Addressing some common objections to generalized noncontextuality

Abstract

When should a given operational phenomenology be deemed to admit of a classical explanation? When it can be realized in a generalized-noncontextual ontological model. The case for answering the question in this fashion has been made in many previous works, and motivates research on the notion of generalized noncontextuality. Many criticisms and concerns have been raised, however, regarding the definition of this notion and of the possibility of testing it experimentally. In this work, we respond to some of the most common of these objections. One such objection is that the existence of a classical record of which laboratory procedure was actually performed in each run of an experiment implies that the operational equivalence relations that are a necessary ingredient of any proof of the failure of noncontextuality do not hold, and consequently that conclusions of nonclassicality based on these equivalences are mistaken. We explain why this concern in unfounded. Our response affords the opportunity for us to clarify certain facts about generalized noncontextuality, such as the possibility of having proofs of its failure based on a consideration of the subsystem structure of composite systems. Similarly, through our responses to each of the other objections, we elucidate some under-appreciated facts about the notion of generalized noncontextuality and experimental tests thereof.Comment: 18 pages, 5 figures. Comments welcome