Det er i denne artikel hensigten, gennem en historisk og teoretisk diskussion af begreberne om ideologi, solidaritet og statsterror (hos henholdsvis de franske "ideologer", Durkheim og Robespierre), at nå frem til en bestemmelse af forholdet mellem moralitet og samfundsmæssighed. Dette forhold fremstilles dermed i sammenhæng med konstitutionen af sociologien hos Durkheim, - idet jeg forfølger tesen om, at "adfærdsvidenskaberne" kan ses som en videnskabeliggørelse af den etiske problematik. Forholdet mellem moralitet og samfundsmæssighed fremstilles desuden i sammenhæng med spørgsmålet om den politiske konstitution af solidariteten i samfundet. Teoretisk søger jeg at vise, at de forskellige enkeltvidenskaber, der tematiserer handlingslivet (sociologi/psykologi/lingvistik), er henvist til at tænke den etiske problematik gennem en fordobling af subjekt-formen i individual-subjekt og kollektiv-subjekt, og til at tænke de almene betingelser for samfundsmæssighed som henholdsvis "indre"handlingskompetencer i individerne og ''ydre" institutioner i samfundet. Der kan argumenteres for, at disse betingelser for samfundsmæssighed egentlig er af moralsk art, og at den praktiske realisering af disse betingelser derfor ikke bør sættes som et apriorisk udgangspunkt for erkendelsen af vores sociale liv.Through a historical and theoretical discussion of the durkheimian concept of "solidarity" and the concepts of "ideology" and "terror" (as they were developed during the French Revolution), it is attempted to develop a conceptualization of the relationshipbetween morality and "social cohesion" (in the sense of: cohesion of the society). This relationship is thus treated in connection with the constitution of sociology, as I am following the thesis, that the "sciences of social behaviour" can be seen as a "scientification"of the problems of morality. Furthermore this relationship between morality and "social cohesion" is treated in connection with the question of the political foundation of solidarity in society. Theoretically I try to show, that the various scientific disciplines, whose subject is the social activity of man, are forced to conceive the problems of morality through a "doubling" of the concept of the subject, that is, they have to recognize subjectivity in the form of an individual subject and in the form of a collective subject. Secondly I try to show, that they are also forced to conceive the universal conditions of "social cohesion", on one side, as "inner" competences of action and, on the other side, as "outer" institutions of regulation and codification. One can put forward, that these conditions of "social cohesion" are in fact moral conditions, and that the practical realization of these conditions in social agency, - that is when we actually act as "responsible" social agents and as "normal" language-users, therefore should not be seen as an apriorical condition of the scientific understanding of social life
