Clavien, Christine

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Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to BetterDecision MakingPenguin Books, 2008 (1st ed. 2007), £ 8.99 (paperback),ISBN-13: 978-0141015910Christine ClavienAccepted: 7 April 2009 /Published online: 28 April 2009# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009Gut Feelings is an introductory book on the nature of intuitive thinking and decision-making in which Gerd Gigerenzer (GG) draws on his own research as well as that of others.It is written for a general audience and as such does a remarkable job. The book isenjoyable to read, does not require any particular background knowledge, and providesuseful tips for further reading.GG’s first main goal is to explain the hidden mechanisms underlying intuition.According to him, the human mind contains a collection of domain-specific cognitivemechanisms: ‘simple heuristics’. They consist in ‘rules of thumb’ such as, “Always do xwhen you find yourself in a situation of type y”, which have evolved because theyhappened to help humans cope successfully with particular aspects of their environment.They give rise to intuitions—or ‘gut feelings’—that are sufficiently strong to make us acton them. Throughout his book, GG deploys a non-exhaustive list of simple heuristics thatguide ordinary human behaviour in all sorts of contexts. The second, most thought-provoking, goal of the book is to show that simple heuristics often produce more successfulchoices and actions than complex consideration. In other words, careful rational analysisoften fails to outcompete primitive mechanisms. In what follows, I will provide a moredetailed analysis of some key aspects of the book.The way GG conceives of intuitions differs from the neo-classical model of decision-making. According to this model, intuitions are unconscious smart calculations that makeus see the best thing to do. Such a view assumes that the human brain contains either onecentral system or a small number of general-purpose decision mechanisms capable ofresolving all sorts of task; they can ascertain the statistical structure inherent in anenvironment and weigh the pros and cons before any decision is taken. Here, rationality isto be found in the intuitions themselves because they are supposed to proceed fromcomplex analysis, during which the subject unconsciously takes into account allconsequences, weighs them and chooses the solution with the highest value or utility. Onthe contrary, GG conceives of intuitions as prompted by the activation of different local anddomain specific mechanisms, a view that assumes massive modularity of the brain. In orderEthic Theory Moral Prac (2010) 13:113–115DOI 10.1007/s10677-009-9172-8C. Clavien (*)Department of Ecology and Evolution, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerlande-mail: christine.clavien@unil.chto sustain his claim, GG shows, with help of evocative examples, that ordinary people oftenmake decisions by using simple unconscious mental processes instead of careful analysisand that these procedures are efficient. GG also presents experiments where the respectiveresults of sophisticated calculation versus simple heuristics are compared. As it turns out, adecision procedure based on simple heuristics often yields better results than a decisionprocedure based on logical calculation. For example, he shows that making use of the“recognition heuristic”—which says “If you recognise one object but not the other, inferthat the recognised object has higher value”—leads in average to better predictionsregarding the outcome of tennis matches than professional experts are able to provide(chap.7). The same holds for the outcome of investments on the stock market! (pp.79–81)GG proposes a reconsideration of the notion of rationality to show that people are, infact, acting rationally while following simple rules of thumb. In order to achieve this, heshows situations in which, even when information is free, more information is detrimental:sometimes there is a beneficial degree of ignorance. The fact that our intuitions areprompted by simple relevant cues in the environment is precisely what allows us to ignoreunnecessary—or relevant but non-crucial—information and focus on the most useful bits ofinformation (p.39). According to GG, when snap decisions based on primitive feelingsyield systematically better results than careful analysis, one can speak of the intelligence ofthe unconscious (p.132) and there is a sense in which one can speak of rational feelings.Here GG claims that he has discovered a “new land of rationality” (p.19). As he writes:“With this book, I invite you on a journey into a largely unknown land of rationality,populated by people just like us, who are partially ignorant, whose time is limited andwhose future is uncertain” (p.4). I fear that GG’s attempt to democratise the concept ofrationality does not help the debate. He goes one step too far in his crusade against neo-classical accounts of decision-making. Logical theories of decision-making are clear on thedistinction between rational choice and optimal choice. A choice can only be rational withrespect to a set of beliefs; under conditions of limited knowledge, a rational choice mightnot be optimal. Therefore, showing the optimality of a behavioural strategy does not help indeciding whether people who use this strategy are rational. To enter into “new lands ofrationality”—which consists more or less in confusing social intelligence with rationality—confuses the debate and shortcuts discussions with the advocates of the neo-classical view.1This said, it seems to me that GG does not need such artifice because his contribution isimportant and innovative even in the context of the old land of rationality.GG has laid down some fundamental building blocks for an innovative interpretation ofhuman decision-making. There are however some ‘hot’ issues that would need some moredevelopment. One interesting topic is to investigate when intuitions are likely to succeed orfail. GG recognises that in stable and predicable environments, gut feelings cannot competewith complex rational calculation; intuitions are mostly efficient in uncertain and changingenvironments. This is valuable but somewhat vague information. GG’s account of decision-making would significantly gain in credibility if it were possible to elaborate morethoroughly on the general domains of efficacy of both mechanisms. A further issue is thefact that dreadful intuitions are fairly common; think of the many people who share theprofound conviction that the death penalty is right. How are we supposed to assess such anintuition after having read that intuitions are usually beneficial for human beings? Ofcourse, GG is aware of the difficulty but curiously, he does not emphasise how careful one1 Note that GG’s account of the chain paradox (pp.100–102) seems particularly unfair. Selten’s formalanalysis can obviously not represent reality because it assumes perfect knowledge. In a world with imperfectknowledge, the logical prediction would be different.114 C. Clavienhas to be with the perils of intuitions. There is a risk here that GG’s overly glowing accountof intuitions might deter readers from simple heuristic approaches to human behaviour.What is now urgently needed is an extensive analysis of when and why it is wise to rely onour intuitions. A linked and particularly tricky issue concerns the practical consequences ofa heuristic approach to decision-making. Indeed, knowing when and how people useparticular heuristics means that one could provide decision-makers, such as politicians,economists or private industry managers, with valuable advice on how to influence others.GG develops some thoughts along this line here and there in his book. However, as soon asthe theory is put into practice, important moral difficulties pop up. Indeed, using knowledgeabout ordinary people’s rules of thumb leads directly to manipulation, which could be forgood, as well as bad, ends. The moral consequences of such practices must be carefullyweighed.Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to Better Decision Making 115

Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to Better Decision Making: Penguin Books, 2008 (1st ed. 2007), £ 8.99 (paperback), ISBN-13: 978-0141015910

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Gerd Gigerenzer, Gut Feelings: Short Cuts to Better Decision Making: Penguin Books, 2008 (1st ed. 2007), £ 8.99 (paperback), ISBN-13: 978-0141015910

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