Torenvlied, René

English

This book describes a positive model of the implementation of policy decisions. The model combines the salience of implementation agencies for policy decisions with the extent to which these agencies are efectively controlled, in order to predict agency deviations from policy decisions. Special attention is paid to the effects of (a lack of) political consensus on the amount of agency deviations. ... Zie: Summar

Dissertations of the University of Groningen

   University of GroningenBesluiten in uitvoering. Theorieën over beleidsuitvoering modelmatig getoetst op socialevernieuwing in drie gemeentenTorenvlied, RenéIMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite fromit. Please check the document version below.Document VersionPublisher's PDF, also known as Version of recordPublication date:1996Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research databaseCitation for published version (APA):Torenvlied, R. (1996). Besluiten in uitvoering. Theorieën over beleidsuitvoering modelmatig getoetst opsociale vernieuwing in drie gemeenten. Thesis.CopyrightOther than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of theauthor(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).The publication may also be distributed here under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license.More information can be found on the University of Groningen website: https://www.rug.nl/library/open-access/self-archiving-pure/taverne-amendment.Take-down policyIf you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediatelyand investigate your claim.Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons thenumber of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.Download date: 11-10-2022SummaryThis book describes a positive model of the implementation of policy decisions.The model combines the salience of implementation agencies for policydecisions with the extent to which these agencies are efectively controlled, inorder to predict agency deviations from policy decisions. Special attention ispaid to the fficts of (a lack ofl political consensus on the amount of agencydeviations. Political consensus does not generally enhance compliance--as isoften asserted. This is shown in a theoretical analysis and by an application ofthe model on 134 policy performances in three Dutch municipalities.Theoretical backgroundDiverging problem perceptions and conflicting policy preferences sometimesmake the implementation of policy decisions a highly political affair. A lack ofconsensus among decision makers, and between decision makers andimplementation agencies, is thought to interfere with a proper course of theimplementation process. The relation between politicians and agencies issometimes described as the "compliance problem" (Noll & Weingast, l99l).This concerns the question of the conditions under which implementationagencies deviate from policy decisions and the conditions under which they donot. In terms of policy prescription we may ask how the latter conditions canbe successfully realized.It is often recommended that actors strive for consensus on the propositionsof the policy before implementation takes place. This consensus betweendecision makers and implementation agencies is thought to reduce the incentiveof agencies to deviate from the decided outcomes of the formulated policy.Sometimes such a recommendation is not feasible, for example when policyperceptions are fundamentally different and the proposed interventions arehighly contested. In those cases, political control of implementation agencieswould presumably reduce the problems of agency compliance, although it istheoretically unclear how a small number of politicians could actually controlthe behavior of a multitude of implementation agencies.The research in the present book is based on the proposition thatimplementation agencies have policy perceptions and preferences of their own.Their perceptions are based on their past experience and future expectationsregarding policy feasability. Implementation agencies often know theconsequences of their policy interventions better than politicians. Thisknowledge may give rise to a policy perception which differs from the policyperception of politicians. Another important assumption in the present study is252 Besluiten in uitvoeringthat implementation agencies strive to realize their own policy positions. Thisleads to the following research questions:I. Under what conditions does a lack of consensus between decision maker"^and implementotion agencies on the most preferred outcome of policydecisions lead to policy deviations by implementation agencies?II. Under what conditions does a lack of consensus among decision makers onthe most preferred outcome of policy decisions lead to policy deviations byimplementation agencies?Positive model of policy implementationThe research questions are approached through the construction of a simple,positive model of policy implementation, which incorporates the politicalcontrol of agencies. This is in contrast with much of the literature, whichfrequently emphasizes the highly complex nature of implementation, and inwhich verbal theories are the norm. For the sake of simplicity, in the presentstudy implementation is regarded as the execution of a policy decision viaindividual agencies rather than through complex interorganizational patterns.The model assumes one-dimensional policy scales and single peaked preferencefunctions of politicians and agencies. Agencies are assumed to rationaliyoptimize the combination of the reputational consequences of deviating fromthe official policy outcome and preferential consequences of moving away fromthe most preferred outcome. Agencies implement the policy alternative whichminimizes their net loss.The behavior of agencies therefore falls between two extremes: fullcompliance with the official policy outcome, and full deviation from the policyin the direction of the agency's most preferred outcome. The complianceproblem arises when there is a conflict of interest between implementationagencies and politicians. An agency could be expected to rationally deviatewhen its own policy preferences are in conflict with the official policy goals. Itis hypothesized that the actual deviating behavior of