WAPLES, DOUGLAS

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308 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLYcommunism is not recognized widely enough, but that the fronts are alreadytoo clearly drawn to win new adherents by focusing attention upon the evilof communism. The universalistic strategy serves to overcome isolation, towin active supporters; to this, the impression of novelty, of the discovery ofa new-found friend, is essential. Thus, the success of the Popular Frontstrategy essentially depended on the fact that it expressly reversed the SovietUnion's previous policy. Anti-colonialism, of course, has long been pro-claimed by the Soviet Union, but its strong impact dates from the emergenceof Communist China as a new power entering the Far Eastern arena. Inrecent times, the impact was further strengthened by novel and dramatic per-sonal appearances made by Soviet leaders in the East.Another obvious difficulty in connection with the use of the universalisticargument is that it can be effective only where people are strongly motivatedto fight. Today, however, few people are eager to fight, and emphasis uponmilitancy is not the best way to win friends.But the fundamental reason why the talk about duplicating communistcommunication strategies is futile is still to be stated. It is that it makes littlesense to imitate strategies where the underlying role conceptions and objec-tives arc different. Western communicators cannot imitate their communistcounterparts because they do not and cannot think in terms of control andauthority relationships when they face their audience. For us, both beliefsand audiences exist in their own right, not merely as data in calculations con-cerning the control and manipulation of conduct. To improve the resonanceof our messages, we have to start from our own presuppositions, and thinkmore deeply about audiences as entities existing in their own right. Westerncommunications policy can derive new strength only from this approach.Publicity Versus Diplomacy:Notes on the Reporting of the "Summit" ConferencesB Y DOUGLAS WAPLES*The Big-Three wartime conferences at Casablanca, Moscow, Tehran,Yalta and also the Potsdam conference of August 1945 each produced sub-stantial results by means of compromise. The compromises were made in•Dr. Waples is Professor of Social Science and Chairman of the Committee on Communi-cation of the University of Chicago. The reporting of both Geneva conference* was examined bythe members of two sequential seminars at the University of Chicago. The contributing memberswere Karl Aim, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, Jan Hajda, Leo Janos, Ivan Klecka, Zbigniew B. Kruszew-ski, Joachim Iim, Lester L. Metx, Kathleen Winterbauer Wiseman and Edward R. Wright Thuarticle nimmariT,ri the papers.COMMUNICATION IN THE GLOBAL CONFLICT 309private discussions and reported only in official communiques approved byall three powers.Neither the Summit meeting of July nor the Post-Summit meeting ofOctober 1955 produced any substantial compromise, a fact perhaps partlyexplained by the glare of publicity to which both Geneva conferences wereexposed.The evidence suggests that the success of any high-level international con-ference is inversely proportional to the publicity the conference receives; thatpublicity compels the participants to address themselves to the galleries—tothe "home," "directly-concerned," allied and other world audiences—insteadof to those across the table. To the degree that unrestricted communication ofthe conference proceedings with the world audiences has this effect upon theparticipants, publicity blocks effective compromise in international confer-ences.The communication of the conference proceedings to the world wasexamined with reference to the following publications: (Soviet) Pravda;(Satellite—Polish) Frzekro] (of Cracow), Swiat, Trybuna Wolnosci, andTrybuna Ludu (of Warsaw); (British) Economist, London Observer, Lon-don Times, Manchester Guardian, New Statesman & Nation, Spectator;(French) Le Monde; (U. S.) New Yort^ Times; (Neutral) Neue lurcherZeitung (Swiss) and The Eastern Economist (Delhi, India). Reading ofthese publications was focussed on the following questions:(1) How did the Soviet reports on the July conference and(2) on the October conference differ most conspicuously from Westernand neutral reports ?