We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible goods to aset of n agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- whichrequires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of anysingle good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when theresource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFXnotion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has somenon-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods. We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requires that noagent envies another agent after removal of any k goods. Our maincontribution is an algorithm that finds a complete (i.e., no good is discarded)EF2X allocation for the restricted additive valuations. In our algorithm wedevise new concepts, namely "configuration" and "envy-elimination" that mightbe of independent interest. We also use our new tools to find an EFX allocation for restricted additivevaluations that discards at most ⌊n/2⌋−1 goods. This improvesthe state of the art for the restricted additive valuations by a factor of 2.<br