implementation agenciesvaries in accordance with three factors affecting the political control ofagencies: (a) the opportunity space for individual agencies, resulting frommonitoring, sanctioning and their salience for policy decisions; (b) thereputational sensitivity of agencies, resulting from procedural arrangements; and(c) the degree of consensus among politicians.DataThe hypotheses are tested with reference to the implementation of three policyHooftlstuk 9: Su,programs in thtpolicy domain 'than in, for erconstrained by .number of localmodel predictiorTo gather thdocuments. Th,administration;motivation of tipolicy proposalscommittees onadministration; (groups. From tldecisions, alternwas to check ana small numberand implementaeye view of th,policy prefereninterpretations.The next sinterpretations idomain specialiRabushka, 1985advantages overa black box, wquestionnaire inlcontrol. The decof the policy <associated motivpolicy decision(spolicy decisionperformances wevaluation repoparticipants. Thrand interpretedoutcome was triscale values of 1the observed amBesluiten in uitvoeringlir own policy positions. Thisnsus between decision makersprefened outcome of policy:ntation agencies?)\s omong deci.sion makers onrs lead to pol icy deviat ions bythe construction of a simple,ch incorporates the politicalnuch of the literature, whichre of implementation, and in: of simplicity, in the presention of a pol icy decision vlax interorganizational patterns.; and single peaked preferencers are assumed to rationallynsequences of deviating fromquences of moving away fromt the policy alternative whichbetween two extremes .fullfull deviation Íiom the policyrd 0utcorne. The compliancerresl ber\\een implementation:xpected 1o rat ional ly deviateith the oÍïcial pol icy goals. I tr  oÍ- implementation agenciesing the political control ofual agencies. resulting Íiomr policy decisions; (b) theprocedural arrangernents: andnplementation of three policyHooldsÍuk 9: Sunrntary 253programs in the domain of social renewal in three Dutch rnunicipalities. Thispolicy domain was seiected because more discretion of agencies was expectedthan in, for example, an infrastructural policy domain. The policy is lessconstrained by Dutch national regulations. The policy programs consisted of anumber of local pro.jects. The duration of these projects was relatively short, somodel predictions could be checked in relatively short order.To gather the relevant data, a first step was to scrutinize all relevant policydocuments. These documents included: (a) the policy proposals of theadministration; (b) the final document containing the statutory principles andmotivation of the public policy; (c) rninutes concerning the discussion of thepolicy proposals and the Ílnal document by the city council (and the specialcommittees on social afÍàirs); (d) internal documents and memos rvithin theadministration; (e) records of discussion meetings with stakeholders and targetgroups. From this content analysis resulted a prel iminary inventory of pol icydecisions, alternative courses of action and actors involved. The second step$'as to check and detail the gathered information by unstructured interviervs ofa small number of participants who play a central role during decision makingand implementation. This qualitative data collection process provided a birdseye view of the policy domain: actors, decisions, alternative outcomes andpolicy preferences were unveiled, prompting a nunrber of tentativei nterpretations.l'he next stage of data-colleclion was to transform the qualitativeinterpretat ions into quanti tat ive judgements. For this purpose. trvo "pol icvdomain specialists" were selected (cf. Bueno de Mesquita, Newman &Rabushka. 1985). Using special ists to obtain the quanti tat ive data has someadvantages over interviewing all participants separately. Policy making often isa black box, which participants open only with reluctance. The quantitativequestionnaire inhibits forthright judgments of policy preferences and effectivecontrol. The decided outcome was measured by a ciose exarnination of the textof the policy document. The official1y authorized policy program and itsassociated motivation were interpreted as alternative outcome(s) of the relevantpol icy decision(s). These alternatives were translated into a scale value on eachpolicy decision: the observed decided outcome. The agency's pol icyperformances were assessed by two means: a careful inspection of officialevaluation reports, and ir.rterviews with the policy domain specialists andparticipants. The actions of all irnplen.rentation agencies were listed, describedand interpreted as alternative outome of the policy decisions. This alternativeoutcome was translated into a policy scale value. The difference between thescale values of the observed decided outcome and the policy as implen.rented isthe observed amount of deviation.l ) 4 Besluiten in uitvoeringResultsE/fects of monitoring, sanctioning and agency salienceThe traditional solution to the compliance problem is contracting,monitoring and sanctioning. However, monitoring implementation agencies isextremely difficult to realize due to an asymmetric distribution of information.Moreover, monitoring is costly because there tends to be a multitude ofagencies and only a limited number of monitoring institutions, such aslegislative committees, the judiciary, the civil service hierarchy and/or courts ofaudit. Even when implementation agencies are monitored and can besanctioned, it may still be worthwhile for them to deviate from certain policydecisions. This could occur when agencies have very strong poiicy preferences.The strong preferences can - for example - be related to what the agencyconsiders feasible. or to its close relations with certain constituencies. In otherwords, even while being closely monitored it can be worthwhile for an agencyto deviate when the policy decision strongly affects the ability to realize itsgoals. The extent to which a policy decision is related to the main individualgoals of an actor is Íhe scrlience of that actor with respect o the policy decision.Implementation theories and models generally draw little attention to saliencervhen modeling agency behavior. This is an obvious shoficoming because thereis no good reason