(3) What audiences were addressed ?JULYThe only business in July was to agree on the issues to be negotiated bythe four foreign ministers in October. This produced no conflicts at the con-ference table and in fact stimulated the correspondents to maximize the rosyoptimism which Bulganin and Khrushchev diffused at the first session.The Soviet reports outdid the Western reports in playing up "the end ofthe cold war" and "the beginning of a new era," but the American, Britishand French reports each gave the prospects the benefit of their serious doubts.Before the July meeting the Western papers stressed the points on which theallies should stand firm and viewed the probable outcomes with reserve.During the conference the Western papers supported the formal proposals oftheir respective delegations and forecast a later East-West deadlock on certainissues like free elections in East Germany. After the conference the Britishpapers held that the West should beware of Soviet intentions, that the per-sonal contacts with Russian leaders might help some, and that Eden's pro-310 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLYposal was the most workable of the four proposals, though Eisenhower's wasthe more dramaticIn contrast, Pravda before the conference made big play of Bulganin'soptimistic and conciliatory speech before leaving for Geneva and stressed therecent peace moves of the Soviet Union: the Helsinki and Leningrad PeaceAssemblies, the World Mothers' Conference at Lausanne, Nehru's visits toSoviet capitals, happy Soviet relations with Tito, the Austrian treaty andothers. Pravda went all out to describe the new day which would dawnat Geneva but played down all practical details as of minor importance.Pravdds manner of reporting the July conference differed mainly fromthat of the Western papers (and likewise from its own previous and laterperformances) in the following respects: it maintained a more hopeful atti-tude before, during and after the conference; reported more fully on agree-ments than on disagreements; reported facts with commendable objectivityand reported no "feature material"; printed each of the four preliminarystatements in full; and reduced to a minimum its previous criticisms of theWestern powers. During the conference Pravda's most vigorous criticismwas its self-righteous scolding of the New Yor\ Times and other Westernpapers which failed to publish each of the four texts in full.OCTOBERPravda's reporting of the October conference clearly implied a change inthe rules since July. Of the statements released by the press attaches of eachdelegation, Pravda published in full only those of the Russian delegation.Statements by other delegations were summarized and quoted selectivelywith qualifying and belittling phrases such as "as if," "seemingly" and thelike. The Soviet proposals and interpretations of the issues were routinelycharacterized by Pravda as "clear," "realistic," "known to all," "acceptableby any reasonable man."Pravda's main tactic was to exploit the analyses made by Western corre-spondents. Items in the Western press which criticized a position taken by aWestern minister were picked up with a regularity which demonstrated closeand routine scrutiny of the Western press. Such items were used to documentthe Soviet argument that the Western ministers were blocking the eagernessof their constituents to accept the peace-making Soviet proposals.Reports of the conference proceedings by the Western papers differedmost conspicuously from those by Pravda in that the Western reports ac-cented the "off-beat" whereas Pravda's reports were "dead-pan." The Westerneditorials were analytical; Pravda's occasional editorials were blunt. Westernreporting (notably in the New Yor\ Times) sought to humanize the con-ference; Pravda did not. The Western papers made more use of pictures andcartoons for both reports and interpretations. In point of subject emphasisCOMMUNICATION IN THE GLOBAL CONFLICT 311the Western reports gave relatively more space to German unification andEast-West exchanges; Pravda gave more to European security and disarma-mentThe supply of aid and comfort which the Western correspondentsrendered to the Soviet editors was inexhaustible. The value of such aid is sug-gested by the following examples. Chancellor Adenauer was quoted in aneditorial to the effect that the U. S. delegation was expected to take thetoughest line with the Russians but had in fact taken the tamest line, andpresumably because of the 1956 presidential elections. "Some Republicanstrategists counted on the popular appeal of the Geneva spirit to offsetagrarian disenchantment with the administration's farm policy, particularlyin the middle western states."The Manchester Guardian of November 17 termed the conference "barrenand disappointing," although the blame was not wholly Mr. Molotov's. Itreferred to the "farcical" Western proposal which required Communisttroops to retreat to the Polish frontiers while the NATO forces stood pat. Mr.Molotov declined to specify the degree of international inspection his govern-ment would accept, and the Western ministers never answered his "validobjections to their inspection plans."AUDIENCES ADDRESSEDEach of the four wartime conferences of the Big Three had only oneaudience, namely the two other members of the conference. Security regula-tions were tight But the wide-open publicity afforded both Geneva confer-ences of 1955 enabled any speaker to address any audience he could reach.The audiences addressed by both Russian and Western spokesmen were es-sentially four: The "home" audience, the German audience, the allied audi-ence (in the Soviet camp this means the satellites), and "neutral" audienceslike India.