Bartels, Jeroen Joseph Alphons

English

According to Popper's hypothetico-deductive conception of science, scientific knowledge starts not from experience, nor from collecting 'facts', but from problems. The edifice of science is not erected upon a solid foundation or reliable facts; it is rather raised on piles above a swamp: we can only enunciate hypotheses, fallible conjectures, which are subsequently to be submitted to vere criticism. The sciences take their alleged objectivity not from the reliability of their anchorage in experience, but form the critical method they pursue. It is the falsifiability of scientific statements that constitutes the criterion of objectivity. In Popper, this 'fallibilistic' view is connected with a 'realistic' thesis, according to which it is up to the sciences to furnish us with increasingly better conjectures about 'reality outside us'. Fallibilism and scientific realism constitute the main elements of Popper's attempt to offer an explanation, within the framework of a theory of science, of the possibility of scientific knowledge and of the increase of our knowledge: the development of the science is not brought about by means of positive verification, but by means of 'progress by refutation'. In the discussion that, also owing to Popper's theories, has arisen since, the issue of the development that, also owing to Popper's theories, has arisen since, the issue of the development and possible growth of our knowledge is likewise pivotal. Notwithstanding the turn towards the history of the sciences and increasing attention to scientific practice that has been apperent in several theories of science in recent decades, we may infer that the epistemological presuppositions underlying this new orientation have remained largely unchanged. Zie: Summary

