de Haan, T.

English

Communication plays a central role in many economic decisions. The extent to which information can be meaningfully communicated depends on the interests of the parties involved. In this thesis, several instances where ´strategic communication´ plays an important role are investigated, both theoretically and experimentally. By letting participants play communication games with monetary incentives, insight is gained in the strategic reasoning of participants. The thesis considers the case in which the signaling channel is noisy, the case in which a sender can convey the information in both costless and costly messages, but prefers to come across as credible, and a job market situation where due to imperfect communication of a worker´s productivity, statistical discrimination between different groups of workers may emerge

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UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl)UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)Strategic communication: theory and experimentde Haan, T.Publication date2012Link to publicationCitation for published version (APA):de Haan, T. (2012). Strategic communication: theory and experiment. [Thesis, fully internal,Universiteit van Amsterdam].General rightsIt is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s)and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an opencontent license (like Creative Commons).Disclaimer/Complaints regulationsIf you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, pleaselet the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the materialinaccessible and/or remove it from the website. 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Strategic communication: theory and experiment

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Strategic communication: theory and experiment

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