Iisager, Bjørn Arnel

Kjeldsen, Emil Frøstrup

Lauridsen, Kathrine Yen

Olin, Katrine Dyrstrøm

In this paper we examine the study of behaviour, specifically nudging theory, in attempt to clarify what view of the subject is represented by this theory, as a part of the greater psychological field of science. We are interested in pinpointing exactly how the subject is understood within nudging theory, as well as the scientific tradition from which it draws much of its behavioural and scientific theory. To do this we take an atypical eclectic approach as laid forth by Simo Koeppe, in order to examine nudging from a pluralistic point of view, without taking a specific theoretical or scientific position ourselves. Firstly, we give an account ofDaniel Kahneman's contributions to behavioural economics and cognitive psychology with his 2 systems of thought as presented in his book Thinking Fast and Slow. Hereafter we briefly establish the fundamentals of nudging theory, as it pertains to the understanding of subject, with an anchor in Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, as well as later contributions by Pelle G. Hansen. In extension, we give a brief introduction to the development of psychology through the previous centuries and give more extensive accounts of the developments in American behaviourism, ending up at the cognitive revolution, which we believe constitutes the scientific field in which Kahneman, Thaler and Sunstein wrote from, and into, with their ground-breaking theories. From here we turn to a discussion in which we gather all our previous points, from both the theoretical foundations of nudging as well as the examinationsof the underlying scientific clashes of behavioural science until this point. We conclude that nudging theory represents different views of what the subject is and how it is explained, some of which are vastly different than other views within nudging theory, but even more so, other previous and current views of the subject within psychology. We note that the outlook of this issue only seems to be worse in the future, bar more research being done, both in the theoretical space of nudging independently of the empirical practice in which it has been popularised. In relation to further developments within other scientific fields working with behavioural theory, as seen in neurology, which is indicated to support more exact and concise explanations to human behaviour and thought, and therefore also give a better understanding of the subject, than nudging theory is capable of, and therefore also a better candidate to represent behaviouralresearch in psychology.In this paper we examine the study of behaviour, specifically nudging theory, in attempt to clarify what view of the subject is represented by this theory, as a part of the greater psychological field of science. We are interested in pinpointing exactly how the subject is understood within nudging theory, as well as the scientific tradition from which it draws much of its behavioural and scientific theory. To do this we take an atypical eclectic approach as laid forth by Simo Koeppe, in order to examine nudging from a pluralistic point of view, without taking a specific theoretical or scientific position ourselves. Firstly, we give an account ofDaniel Kahneman's contributions to behavioural economics and cognitive psychology with his 2 systems of thought as presented in his book Thinking Fast and Slow. Hereafter we briefly establish the fundamentals of nudging theory, as it pertains to the understanding of subject, with an anchor in Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, as well as later contributions by Pelle G. Hansen. In extension, we give a brief introduction to the development of psychology through the previous centuries and give more extensive accounts of the developments in American behaviourism, ending up at the cognitive revolution, which we believe constitutes the scientific field in which Kahneman, Thaler and Sunstein wrote from, and into, with their ground-breaking theories. From here we turn to a discussion in which we gather all our previous points, from both the theoretical foundations of nudging as well as the examinationsof the underlying scientific clashes of behavioural science until this point. We conclude that nudging theory represents different views of what the subject is and how it is explained, some of which are vastly different than other views within nudging theory, but even more so, other previous and current views of the subject within psychology. We note that the outlook of this issue only seems to be worse in the future, bar more research being done, both in the theoretical space of nudging independently of the empirical practice in which it has been popularised. In relation to further developments within other scientific fields working with behavioural theory, as seen in neurology, which is indicated to support more exact and concise explanations to human behaviour and thought, and therefore also give a better understanding of the subject, than nudging theory is capable of, and therefore also a better candidate to represent behaviouralresearch in psychology

Nudging. An inquiry in the view of the subject in psychological behavioral science

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