Bjerring, Andreas

Hasselby, Edyta Wioleta Niminska

Hørringsen, Isabella Hartmann

Lund, Linnea Margareta Meldgaard

This paper attempts to examine and critically discuss Sarah Conly’s arguments for coercive paternalism as presented in her book ‘Against Autonomy’. Conly’s rationale behind her idea and argument for more radical and coercive paternalism is the notion that people in general are bad decision-makers and this creates a barrier for people to achieve their ultimate goals in life. Although this notion might be true, we argue that coercive paternalism to this degree is a problematic limitation of the autonomy of individuals as well as an unnecessary intrusion. Although we agree that coercive paternalism might be effective in severe cases of problematic behavior, we disagree that coercive paternalism should work as the means for individuals to reach the ultimate goals. We find that coercive paternalism induces several kinds of ethical and practical issues related to slippery slope totalitarianism, loss of individuality, and individual quality of life and well-being.Furthermore, we are of the opinion that there is a lack of evidence in terms of how coercive paternalism should work as an effective means for people to make smarter and healthier decisions. Instead, we are of the opinion that coercive paternalism only forbids people from doing certain actions, but it doesn't allow them to make a wrong one and reflect on it afterwards. We argue that life is about making good and bad decisions and learning from the mistakes we make.Therefore, we suggest that contractualism based on consent and behavioral psychology might be a better alternative than making more prohibitions. A study in behavioral psychology suggests that habits are effectively changed when the person in question, first of all, consents to change a habit, and secondly when it’s done in compliance with the person in question’s own motivation and values. In our opinion, this suggestion is rather attractive since it respects both the autonomy and values of individuals.This paper attempts to examine and critically discuss Sarah Conly’s arguments for coercive paternalism as presented in her book ‘Against Autonomy’. Conly’s rationale behind her idea and argument for more radical and coercive paternalism is the notion that people in general are bad decision-makers and this creates a barrier for people to achieve their ultimate goals in life. Although this notion might be true, we argue that coercive paternalism to this degree is a problematic limitation of the autonomy of individuals as well as an unnecessary intrusion. Although we agree that coercive paternalism might be effective in severe cases of problematic behavior, we disagree that coercive paternalism should work as the means for individuals to reach the ultimate goals. We find that coercive paternalism induces several kinds of ethical and practical issues related to slippery slope totalitarianism, loss of individuality, and individual quality of life and well-being.Furthermore, we are of the opinion that there is a lack of evidence in terms of how coercive paternalism should work as an effective means for people to make smarter and healthier decisions. Instead, we are of the opinion that coercive paternalism only forbids people from doing certain actions, but it doesn't allow them to make a wrong one and reflect on it afterwards. We argue that life is about making good and bad decisions and learning from the mistakes we make.Therefore, we suggest that contractualism based on consent and behavioral psychology might be a better alternative than making more prohibitions. A study in behavioral psychology suggests that habits are effectively changed when the person in question, first of all, consents to change a habit, and secondly when it’s done in compliance with the person in question’s own motivation and values. In our opinion, this suggestion is rather attractive since it respects both the autonomy and values of individuals

Ethics and autonomy: A critical discussion of "Against Autonomy" by Sarah Conly

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

Roskilde Universitet