The text tackles the interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy as the “philosophy of difference” in contemporary French philosophy (Deleuze, Derrida). This interpretation is not so “French” by and in itself since it comes from Heidegger. There where the latter sees concealment and unconcealment of the difference, Deleuze and Derrida see the disclosure of the difference itself. The main motive behind the persistent interpretation of the eternal return as the thought of difference in Deleuze and Derrida is anti-Hegelianism. The dialectics and the concept of the negative are declared to be phantoms. But the problem is not only that the difference is not a Nietzschean concept, but that in Nietzsche one cannot find a similar critique of Hegel, even more, in Nietzsche one cannot find the idea that the eternal return is the principle of choice and selection. In spite of some differences between Deleuze’s and Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche, their basic agreement is that in Nietzsche only the difference returns. The price to be paid for this is the suppression of some motives (in German: gleich, gleichgültig) which definitively have their place in Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal return. The author, therefore, proposes a new reading of it, she suggests replacing the difference with the clone and in this way obtaining a possibility of reading the eternal return as the thought of ontological cloning.Tekst se loteva interpretacije Nietzschejeve filozofije kot »filozofije razlike« znotraj sodobne francoske filozofije (Deleuze, Derrida). Ta interpretacija sama po sebi ni nič kaj »francoska«, saj se opira na Heideggerja, pri čemer tam, kjer slednji vidi zastiranje in razpiranje razlike, vidi razkritje čiste razlike. Glavni motiv za vztrajanje pri večnem vračanju kot misli razlike pri Deleuzu in Derridaju je anti-heglovstvo. Gre za kritiko dialektike in negativnega, slednjo se razglasi za fantoma. A težava ni le v tem, da razlika ni nietzschejanski pojem, temveč da pri Nietzscheju takšne kritike Hegla ni najti, še več, pri njem pa tudi ne najdemo ideje, da je večno vračanje samodejno načelo izbora, selekcije. Čeprav obstajajo razlike v Deleuzovem in Derridajevem branju Nietzscheja je njuno osnovno strinjanje v tem, da se pri Nietzcheju vrača zgolj razlika, cena za to pa je potlačitev nekaterih motivov (gleich, gleichgültig), ki nastopajo pri Nietzschejevem večnem vračanju. Avtorica zato predlaga novo branje večnega vračanja, pri čemer je njen predlog v tem, da bi razliko nadomestili denimo s klonom in s tem dobili možnost branja večnega vračanja kot mišljenja ontološkega kloniranja