why salience should play no role in the stage ofimplementation. Even when the implementation agency is fully sensitive tornonitoring and sanctioning, the agency may be better off by deviating when itssalience is large enough. lhe direct policy/goal-attainment benefits of deviationcompensate for their reputational consequences.The empirical test provides grounds to suppose that salience in interactionwith effective control is a crucial variable in policy implementation. The resultssuggest hat even under conditions of extreme monitoring, agencies wil l bebetter off when they deviate than when they comply. if the salience is largeenough. Neither full compliance nor full drift describe agency behaviorcorrectly.E//è c ts of administrative procedure sThe reputation sensitivity of implementation agencies is a condition whichaÍïects all agencies. When there are no or only weak procedural arrangements,the reputation is not so important to agencies. Fixed procedures and stronginvolvement of politicians will provide more Íèedback on performance.Consequently. all agencies wil l deviate less. When a policy program has a lowpriority lbr polit icians more deviations occur.Efíècts of dissent among politiciansIt seems reasonable that the political control of agencies could also beHooldstuk 9: Summarstrongly hampered tpolit ical consensus cagency deviations. Tvery r'"'ell be contingrThe model attemptsbook shows that ansalience for the poli,sensitivity. In other vof polit ical consensLdeviate. However, coshow' no effect of 1municipalities and fopolit ical consensus isubject.Forecasting policy oThis book has presenof implementation ag70 percent of the poneed to be put in prrrnodel is a positive mupon rather strong plmore complex. Theconfir.red to those issdimensional policy dmaking give reasonNewman & RabushkrBos, 1992). Anotherindividual agency ex(interorganizationaiimplementation oftenMazmanian & Sabatirfhe empirical ap1One limitation of thedornain specialists. Tthe subjective percep'are more impartial. ,rthat the model is orAdditional empiricalargument in this bookBes Iu iten in ui tvoer ingsalienceliance problem is contracting,oring implementation agencies isnetric distribution of information.)re tends to be a multitude ofmonitoring institutions, such asservice hierarchy and/or courts ofjs are monitored and can be:m to deviate from certain policy/e very strong policy preferences.- be related to what the agencyth certain constituencies. In othercan be worthwhile for an agencyaffects the ability to realize itsis related to the main individualdth respect to the policy decision., draw little attention to saliencebvious shortcoming because thereplay no role in the stage ofion agency is fully sensirive toe better off by deviating when itsLl-attainment beneÍlts of deviationppose that salience in interactionolicy implementation. The resultsne monitoring, agencies will becomply, if the salience is largedrift describe agency behaviorrn agencies is a condition whichy weak procedural arrangements,:s. Fixed procedures and strongore feedback on performance.'hen a policy program has a lowrtrol of agencies could also beHooJtlstuk 9; Summary 255strongly hampered by dissent among politicians. These effects of a lack ofpolitical consensus can be explained by the tolerance of elected officials foragency deviations. The elfect of political consensus on agency behavior mayvery well be contingent on other characteristics of the implementation agencies.The model attempts to specify such conditions. The model developed in thisbook shows that an implementation agency will deviate ín any ca.re, if itssalience for the policy decision is very large relative to the agency's controlsensitivity. In other words; the deviation of an agency need not be due to a lackof politicai consensus, but rather to the initial disposition of the agency todeviate. However, contrary to these theoretical expectations, the empirical datashow no effect of political consensus at all. This result arises in all threemunicipalities and for all different types of issues. The absence of an effect ofpolitical consensus is consistent with the few empirical studies available on thissubject.Forecasting policy outputsThis book has presented a model to explain and predict the deviating behaviorof implementation agencies. The prediction models performed fairly well: about70 percent of the policy performances were predicted correctly. These resultsneed to be put in proper perspective. An essential theoretical point is that themodel is a positive model of implementation. The theoretical argument is basedupon rather strong propositions and simplifying assumptions. Reality is muchmore complex. fhe applicability of the implementation model therefore isconfined to those issues whicl.r can be properly translated into a set of one-dimensional policy decisions. Experience with models of collective decisionmaking give reason for optimism on this point (ci Bueno de Mesquita,Newman & Rabushka, 1985; Laumann & Kaoke,1987: Stokman & Van denBos, 1992). Another limitation of the model is its theoretical confinement toindividual agency execution rather than to implementation in a highly complexinterorganizational context. In-depth empirical research on policyimplementation often shows considerable interdependence arnong agencies (cf.Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989).The empirical application does not permit a full generalization of results.One limitation of the empirical application is also its strength: the use of policydomain specialists. These specialists judge relevant variables independently ofthe subjective perceptions of participating actors. In that way, their judgmentsare more impartial. Another iimitation of the empirical application is the factthat the model is only tested on one policy domain in three municipalities.Additional empirical applications are indispensable to further extend thearsument in this book.

Besluiten in uitvoering. Theorieën over beleidsuitvoering modelmatig getoetst op sociale vernieuwing in drie gemeenten

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Besluiten in uitvoering. Theorieën over beleidsuitvoering modelmatig getoetst op sociale vernieuwing in drie gemeenten

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