The article of record as published may be found at https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.140022

Wirtz, James J.

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Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School

Calhoun: The NPS Institutional ArchiveDSpace RepositoryFaculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications2018Introduction, David Shermans WilliamFriedman and Pearl Harbor: A SymposiumWirtz, James J.Routledge, Taylor & Francis GroupIntroduction, David Shermans William Friedman and Pearl Harbor: A Symposiumhttps://hdl.handle.net/10945/71672This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, UnitedStates Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in theUnited States.Downloaded from NPS Archive: CalhounINTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY, 2018VOL. 33, NO. 3, 307!308https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1400223DAVID SHERMAN’S ‘WILLIAM FRIEDMAN AND PEARL HARBOR’: A SYMPOSIUMIntroductionJames J.!WirtzWhen I "rst encountered David Sherman’s article describing William F. Friedman’s initial reaction to and slightly belated explanation of the American intelligence failure surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, I saw an opportunity for a bit of intelligence archeology, so to speak. Here were the reminisces and considered assessment of a man who not only played a leading role in breaking the Japanese diplomatic (‘Purple’) code, but who also had a ringside seat when it came to the workings of the US Secret Intelligence Service in the years leading up to World War II.1 While there is no ‘smoking gun’ in Sherman’s manuscript, it does chronicle the observations of an informed observer who lacked the bene"t and context provided by today’s voluminous literature on Pearl Harbor and intelligence analysis. Friedman’s re#ections might be considered as a sort of mile marker, allowing us to estimate the progress made by both the Intelligence Community and intelligence studies in understanding why governments su$er intelligence failure and fall victim to surprise attack.Two elements in Sherman’s narrative were immediately noteworthy. The "rst is his depiction of how Purple decrypts were handled inside the American government. Instead of being subjected to any sort of analysis, messages were quickly whisked away to the White House, making Franklin Delano Roosevelt the de facto, intelligence, warning and operations o%cer for the United States. Friedman and his col-leagues clearly saw war as a distinct possibility as they worked to decrypt and translate intercepted messages in late 1941, but it also is clear that there was no ready mechanism to turn that insight into ‘actionable’ intelligence that could immediately bene"t commanders in the "eld. There was no way to couple situational awareness about the status of US forces in the Paci"c with indications that political relations between the United States and Japan were rapidly deteriorating. Circulation of information derived from Purple was so limited, that it had virtually no constructive impact on the alert status of US forces. Nevertheless, secrecy and compartmentalization might have just been symptomatic of the non-existent intelligence-policy-military nexus in the United States in 1941, which Friedman described as a counterproductive intelligence culture.The second element is Friedman’s lingering regret about not providing Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii with Purple decrypts, o$ering us a series of counterfactuals that have reverberated over the years. On the one hand, warning might have led to constructive action. The psychological principle of availability, to say nothing of common sense, might have activated Hawaii’s defenses against air attack following news that H-hour for some nefarious Japanese initiative was going to unfold the morning of 7 December, about the time the sun was coming up over Pearl Harbor. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commander of the US Paci"c Fleet, for instance, knew that his predecessor, Admiral James O. Richardson, was removed from command for protesting too vigorously that deploying the Fleet to Pearl Harbor would leave it vulnerable, and that Kimmel recognized this vulnerability. On the other hand, in the wake of deteriorating Japanese-American relations, defenders on Hawaii took steps against sabotage, which proved to be counterproductive. Moreover, as Sherman notes, a timely sortie of the US Paci"c Fleet might have led to its permanent loss at sea, along with destruction of the valuable © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis GroupCONTACT James J. Wirtz   JWirtz@nps.edu308  INTRODUCTIONlogistical infrastructure and POL storage at Pearl Harbor. In the end, we are left with the history that has transpired, which includes Friedman’s observation that providing Purple to commanders in Hawaii was one act that might have made a di$erence.What follows is David Sherman’s article that provides a #avor of the state of a$airs inside US intelli-gence circles in the period surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack and Friedman’s reaction to that history. Several brief essays, written by leading scholars in the "eld of intelligence studies, then o$er commen-tary on the archeological "nd chronicled by David Sherman.Note1.  For a biographical sketch and a description of William F. Friedman’s achievements in the "eld of cryptology see David Sherman, “The National Security Agency and the William F. Friedman Collection,” 195.BibliographySherman, David. “The National Security Agency and the William F. Friedman Collection.” Cryptologia 41, no. 3 (2017): 195–238.

Introduction, David Sherman’s ‘William Friedman and Pearl Harbor’: A Symposium

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Introduction, David Sherman’s ‘William Friedman and Pearl Harbor’: A Symposium

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