Flache, A.

English

Recent research argues that individual risk aversion favors cooperation in social dilemmas. The argument focuses on conditional cooperation in repeated interaction. The more risk averse actors are, the less they are inclined to put at risk ongoing cooperative relationships by attempts at unilateral exploitation. I argue that this reasoning may not suffice to capture risk effects in exchange networks, where actors face both decisions about cooperation and decisions about selection of new partners. I present a model that combines both decisions. Consistent with previous analyses, the model predicts that individual risk aversion favors rational cooperation in ongoing dyadic exchanges. However, simulations also reveal that risk aversion may negatively affect cooperation through reduced mobility in partner search. If actors consider partner change as risky, then risk-averse actors may stick to suboptimal relationships, even if better alternatives are available that allow for higher levels of cooperative exchanges. Further simulations show nonlinear effects of individual risk preferences on the density and efficiency of exchange networks.</p

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   University of GroningenIndividual risk preferences and collective outcomes in the evolution of exchange networksFlache, A.Published in:Rationality and SocietyIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:2001Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Flache, A. (2001). Individual risk preferences and collective outcomes in the evolution of exchangenetworks. Rationality and Society, 13(3), 304-348.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 20-06-2022from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

Individual risk preferences and collective outcomes in the evolution of exchange networks

https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/169315654/104346301013003002.pdf

Individual risk preferences and collective outcomes in the evolution of exchange networks

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ARTS repository - University of Groningen