The US Department of Defense (DoD), in cooperation with other federal agencies, has taken many initiatives to improve its ability to support civilian response to a domestic biological terrorism incident. This paper discusses one initiative, the 911-Bio Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), conducted by the Office of the Secretary of Defense during 1997 to better understand: (1) the capability of newly developed chemical and biological collection and identification technologies in a field environment; (2) the ability of specialized DoD response teams to use these new technologies within the structure of cooperating DoD and civilian consequence management organizations; and (3) the adequacy of current modeling tools for predicting the dispersal of biological hazards. This paper discusses the experience of the ACTDs from the civilian community support perspective. The 911-Bio ACTD project provided a valuable opportunity for DoD and civilian officials to learn how they should use their combined capabilities to manage the aftermath of a domestic biological terrorism incident

Baldwin, T.

Gasper, W.

Lacher, L.

Newsom, D.

Yantosik, G.

UNT Digital Library

LESSONS LEARNED FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 911-BIOADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONSL. Lather D. Newsom -Argonne National Laborato~ Argonne National Laboratory9700 South Cass Avenue 9700 South Cass AvenueArgonne, IL 60439, USA Argonne, IL 60439, USA630-252-3087 630-252-3278lacher@anLgov newsomd@anl.govT. Baldwin G. Yantosik W. GasperArgonne National Laboratory Argonne National Laborato~ Argonne National Laboratory9700 South Cass Avenue 9700 South Cass Avenue 9700 South Cass AvenueArgonne, IL 60439, USA Argonne, IL 60439, USA Argonne, IL 60439, USA630-252-3087 630-252-3087 630-252-4878baldwint@anLgov yantosik@anl.gov gaspenvr@anl.govSUMMARYThe U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), incooperation with other federal agencies, has takenmany initiatives to improve its ability to supportcivilian response to a domestic biological terrorismincident. This paper discusses one initiative, the91 l-Bio Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstrations (ACTDS), conducted by the Officeof the Secretaty of Defense during 1997 to better. .understand:. The capability of newly developed chemicaland biological collection and identificationtechnologies in a field environment.● The ability of specialized DoD response teamsto use these new technologies within thestructure of cooperating DoD and civilianconsequence management organizations.. The adequacy of current modeling tools forpredicting the dispersal of biological hazards.This paper discusses the experience of the ACTDSfrom the civilian community support perspective.The 91 l-Bio ACTD project provided a valuableopportunity for DoD and civilian officials to learnhow they should use their combined capabilities tomanage the aftermath of a domestic biologicalterrorism incident.L BACKGROUNDThe Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year1997 directs the U.S. Department of Defense(DoD) to improve its ability to support civilianauthorities responsible for responding to domesticbiological terrorism. Specifically, Congressdirected the Secretary of Defense to develop andmaintain the capability to respond quickly to acts ofdomestic terrorism and provide the capability to aidfederal, state, and local officials in detecting,neutralizing, containing, dismantling, and disposingof weapons of mass destruction (VVhlD)thatcontain chemical, biological, or related materials “,(Public Law 104-201, Section 1414(a)).The proliferation of WMD, particularly biologicalwarfare (BW) agents, threatens U.S. interests andpersonnel worldwide. In response to thisproliferation of acts of terrorism, which include the . ~Tokyo subway sarin gas attack and the bombings “of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City “Federal Building, President Clinton signedPresidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), whichaddresses how the United States should deal withthe prospect of a terrorist use of WMD. Thepresidential directive divides the U.S. response tothe threat of terrorist VJNIDuse into two distinctcategories: crisis response and consequence. .management.Crisis response refers to instances where theperpetrators have been discovered before anactual WMD release. Domestic crisis response isthe responsibility of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI). Consequence management,by contrast, describes ways and means to alleviatethe short- and long-term physical, socioeconomic,.DISCLAIMERThis report was prepared as an account of work sponsoredby an agency of the United States Government. Neither theUnited States Government nor any agency thereof, nor anyof their employees, make any warranty, express or implied,or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the ‘accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information,apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents thatits use would not infringe privately owned rights. Referenceherein to any specific commercial product, process, orservice by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, orotherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply itsendorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the UnitedStates Government or any agency thereof. The views andopinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarilystate or reflect those of the United States Government orany agency thereof..T.. -...V-., . ,. .