Goeree, J.K.

Offerman, T.

Sloof, R.

English

Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for pre-emptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an environment where both demand reduction and preemptive bidding are supported as equilibrium phenomena of the ascending auction. In a series of experiments, we compare its performance to that of the discriminatory auction. Strategic demand reduction is quite prevalent in the ascending auction even when entry imposes a (large) negative externality on incumbents. As a result, the ascending auction performs worse than the discriminatory auction both in terms of revenue and e¢ ciency, while en- trants’chances are similar across the two formats.JEL classification: D44, D45, C91Keywords: Multi-license auctions, demand reduction, external effects, preemptio

International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications

Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions

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Demand reduction and preemptive bidding in multi-unit license auctions

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International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion online publications