Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution sources against light-injection attacks

Abstract

A well-protected and characterised source in a quantum key distribution system is needed for its security. Unfortunately, the source is vulnerable to light-injection attacks, such as Trojan-horse, laser-seeding, and laser-damage attacks, in which an eavesdropper actively injects bright light to hack the source unit. The hacking laser could be a high-power one that can modify properties of components via the laser-damage attack and also further help the Trojan-horse and other light-injection attacks. Here we propose a countermeasure against the light-injection attacks, consisting of an additional sacrificial component placed at the exit of the source. This component should either withstand high-power incoming light while attenuating it to a safe level that cannot modify the rest of the source, or get destroyed into a permanent high-attenuation state that breaks up the line. We demonstrate experimentally that off-the-shelf fiber-optic isolators and circulators have these desired properties, at least under attack by a continuous-wave high-power laser.Comment: Abstract, Fig.5 and discussion section modified. Various minor corrections, including clarification and explanation about the experimental setup stability and its graphical representation; testing procedure; configuration of QKD systems with circulators; heating of isolators; testing results of circulators' port couples. New references added in the bibliography. 13 pages, 6 figures, 2 table