(1) By the Soviet Union. The covert intentions of the Russian delegationwere of course never stated by any Soviet official and arc best inferred fromthe statements made and from their several contradictions. The following"covert Russian intentions" may perhaps explain why the Russian spokesmenat Geneva told the power audiences what they were told.In general, the Russian covert intentions in both conferences may havebeen to wreck NATO and reduce Western forces in Europe; to facilitateSoviet infiltration of the Middle East; to conceal Soviet intransigence onGerman unification and on fruitful negotiation; and to persuade the neutralsto accept the Soviet account for the failure of the Geneva conferences toproduce results—which is that the Western powers have not yet found "theright approach" to the Soviets' compliance with Western aims.Molotov's messages to the home audience via Pravda included:312 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY"The Soviet delegation sought to perafade the representatives of the three Westernpowers to follow the directives of the heads of government with regard to Europeansecurity. They in no way conformed to the decisions of the heads of government""We stand for the restoration of German unity on the basis of free all-Germanelections.""The West refuses to examine measures for disarmament"T h e Soviet delegation submitted a number of proposal* for the development ofcontacts in the fields of culture, science, press, radio, art, sports, tourism, and so forth.The Soviet delegation, however, found no support from the United States, France orGreat Britain."To the West German audience (and also less directly to the neutrals)Pravda carried messages like the following:(?Dissolution of the Military Blocs is a Prerequisite to Lotting Peace") October 21.T h e Western nations seek normal international relations by the policy of strength.They say that the existence of two German states and the division of Germany explainthe unstable situation in Europe. This is false. The main reason for European tensionis the division of Europe itself between two conflicting groups of states. The division ofGermany .was in fact born of the policy of strength. . . . History shows that the out-break of both world wars was preceded by similar military groupings of Europeanstates."("Good Will Must be MututW) The U. S. is presented as leading ananti-neutralist crusade, developing military blocs and refusing to disarm.October 25: "It is now clear that certain U. S. circles arc unwilling to meetthe disarmament problem. Declarations for peace which are not supported byactions are suspect."The USSR is presented by Prat/da as the only state which seeks to easeinternational tensions in a practical way.October 26: "Americans evade the basic question of disarmament They wouldconfine the discussion to proposals for the exchange of military information and aerialphotography of the U. S. and the USSR, thus diverting attention from the pressing taskof ending the arms drive."To the Soviet allies including the satellites and also by indirection to neu-trals like India, the following are typical messages:(^'Security it Indivisible") October 12: "Security is indivisible both in Europe and inAsia. NATO denies die interests of European security, just as SEATO denies the in-terests of Asian security."October 13: "The intention of Iran to join the Turkish-Iraqi-Pakistani alliance is abreach of the Geneva spirit and a renewal of the Western aggressive policy. The attemptto draw Iran into a military bloc shows once more the duplicity of some powers whichin words come out for the preservation of the spirit of Geneva, but in deeds are formingaggressive military blocs of increasing size. The actions of these powers imply the con-tinuation of their cold-war policies toward the aggravation of international tensions."(2) By the Satellite (Polish) Press. The Polish press as sampled by thefour papers named above stressed the positions taken by Pravda, of course,but with overtones which deserve attention.COMMUNICATION IN THE GLOBAL CONFLICT 313In general, the comments on the Geneva conferences by the Polish pressmade more emphatic appeals than were made by Pravda to the victims ofNazi aggression. These victims were urged to support the Soviet's opposi-tion to the rearming of West Germany in order to prevent further aggression.More specifically, the Polish press gave full play to the importance of the EastGerman state as a bulwark against West German reclamation of the Oder-Neissc territories and their seven million Polish inhabitants. The Westernstand was reported as an unconditional demand for the inclusion