding digital issues will therefore differ. For example, although most African states agree on the need to avoida 'cyber Pearl Harbour', for them digital health remains their topmost priority and they would thus benefitgreatly if discussions on global digital governance aimed to creating an enabling environment for (health)information-sharing on a regional or global level. To avoid isolating states from already-underrepresented regionsand to prevent further fragmentation, agenda-setting in multi-stakeholder efforts at global digital governanceshould thus account for these differing priorities.Private sector players are keyGovernments should also realise that private sector tech expertise will have a key role to play in any global digitalgovernance effort. Private tech companies already play a critical role in the functioning of today's society byproviding key financial and communication services to their customers. As stated in the 2018 Paris Call for Trustand Security in Cyberspace, private tech companies are responsible for the development of the digitaltechnologies that are being discussed by states. It is very likely that they will play a key role in implementing globaldigital governance initiatives – something that the sector appears willing to do. The Cybersecurity Tech Accord,an industry coalition that counts Dell, Microsoft, Nokia, and Oracle amongst its signatories, has actively signalledits willingness to partner on issues of global digital governance. Some, like Microsoft, have gone further toestablish a dedicated Digital Diplomacy team and to push for a 'Digital Geneva Convention'. However,incorporating private sector expertise into what is traditionally a state-dominated arena need not be a bridge toofar for governments. Successful examples of how this can be done can be drawn from the fields of nuclear non-proliferation, space cooperation, or climate change. Failure to do so would further derail efforts at effective andequitable global digital governance.In conclusion, the state of global digital governance in international relations faces significant challenges.However, none of these challenges are insurmountable. To overcome them, multilateral efforts should clarify thedistinction between AI and digital governance, streamline discussions, and prioritize inclusive representation ofdifferent national priorities. Engaging the private sector, which possesses critical tech expertise, is also essentialfor making progress as private companies can play a key role in implementing initiatives and have shownwillingness to collaborate. Governments must recognize the importance of incorporating private sectorperspectives and learn from successful examples in other domains. By addressing these challenges, theinternational community can work towards a regulated and secure digital domain that promotes stability andresponsible state conduct in cyberspace.[back to top]Kenddrick Chan is the Head of the Digital IR in the Information Age project at LSE IDEAS, the foreign policythink tank of the London School of Economics. He would like to thank Chris Alden and Mary Martin for theirfeedback and input. Chris Alden and Mary Martin are both co-chairs of the G20's T20 Task Force on ReformedMultilateralism.[back to top]This Information System is provided by the University of Toronto Libraryand the G20 Research Group and G7 Research Groupat the University of Toronto.Follow @g7_rg     Follow @g20rgPlease send comments to:g7@utoronto.cag20@utoronto.caThis page was last updated June 21, 2023 .All contents copyright © 2023. University of Toronto unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.

Multilateralism in the digital age: how to make progress on global digital governance

http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/119637/1/Chan_multilateralism_in_the_digital_age_published.pdf

Multilateralism in the digital age: how to make progress on global digital governance

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