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Veto players and state decisiveness: Negotiating bilateral economic partnership agreements between Japan and Southeast Asia
Authors
Eric Vincent C. Batalla
Publication date
1 December 2012
Publisher
Animo Repository
Abstract
This article extends the veto player framework introduced by Haggard and McCubbins in 2001 to examine state decisiveness toward bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in developing countries of Southeast Asia. It uses as reference points Japan\u27s bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. As argued in the Haggard and McCubbins framework, decisiveness is a function of the number of effective veto players arising from a country\u27s institutional configuration. In addition, this article proposes that the political environment as it affects veto player preferences be considered in explaining decisiveness. The article further discusses the political consequences of decisive policy-making behavior in Southeast Asian democracies. © 2012 Philippine Political Science Association (PPSA)
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Last time updated on 03/12/2021