Nuclear explosive assembly/disassembly operations that are carried out under United States Department of Energy (DOE) purview are characterized by activities that primarily involve manual tasks. These process activities are governed by procedural and administrative controls that traditionally have been developed without a formal link to process hazards. This work, which was based on hazard assessment (HA) activities conducted as part of the W69 Integrated Safety Process (ISP), specifies an approach to identifying formal safety controls for controlling (i.e., preventing or mitigating) hazards associated with nuclear explosive operations. Safety analysis methods are used to identify controls, which then are integrated into a safety management framework to provide assurance to the DOE that hazardous activities are managed properly. As a result of the work on the W69 ISP dismantlement effort, the authors have developed an approach to identify controls and safety measures to improve the safety of nuclear explosive operations. The methodology developed for the W69 dismantlement effort is being adapted to the W76 ISP effort. Considerable work is still ongoing to address issues such as the adequacy or effectiveness of controls. DOE nuclear explosive safety orders and some historical insights are discussed briefly in this paper. The safety measure identification methodology developed as part of the W69 ISP dismantlement process then is summarized
