Boot, A.

Krahnen, J.

Senbet, L.

Spatt, C.

English

In this statement, we assess the role and power of proxy advisors and asset managers in corporate governance, an industry that is characterized by a limited number of voting advisory firms (ISS and Glass-Lewis), accompanied by the growing dominance of index investing in an industry with a few large asset managers, such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street. We discuss the business model of proxy advisory firms and contrast its objectives with those of asset managers in the context of the informational screening/filtering role and voting analysis. This discussion concludes with a set of policy recommendations, such as: (a) requiring disclosure of advisory firms’ other businesses, (b) increasing the transparency of the business model of proxy advisory firms, particularly around the rationale for their general guidelines for voting recommendations, (c) ensuring that the regulatory burden on proxy advisory firms does not discourage entry, and (d) increasing the regulatory oversight of the voting process with a view to incorporating investor preferences in proxy voting

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

The Controversy over Proxy Voting:The Role of Asset Managers and Proxy Advisors

https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/102320010/Boot_et_al._2022_Controversy_over_Proxy_Advising_FER_20221128.pdf

The Controversy over Proxy Voting:The Role of Asset Managers and Proxy Advisors

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications