The Organisational Salience and the Perceived Influence of Operational Safety Professionals: An examination of Hopkins’ hypothesis that decentralised hierarchical structures limit the capacity of technical experts and specialists to promote operational safety priorities in corporate decision-making processes
This research examines Hopkins’ argument, in his analysis of
the BP Texas City Refinery disaster, that a decentralised
organisational structure contributed to a “blindness to major
risk”. Hopkins asserts that communications along hierarchical
lines of operational accountability allow for safety-critical
information to be discounted by intermediaries with commercial
priorities. He suggests that fully independent and centralised
lines of functional accountability for technical experts and
safety specialists could ensure that safety priorities are
recognised and advocated if decision-making can be readily
escalated to their CEO.
Hopkins’ recommendations are grounded in high reliability
theory and supported by the analysis of several disaster
investigations. A literature review identifies various
theoretical issues that underpin the central research hypothesis
that organisational structure impacts on the exercise of
influence. The research itself is a practical inquiry: seeking to
better understand how this hypothesis is interpreted and applied
by safety practitioners within hazardous industry. I gather the
opinions, insights and experiences of thirty professionals from
nine participating companies within the Australian resources
sector.
The key research objective is to examine the practical
relationship between: the structured organisational salience of
technical safety professionals; and their perceived influence on
the priority given to operational safety issues in both
operational and strategic decision- making. A secondary concern
is to identify organisational dynamics that affect the influence
that is exercised by technical safety professionals and to
understand how organisational design parameters may be utilised
to appropriately reinforce operational safety priorities.
The research findings are presented as nine corporate case
studies, describing the structured positions and activities of
technical experts and process safety professionals within the
operational hierarchy. The research finds that operational safety
professionals and process safety experts are typically not able
to fulfil their responsibilities within their defined roles. They
are instead challenging or circumventing the structured
parameters of their position and functions. The research findings
confirm the underlying concerns that organisational design
choices impact on the capacity within the organisation to
reliably communicate safety-critical technical details.
Hopkins’ hypothesis is extended to include organisational
design parameters beyond structure.
Three other modifying factors are identified as also able to
elevate or undermine the influence of technical experts and
safety specialists. These are: leadership support; management
systems; and personal credibility, as illustrated below.
Figure: Organisational Factors that Modify Influence
In particular, the capacity of leadership, such as CEOs, to
dictate and modify organisational structure and to establish and
reinforce corporate priorities has both indirect and direct
impacts on the influence that operational safety professionals
exercise. There is also a widely acknowledged expectation that
safety practitioners, including technical experts, should be
personally persuasive with “an ability to influence”. This
suggests that delegated authority for safety practitioners is
accepted as being limited and unlikely to be available.
Promoting a single cohesive safety message that does not account
for such issues of influence and authority may present the
appearance of a unified safety culture in spite of recognised
underlying conflicts: between organisational sub-cultures such as
managers, operators and engineers; or between corporate goals
such as production and safety