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   University of GroningenKennis, geschiedenis, objectiviteitBartels, Jeroen Joseph AlphonsIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1987Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Bartels, J. J. A. (1987). Kennis, geschiedenis, objectiviteit: een filosofische reflectie op enkeleontwikkelingen in de wetenschapstheorie. s.n.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 13-02-2023/iteit en historiciteit van onze weten-groeiende inzicht in de wezenlijk histo-ennis maakt het steeds urgenter, cate-jkheidvoorwaarden van onze kennis-nistheoretische problematiek, die dooris geworden, tot een oplossing te bren-.werkelijkheid is, wat bedoelen we danvan kennis? Indien werkelijk van ge-welke zin kan men dan nog van werke-eoretische uitwerking van de categorie;che, praktisch-materiële verhouding,ouding te begrijpen als eigen moment'an die situering de eenheid van de we-:n haar mogelijke objectiviteit te lateneflectie zelf een dimensie is van een, houdt in, dat een kennistheorie zouanalyse van het systeem van materiëleing deel van uitmaakt. De verwijzingvan de arbeid leidt echter, zoals ik eer-r bevredigend resultaat, wanneer men'ep€rken. De specifieke verhouding diecnsequent interpreteerbaar als verhou-,grepen als een systeem van materiëletheorie met betrekking tot de totaal-zich derhalve als noodzaak aan in destheoretische aporie leidt zo tot het in-rnistheoretische vooronderstelling vanwerkelijkheid kritisch te herzien. Hetleek om het wezenlijk historische ka-twoorden, blijkt deze verantwoording: een bevredigende analyse van de ver-iteit van onze kennis en haar (mogelij-lering van de kennisverhouding in eenngen onontbeerlijk.kennistheoretische ruimte, waarin delar wordt en ter discussie kan wordenaarheidstheorie beschikt, moge duide-rmin een wetenschapstheorie te biedenke verhouding van historiciteit en mo-tijke theorieën. In bovenstaande be-rm, uitgaande van enige wetenschaps-e voorwoqrden aan te duiden van eenm, waarin deze problemen adequaterSummaryAccording to Popper's hypothetico-deductive conception of science, scientificknowledge starts not from experience, nor from collecting 'facts', but fromproblems. The edifice of science is not erected upon a solid foundation of re-liable facts; it is rather raised on piles above a swamp: we can only enunciatehypotheses, fallible conjectures, which are subsequently to be submitted to se-vere criticism. The sciences take their alleged objectivity not from the reliabili-ty of their anchorage in experience, but from the critical method they pursue.It is the falsifiability of scientific statements that constitutes the criterion ofobjectivity. In Popper, this 'fallibilistic' view is connected with a 'realistic' the-sis, according to which it is up to the sciences to furnish us with increasinglybetter conjectures about 'reality outside us'. Fallibilism and scientific realismconstitute the main elements of Popper's attempt to offer an explanation, wit-hin the framework of a theory of science, of the possibility of scientific know-ledge and of the increase of our knowledge: the development of the science isnot brought about by means of positive verification, but by means of 'pro-gress by refutation'. In the discussion that, also owing to Popper's theories,has arisen since, the issue of the development and possible growth of ourknowledge is likewise pivotal. Notwithstanding the turn towards the history ofthe sciences and increasing attention to scientific practice that has been appe-rent in several theories of science in recent decades, we may infer that the epi-stemological presuppositions underlying this new orientation have remainedlargely unchanged.This studie attempts to answer three questions, also in the light of the work ofPopper, Kuhn and (to a lesser degree) Lakatos, viz.:(l) Does the tradition in the theory of science that has concerned itselfwith the development of knowlege and, subsequently, with the history of thesciences, ideed open up the prospect of a theoretically satisfactory interpreta-tion of the central problem within this tradition: the problem of the relationbetween historicity and the possible objectivity of our knowledge?(2) ln what respect, and to what extent, do the problems that these theo-ries of science are apparently unable to solve result from philosophical presup-positions affecting the way in which these theories of science approach theirsubject?(3) Which conditions are to be satisfied that will make a more adequatetheoretical treatment of the problem at hand possible?The present study consists of two parts. The first, comprising chapters I andII, is mainly a summary of the main features of the positions that Popper,Kuhn and Lakatos occupy within the theory of science, thus preparing the wayfor the systematic analysis of the second part. In that. second part (chaptersIII, IV and V) the technique of internal reconstruction' is abandoned. I outli-2t5ne some theoretical alternatives that induce me to arrange the subject matteraround some pivotal issues. This requires a shift of perspective: the treatmentof these issues leads to a boundary that can be crossed only by abandoning thephilosophical presuppositions underlying the first part. In the second part I fo-cus attention on the ontological and epistemological presuppositions that theauthors under scrutiny take for their starting-point, and to conclude I specifysome conditions that might make it possible to break out of the aporias in thetheory of science that, in my opinion, are inherent in these presuppositions.In chapter I some concepts that are central in Popper's theory ar indicated byway of introduction to the issues raised later on, and the implications of theseconcepts for a theory of science ar pointed out. Chapter II first marks the con-tours of the problem that arises from Popper's elaboration of the historicity ofscientific knowledge, and subsequently focuses attention on some importantaspects of the discussion that in the sixties followed the publication ofPopper's studies. In the second part, in chapter III, I then specify three areason which aporias emerge. Although remarkable results have been obtained inspecific fields, it seems that these aporias cannot be solved any further on thebasis of the presuppositions underlying the theories of science under conside-ration. The three areas concerned are: (a) the relation between a 'logic ofscience' and the actual history of the sciences; (b) place and function of theconcept of convention within the theory of science; and (c) scope and functionof the concept of law. The presupposition involved concerns the ontologicaland epistemological separation of (object of) knowledge and real object. Thisseparation induces the authors under consideration to redifine two concepsthat play a vital part in the theorie of science, viz. objectivity and historicity.The first conclusion that presents itself runs as follows: a non-empiricist andconsistently fallibilistic theory of science, in which the essentially relative, per-spectival and historical nature of knowledge and its development is elucidatedand accounted for, requires a materialistic ontology, which allows the know-ledge relation to be interpreted as an ontological relation. The knowledge rela-tion may thus be brought to bear upon and be located in a reality existing inde-pendently of consciousness. In the fourth and final section of chapter III, Iraise the question whether constructing such an ontology would not inevitablyimply a return to an empiricist foundation of knowledge, which Popper right-ly rejected as being unsatisfactory. In III.4, I investigate the characteristicstructure of the empiricist foundation of knowledge in the light of Feuerbach's'genetico-critical philosophy', in which in my opinion the problematic natureof the empiricist foundation emerges in an exemplary way. The very core ofthe empiricist