Schimmelfennig, Frank

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rights have come to be integrated in particular PTAs.Within each stage, the account is rich, sophisticated, andhighly readable. The book strikes a good balance: It isstrongly analytical while simultaneously readable andempirically rich. Along the way, we are introduced to awide variety of actors and structures—domestic interestgroups, elected politicians, national constitutions, legisla-tive processes, trade negotiators, and repressive govern-ments. Hafner-Burton succeeds both inmaking complexityparsimonious and in telling a compelling story.One of the great strengths of the book is breadth of theargument and, hence, of its empirical coverage. Inter-national relations has a vogue for monocausality and forframing puzzles in dependent variable–independent vari-able terms, which often obscure causal richness. This bookinstead embraces politics and unpacks causal process in alltheir complexity. It offers an object lesson for the ways inwhich scholars and graduate students can think about com-plex puzzles that transcend domestic and internationalpolitics. However, in attempting to cover such a range—ofquestions, stages of causal process, time periods and states—the inevitable trade-off is that at times the evidence basecan seem a little thin, and that occasionally important andcontestable empirical claims are reduced to assertions. Forexample, in unpacking “preferences,” a range of “crises”—such as Yugoslavia and Haiti in the immediate post–ColdWar aftermath—are cited as having causal importance(p. 76), but only a narrative claim that they existed in thebackground is used to substantiate causal impact. Whilethe macro-causal logic of the book is strong, its analysis ofmicro-level processes is therefore more cursory, often rest-ing on unsubstantiated claims about motives, interests,and background conditions, in which we are required totake Hafner-Burton’s word for it.This, in turn, leaves the reader potentially skeptical aboutsome of the broader claims. How much are the empiricsbeing shoe-horned into the analytical framework? In par-ticular, Hafner-Burton is implicitly dismissive of the roleof ideas and norms in her causal story. She acknowledgesthat the force of human rights norms and hence ideasrepresent an important alternative explanation. Yet, ratherthan engage in an open debate with those alternative frame-works, her approach is to co-opt them to her inherentlyrationalist explanation: “[T]o be sure, the moral discourseon human rights has evolved tremendously . . . yet it isclear that moral norms did not find a clear path to regu-lation” (p. 83). While rationalist scholars will be intu-itively sympathetic to the focus on interests and institutions,those with more constructivist proclivities will be left won-dering whether the role of ideas and norms are underplayed.This is a book that matters for both policy and theory;it has potentially huge implications for the practice ofhuman rights and for the study of politics and inter-national relations. Policymakers and practitioners will findreally valuable insights that enable them to better under-stand the processes by which human rights become partof trade agreements. In unpacking causal process, Hafner-Burton offers insights into the levers and mechanisms forreal-world change. At the level of theory, it gives us newways to methodologically and analytically bridge thedomestic–international divide. It also tells us somethingof potentially much wider significance about how it isthat issue linkages emerge and issue areas become inter-twined or nested within the institutional structures of otherseemingly unrelated issue areas.Yet in both cases, the book is strangely understated inthe claims it makes about its wider implications. Its policyconclusions are ambivalent, telling us that “policymakers. . . are primarily motivated by their own self-preservationto put human rights standards into trade agreements, butthese regulations can indeed make a difference in coun-tries guilty of abusing human rights” (p. 164); yet that thehuman rights clauses work when there are “enough mean-ingful incentives and commitment instruments” but thatthey are “not the ideal form of human rights governance.”While these conclusions are entirely consistent logically,they present an incomplete picture of the way forward inpolicy terms. What are the insights for human rights pro-motion through trade agreements? Should they be pur-sued or not, and, if so, how? Similarly, at the level oftheoretical implications, the book is understated, and theconclusion shies away from engaging in bigger debateswith international relations theory or from deriving widerconceptual implications.We are left on the final page withthe idea that politics has “changed the face of economicstatecraft” (p. 174) in unanticipated ways that have impli-cations for human rights and the international politicaleconomy, but we are left wondering about implicationsthat the book has for our conceptual understanding of theworld.Overall, this is a highly accessible and original bookthat deserves to be widely read and cited, both for thecompelling and important story it tells as for its poten-tially wider contribution to political science and inter-national relations. Hafner-Burton has an immense talentfor framing and analytically unpacking complex empiricalpuzzles. In Forced to Be Good, she uses it to great effect tohighlight the changing nature of the politics of both tradeand human rights.Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU atFifty. By Giandomenico Majone. New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth, $38.99 paper.doi:10.1017/S1537592711003823— Frank Schimmelfennig, ETH ZurichIn its subtitle, Giandomenico Majone’s book refers to thefiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in 2007. Butthe book is not a birthday present—at least not a pleasantone. The title is reminiscent of Europe’s Would-Be Polity by| |December 2011 | Vol. 9/No. 4 975https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711003823Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available atLeon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). Iftheir book can be seen as the refinement and adaptationof neofunctionalist integration theory to the adolescentproblems of the European Community, Majone’s is thepitiless diagnosis of a midlife crisis. He dismisses both theEuropean Union’s “crypto-federalist” method of integra-tion and much of the scholarship that has grown aroundit. Contrary to what the title suggests, the book deals onlyto a very minor extent with the EU as a foreign policyactor. It is a polemic essay. Do not expect well-balancedand richly referenced arguments or data-based theory test-ing. But Majone draws on much of his earlier work (aboveall, Dilemmas of European Integration, 2005) and sharpensthe conclusions drawn there.The author deciphers the “operational code” of Euro-pean integration, depicts its unintended (and undesirable)consequences, describes the impasse in which the EU findsitself, and discusses solutions. According toMajone, Euro-pean integration has followed a fewmajor operational prin-ciples. As a response to the failure of mass-based Europeanfederalism in the early post–World War II era, Europeanelites have pursued what he calls a crypto-federalist strat-egy. They have prioritized institutional integration over allcompeting values, including democracy and economic effi-ciency. Following the “bicycle theory of integration,” whichassumes that integration cannot pause without collapsing,they have pursued continuous movement regardless of ulti-mate ends. Finally, they have used the “strategy of the faitaccompli” or “integration by stealth”; that is, they haveprepared and established further steps of integration in away that prevented open debate, accountability, and mod-ifications. Majone attributes a pivotal role in this strategyto the “Community method,” which accords the unelectedEuropean Commission a formal monopoly of agendasetting.This elitist, technocratic, andunaccountable style of deci-sion making focused on integration for its own sake pro-duces inefficient policies that are neither abandoned noradequately reformed (such as the common agricultural andfisheries policies), aswell as far-reaching integrationprojects(such asmonetary union andEastern enlargement) that notonly lack democratic support but also proper attention torisks and resources. Evenpostwar peace and economic pros-perity in Europe only coincidedwith European integrationbut were not caused by it.Yet the biggest successes of the crypto-federaliststrategy—the introduction of the euro and big bangenlargement—exposed its limits at the same time. Forone, they affected the people more directly than earlierintegration projects, politicized European integration,mobilized Euro-skepticism, and triggered negativereferendums against treaty revisions in a variety of coun-tries. In addition, enlargement increased the economicand social heterogeneity of the EU, thereby underminingthe one big project thatMajone supports: the single market.What is to be done about the conundrum in which theEU finds itself ? Majone rejects all solutions that wouldamount to replicating the nation-state model at the regionallevel. Not only does the EU lack the normative and finan-cial resources to sustain a Europe-wide democratic welfarestate; such a solution would also not tackle the core prob-lem, which does not consist in a neoliberal EU (Majonedisputes this) or in its democratic deficit but in the pur-suit of ever deeper and wider integration in the face ofeconomic and social heterogeneity. The Communitymethodmay have been suitable for a small group of homo-geneous and integration-friendly countries but not in thecurrent environment.In its stead, Majone advocates differentiated integra-tion. Rather than aiming at the Europe-wide and unifiedcentralization of all policy sectors, the EU would be a clubof clubs with different levels of centralization and mem-bership.This would allow for a bottom-up process in whicheach country could choose the levels and field of integra-tion that its citizens desire. Each club would bring togethercountries with homogeneous preferences, and competi-tion between clubs would improve the overall results ofintegration.This is a timely book. Even though it came out a bittoo late for the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties ofRome, it was published before the euro zone debt crisisthat moved many of the issues discussed by Majone intothe spotlight. It is also a book that shows a rare combi-nation of historical depth, broad knowledge of EU poli-cies and institutions, familiarity with specific issues andcases, and clear analytical focus. Given the polemical natureof the book, the author can be forgiven for paintingEuropean integration with too-stark contrasts and colors.The Commission’s role as the villain of crypto-federalismis exaggerated. It has been the greatest institutional loserof the series of treaty reforms in the past 20 years, andMajone’s prime examples of the EU’s hubris—monetaryunion and enlargement—have mainly been the productof intergovernmental negotiations. The “strategy of thefait accompli” does injustice to the intense debate andconflicts about enlargement and monetary union, notonly among the member states but also in the mass media.There is a tendency in the book to attribute everythingthat went wrong in Europe to the EU while denying itany credit for what went well. Many claims involve diffi-cult counterfactuals and would have benefited from com-paring the EU to other international organizations ornation-states. Inefficient policies, learning failures, theunderestimation of risks, and the overstretching of resourcesare certainly not a monopoly of the EU. Finally, it is mis-leading to include the bulk of EU research in the greatcrypto-federalist conspiracy. The main features of the EU’s“operational code” and policymaking, the democratic def-icits, and the backlash against elitist integration projectshave long been uncovered and debated.