Risk sensitivity plays an important role in the study of finance and
economics as risk-neutral models cannot capture and justify all economic
behaviors observed in reality. Risk-sensitive mean field game theory was
developed recently for systems where there exists a large number of
indistinguishable, asymptotically negligible and heterogeneous risk-sensitive
players, who are coupled via the empirical distribution of state across
population. In this work, we extend the theory of Linear Quadratic Gaussian
risk-sensitive mean-field games to the setup where there exists one major agent
as well as a large number of minor agents. The major agent has a significant
impact on each minor agent and its impact does not collapse with the increase
in the number of minor agents. Each agent is subject to linear dynamics with an
exponential-of-integral quadratic cost functional. Moreover, all agents
interact via the average state of minor agents (so-called empirical mean field)
and the major agent's state. We develop a variational analysis approach to
derive the best response strategies of agents in the limiting case where the
number of agents goes to infinity. We establish that the set of obtained
best-response strategies yields a Nash equilibrium in the limiting case and an
ε-Nash equilibrium in the finite player case. We conclude the paper
with an illustrative example