foundation, so it turns out, is that is inevitably arrives at a locusof pure identity, where thought and reality are supposed to 'coincide'. Thepointing out of such a locus, however, is essentially contradictory, and turnsout to eliminate in advance the epistemological spsce that is required to reflectupon the historical and perspectival nature of knowledge.When attempting to lay a materialistic foundation it is therefore importantto reject the 'empiricist' identity of knowledge and realty and to aim at the2r6construction of a system of remaintained and be accounted 1into some important conditiondies by Ruben in order to showthe material instruments of kntion in which, according to Ishould be situated, viz.labourout, offers the possibility of ccledge and development of knorsis, and the possibility of anchIn the first section of chapteris connected with philosophicarentiation of distinct levels of gtical description and explanatirand justify the epistemologicalphical starting-point within thtcond section elaborates the viequires the construction of an orlabour can be situated as a sFconsistently as labour relation.section of chapter V) some corknowledge for a theory of scietion of the essential 'historicitlBoth concepts ar closely interlibeyond the dichotomy of subjtme time opens up new avenuesrical nature of scientific knowtexts from Marx's Economic tpossible starting-point for thtwhich the 'gegenstàndliche Tàllation, and the knowledge relaThe perspectival quality of outments, all of which are inextrithe subject, the social space inwhich exists independently of <tivally in our knowledge. In thivour of the view that an epistein isolation, and as though itning, on the level of the theor'spectival nature of our knowlbetween the everlasting histority, an ontological foundationrial relations of reflection seernot put at our disposal a fullyIn the present study I have onlge the subject matter:ective: the treatment[y by abandoning ther the second part I fo-:suppositions that theto conclude I specifyt of the aporias in thelese presuppositions.heory ar indicated byimplications of thesetI first marks the con-rn of the historicity ofn on some importantI the publication ofen specify three areasrave been obtained ined any further on thecience under conside-r between a 'logic ofr and function of thec) scope and functionrcerns the ontological,and real object. Thisredifine two concepsrivity and historicity.a non-empiricist andsentially relative, per-rlopment is elucidatedrich allows the know-. The knowledge rela-a reality existing inde-tion of chapter III, Ir would not inevitably, which Popper right-ate the characteristice light of Feuerbach'sre problematic naturei'ay. The very core ofably arrives at a locused to 'coincide'. Thertradictory, and turnsrt is required to reflect,e.s therefore importantIty and to aim at theconstruction of a system of relations in which the knowledge relation can bemaintained and be accounted for on a theoretical level. In chapter IV, I enterinto some important conditions for such a system. In IV.l, I refer to the stu-dies by Ruben in order to show the significance of scientific experiment and ofthe material instruments of knowledge. In IV.2,I elaborate the material rela-tion in which, according to Ruben, the material instrument of knowledgeshould be situated, viz.labour. Introducing the concept of labour, so it turnsout, offers the possibility of connecting the epistemological analysis of know-ledge and development of knowledge in the sciences with an ontological analy-sis, and the possibility of anchoring them in the same.In the first section of chapter V, I raise the matter of how a theory of scienceis connected with philosophical presuppositions. I argue in favour of a diffe-rentiation of distinct levels of generalisation that are indispensable to a theore-tical description and explanation. I also emphasize the need to explicitly stateand justify the epistemological and ontological implications of one's philoso-phical starting-point within the theory of science itself. Subsequently, the se-cond section elaborates the view that an analysis of the concept of labour re-quires the construction of an ontological system of material relations, in whichlabour can be situated as a specific relation, if 'labour' is to be maintainedconsistently as labour relation. To conclude, I advance (in the third and finalsection of chapter V) some consequences of this approach to a foundation ofknowledge for a theory of science, with regard to the definition and elabora-tion of the essential 'historicity' and possible 'objectivity' of our knowledge.Both concepts ar closely interlinked. The way that I propose here to progressbeyond the dichotomy of subject and object in the theory of science at the sa-me time opens up new avenues for a more adequate reflection upon the histo-rical nature of scientific knowledge. Starting also from an analysis of sometexts from Marx's Economic snd philosophicol manuscripts I then discuss apossible starting-point for the construction of a materialistic ontology, inwhich the 'gegenstándliche Tátigkeit' can be situated as a specific material re-lation, and the knowledge relation as a particular moment of this relation.The perspectival quality of our knowledge is determined by a number of mo-ments, all of which are inextricably interlinked: the specific point of view ofthe subject, the social space in which this point of view is located, and reality,which exists independently of our knowledge and which we approach perspec-tivally in our knowledge. In this study I have tried to advance arguments in fa-vour of the view that an epistemology which considers one of these momentsin isolation, and as though it were entirely self-sufficient, results in abando-ning, on the level of the theory of science, the historicity and necessarily per-spectival nature of our knowledge. For a satisfactory analysis of the relationbetween the everlasting historicity of our knowledge and its possible objectivi-ty, an ontological foundation of the knowledge relation in a system of mate-rial relations of reflection seems to be inperative. It is obvious that this doesnot put at our disposal a fully elaborated theory of truth corresponding to it.In the present study I have only attempted to specify the epistemological space217and the ontologicalry of science comere adequatelY.conditions for that space' in which these issues inup again explicity, and consequently can be dealtZusammenfassungNach Poppers hypothetischsenschaftliche Erkenntnis ni'Fakten', sondern mit Protauf einem Fundament verlËPfeiler in einem Sumpf: wi:fehlbare Vermutungen, diemiissen. Die WissenschafterVerlii8lichkeit ihres Fundadurch sie befolgten kritischrsifizierbarkeit wissenschaftlverbindet sich bei Popper ngabe der Wissenschaften stauíJerhalb von uns' zu liefebilden die wichtigsten Bestisenschaftlicher Entwickluntschaftstheoretisch zu erklánicht durch positive Verifil'Fortschritt durch Widerlesion, die seither mitbeeinflusteht ebenso die Problematiunserer Erkenntnis im MitWissenschaften und der stidie sich in den letzten Jalnachweisen láíJt, kónnen waussetzungen, die dieser N,ándert geblieben sind.In dieser Arbeit wird, auchPopper, Kuhn und, in gerigende drei Fragen gesucht:(l) Bietet die wissenscder Erkenntnis und, daratTat auch eine Perspektive Ízentralen Problems, das mrdas Problem des VerhtiltnObjectivitát unserer Erken(2) In welcher Hinsicschaftstheoretisch o f fenbarVoraussetzungen, die mandes wissenschaftstheoretis<(3) Welche Voraussetfalls angemessenere wisserenden Problems zu ermógthe theo-with mo-218

Kennis, geschiedenis, objectiviteit:een filosofische reflectie op enkele ontwikkelingen in de wetenschapstheorie

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Kennis, geschiedenis, objectiviteit:een filosofische reflectie op enkele ontwikkelingen in de wetenschapstheorie

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