| |Book Reviews | International Relations976 Perspectives on Politicshttps:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711003823Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available atThese critical points concern style more than sub-stance. Majone argues convincingly, first, that the tradi-tional method of integration is confronted with severeproblems of mass support, resources, and capacity, that is,the major ingredients of a crisis of system integration;and, second, that the great leap forward to the pan-European democratic welfare state is neither viable norrealistic. His plea for differentiated integration is not onlytheoretically attractive but also supported by reality. Euro-pean integration has become ever more differentiated, pre-cisely as a result of the flagship projects of the 1990s:monetary union and enlargement.Whether member states,old or new, join the euro zone has become de facto amatter of (electoral) choice. It seems that the very excessesof crypto-federalism Majone criticizes help bring aboutthe kind of European integration he favors.More discussion is needed on the trade-offs involved indifferentiated integration. Majone describes the “oldEurope” and “new Europe” coalitions that formed on theoccasion of the war against Iraq in 2003.These were exactlythe competing clubs based on homogeneous sets of pref-erences that match his general vision of differentiatedintegration—and a guarantee for keeping the EU in theposition of a would-be world power for the next 50 years.A Stability-Seeking Power: U.S. Foreign Policy andSecessionist Conflicts. By Jonathan Paquin. Montreal & Kingston:McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010. 230p. $85.00 cloth, $27.95paper.doi:10.1017/S1537592711003835— Jason Sorens, University at Buffalo, The State University of New YorkIn his book, Jonathan Paquin aims to explain US govern-ment decisions to recognize and not to recognize seces-sionist states. He justifies a focus on recognition specificallyrather than “support” more generally on the grounds that,for the globe’s sole remaining superpower, recognizing astate entails ongoing diplomatic ties and requires somedegree of commitment to helping the new state maintainits independence against potential enemies. Using theframework of “defensive positionalist realism,” Paquinargues that the US government takes a pessimistic view ofchanges in the international environment and seeks tominimize rather than to exploit “stability gaps” in the statesystem (pp. 28–29). Consequently, the US governmenthas maintained a generally antisecessionist stance on rec-ognition. Nevertheless, when circumstances are such thatrecognizing the seceding state is more likely to createregional stability than withholding recognition, the USdecides to recognize the new state.The sketch of the argument is as follows: If a centralgovernment successfully maintains stability, whetherthrough repression or liberality, or makes a good-faitheffort to restore stability by negotiating with secession-ists, the US government opposes secession. If the preced-ing conditions do not hold, and the seceding statedemonstrates its ability to maintain external and internalstability, then the US government recognizes the seced-ing state; otherwise, it does not (p. 45). Alternative hypoth-eses considered at length are that ethnic lobby strengthdetermines US recognition policy and that US businessinterests guide State Department decision making. (Paquinmore summarily rejects several other hypotheses for whichthere is readily available contrary evidence: weakeningthreatening powers, supporting secessionists in weakerstates, maintaining a consistent antisecession norm, andsupporting the side with whom there is a greater “civili-zational tie” [p. 27].)The author tests the argument by means of controlledcase comparisons on separatist movements in the formerYugoslavia and in the Horn of Africa (Eritrea, Somali-land). Fluctuations in the relative abilities of central statesand secessionist rebels to guarantee stability provide within-case variance that he is able to exploit. Additionally, heprovides some “process tracing” evidence from declassi-fied diplomatic cables and analyses and from interviewswith policymakers to support the argument.The evidence largely supports the argument. Paquinpersuasively shows that the United States withheld recog-nition from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia until April1992 for fear that premature recognition would encour-age interethnic violence and concomitant, destabilizingrefugee flows in the latter two countries. At the sametime, the United States chose to recognize Bosnia earlierthan did the European Union precisely to discourage aSerbian invasion. On the other hand, the US govern-ment waited to accord Macedonia full recognition forfear that it would provoke tension or even conflict withGreece. Once the United States did recognize Macedonia(as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, orFYROM) in 1994, the powerful Greek-American lobbywas unable to persuade the US government to reverse itsdecision. In 2004, the Bush administration recognizedthe state under the name Republic of Macedonia againststrenuous objections from the government of Greece, inorder to reward the new government for following throughon a controversial decentralization plan intended to set-tle an Albanian insurgency.The case that does not fit the argument well is Somali-land. By 2001, Somaliland had established a stable, dem-ocratic, federal government at peace with its neighbors, acomparative bright spot in a war-ravaged, anarchic coun-try. Still, the United States withheld recognition, and theevidence shows little internal debate at the State Depart-ment on the matter. Paquin appeals to a “Somalia aver-sion” dating to 1993’s Battle of Mogadishu as the mainreason for the US government’s lack of interest (pp. 164–65). However, this explanation strikes me as ad hoc, andan alternative explanation—appeasing the antisecessionistAfrican Union (formerly OAU, Organization of African| |December 2011 | Vol. 9/No. 4 977https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592711003823Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:54:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at

Book Review: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. By MajoneGiandomenico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth, $38.99 paper

Book Review: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. By MajoneGiandomenico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth,$ 38.99 paper

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Book Review: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. By MajoneGiandomenico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 266p. 109.00cloth,109.00 cloth, 109.00cloth,38.99 paper

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Book Review: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty: Europe as the Would-Be World Power: The EU at Fifty. By MajoneGiandomenico. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 266p. $109.00 cloth,$ 38.99 paper