This paper lists and critically assesses European Rule of Law enforcement instruments. It argues that these
could have provided dissuasive responses to severe and systemic Rule of Law violations in Hungary, had
they been applied consequently, promptly, and in a coordinated manner. But they have not been used, or
not effectively, or not in a timely manner. To prove this point, Hungarian cases of Rule of Law violations
are listed and analysed, pointing out instances where European enforcement tools were applied; where
they were applied, but could have been employed more efficiently;and where they could have been applied,
had there been a political will to do so. Based on the assessment, authors consider infringement procedures
and the rule of law conditionality mechanism to be the most effective tools of enforcement, and encourage
the Commission to follow academic proposals and bundle cases to show and adequately respond to the
systemic nature of autocratisation, where interconnected instances of Rule of Law violations mutually
reinforce each othe