of reunifiedGermany in NATO.The Manchester Guardian's characterization of the Western proposal forGerman reunification as a "gamesman's move" was stated as "szulerska gra"(cheating game) instead of "posuniecic gracza," the proper translation."So long as the East German state exists, no Western-allied military force will bestationed on die Oder-Neisse frontier." (Prxe^roj)"The brothers Alsop say in die Herald Tribune that die Western ministers arehypocritical in dieir approach to die East-West problems." (Swiat)"The Western proposals would demilitarize half of Poland and a large part ofCzechoslovakia and hence leave Poland virtually defenseless." {Swiat)"Can Germany's neighbors—the Poles, die Czechs, the French—be convinced thatGerman rearmament will increase dieir security?" {Trybuna Ludu)(3) By the Western Powers. The Soviet Union profited from the "dis-cipline" of its press to the disadvantage of the Western powers. Molotov'sability to work selectively on particular power audiences through his captivepress is perhaps a sufficient reason for his insisting on an open conferencedespite the British preference for a closed conference. Also the Russians hadlarge benefits from the undisciplined Western press whose skilled analystssupplied Pravda with an abundance of anti-Western arguments well-statedin the Western idiom. Combat says "Germany can be united only by aban-doning the Paris agreements and setting up a collective security system" andstresses that a policy built on "positions of strength" and the Paris agreementsis a "dead policy."Several Western papers raised the question whether the Western alliesreally did want to reunite Germany since they were unwilling to make anyimportant concessions to that end. It was also noted that the Western pro-posals were not even good propaganda toward West Germany since theleaders in Bonn regarded the proposals as non-negotiable from the start.Regarding the French position, it was pointed out that Pinay's statement—"the reunification of Germany is now in the national interest of France"—was made with tongue in cheek and in the virtual certainty that Molotovwould reject the Western proposal.The Western official spokesmen made a united stand and avoided allSoviet traps except the propaganda trap. The Western messages to Germany314 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLYand to the neutrals and other power audiences were too much of a pattern tobe clearly distinguished. The most genuine humanitarian ring was probablythe speech by Macmillan on 17 November which closed with the followingparagraphs:" Teacdoving," 'democratic,' freedom' are words which have a clear and inspiringmeaning to us, with deep undertones. They appear to have a wholly different significanceto the Soviet government We stand looking at each other across the great divide."I cannot help thinking that last summer's Geneva idyll was not a sham or vagueaffair. There was genuine longing on both sides of die iron curtain to break down thewretched thing. The terrible fact is that the Soviet Union fears our friendship morethan our enmity. Yet this isolation cannot last forever."SUMMARYIn summary the reports on the conference indicated that the open confer-ence virtually prevented genuine diplomacy and necessitated psychologicalwarfare. The free access of the world press to both conferences tended:(1) To favor a "disciplined" or captive press, e.g., Pravda, as against anyfree press;(2) To exaggerate the basic differences between the two parties;(3) To enable a controlled press to exploit such differences by relaying ap-propriate paraphrases of its spokesmen's remarks to other power audiencesthan those to which the remarks were primarily directed;(4) To give the free press of the Western powers the scope to supply theopposition press (e.g. Pravda) with arguments for the Soviet positions whicharc the more convincing to Westell audiences because they are pre-stated inWestern idioms—a journalistic task beyond the Pravda editors; and(5) To force each speaker at the October conference to formulate hisremarks with reference to the outside audiences.That on balance the Soviet Union won this psychological engagement isfairly indicated by the increased cordiality to Russian moves in critical areaslike the Middle East and India since the conference ended on 17 November.American and Soviet Themes and Values:A Content Analysis of Pictures in Popular MagazinesBy IVOR WAYNE*The present study seeks to compare the values expressed in the content oftwo major family magazines of the "picture weekly" class—one in Russia, theother in the United States. Its aim is not, of course, to study communication* Mr. Wayne ii a Research Associate at the Bureau of Social Science Research, The AmericanUniversity, Washington, D. C

Publicity Versus Diplomacy: Notes on the Reporting of the "Summit” Conferences

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