----ZTY —— ----- _ _ —. . .DISCLAIMERPortions of this document may be illegiblein electronic image products. Images areproduced from the best available originaldocument.--.—- —~ —m., .—.-s..p.— — ,.>._—_ _.. ._..and psychological effects of a chemical,radiological, or biological attack. Domesticconsequence management of WMD attacks is theresponsibility of the Federal EmergencyManagement Agency (FEMA).Il. ADVANCED CONCEPT TECHNOLOGYDEMONSTRATIONIn January 1997 the Consequence ManagementAdvanced Concept Technology Demonstration(ACTD) was proposed to help define and establishthe capability needed to rapidly transition fromcrisis response to consequence management withearly detection and identification of BW agents andproper care and treatment of victims. With itsfocus on terrorist use of BW agents, thisconsequence management ACTD was given thename ‘i91l-Bio.” -●The Office of the Deputy to the Assistant to theSecretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemicaland Biological Defense Programs,Counterproliferation and Chemical/BiologicalDefense conducted two 91 l-Bio ACTDS atDugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah. The ●preliminary ACTD took place on June 3 and 4,1997; the final 91l-Bio ACTD was conducted on .December 5 and 6, 1997.validate, research, development, andacquisition priorities.. Operational concepts for the U.S. Army’sTechnical Escort Unit (TEU) and the U.S.Marines’ Chemical Biological IncidentResponse Force (CBIRF).● The ability of DoD units to interact with othergovernment agencies.B. MethodologyArgonne National Laboratory possesses more than20 years of experience in emergencypreparedness. Much of Argonne’s capabilities arefocused in the civilian arena. Recognizing this,DoD requested Argonne’s assistance in theproposed ACTDS with the following primaryfunctions:Develop a Simulation Cell (SIMCELL) thatwould inject into the ACTD, actuallreal-timecommunications requesting DoD support,responding with actions that would be taken bycivil authorities in response to the scenarioevents.Collect information about the DoD interfaceswith these agencies.Make recommendations based on the analysisof the data collected.A. Purpose Argonneestablished the ACTD SIMCELL toThe purpose of the 91l-Bio ACTD was to enhance represent federal, state, and local consequenceworldwide militaty capability to respond effectively management officials who could request andto the use of biological weapons by demonstrating: receive DoD support in the event of a domesticbiological terrot%m incident (Figure 1).. Key WMD consequence managementtechnologies in a field environment andt’:?Eiefcise;cotitrolj~f‘-+3iiit%ik :-;-EY:.;:and-y~ange:~a~ey.::,, .-<-;: ;:,,,,“ ;. ‘-.,-. .,.* ,... -- ‘. -F’., ;.’%. . . +.. ~:~ j:’-:.: ~edeial;,Sfate;-’:;-:;,.,.-_<...--A..:and ~o.,ql;A,ujhori~es~.:.“.:..- ; ,--.:,,,,. .,,—-.,. , ... . .1:..:““....-.’ : .... 1.-.-:..,.-. .,-..-–.. ..... -f...:..,L.L$,=-. ......:;-.”..IIA ‘— reformation, and-responsesbetween the SIMCELLand DoDPH55!I – Path for exchange of operational;?+?;J; %’WMN direction and information amongDoD playersFigure1. Relationship of SIMCELL to DoD and other demonstration cells..The operational structure of the SIMCELL wasdesigned to represent a Joint Operations Center(JOC) led by the FBI. The JOC included aconsequence management element led by FEMA.A number of federal agencies, state offices, andlocal offices were represented in the JOC. For thepreliminary ACTD in June 1997, Argonnepersonnel played the roles of all civilian officialsrepresented. For the second ACTD, the SIMCELLstaff included officials from the FBI, FEMA, theState of Utah, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake and TooeleCounties, and a liaison officer from the U.S. FifthArmy Response Task Force, with Argonne staffplaying the roles of other civilian officials. TheSIMCELL also simulated the effects of events onprivate and public institutions (e.g., hospitals, themedia, businesses, and other critical infrastructure- organizations and facilities) by role playing withinthe SIMCELL staff. This was only to the limitedextent that the role playing related directly to theobjectives defined for the ACTD.A second cell - the DoD operations cell -represented the command and operationsstructure the military would establish to supportfield operations.. [11.RESULTSThe information requests and interchangesbetween the civilian officials in the simulated JOCand the DoD response units were carefullycollected and analyzed. They included thecommunications exchanged within the SIMCELLand between the SIMCELL and the DoDoperations cell during the Final Demonstration.These data were supplemented by information. . .. obtained from questionnaires completed by, andinformal interviews with, the SIMCELL staff.A. Communications AnalysisThe communications exchanged between theSIMCELL and the DoD operations cell during thetwo days of demonstrations were analyzed toidentify the priorities and concerns of each cell andto evaluate the extent to which each wasresponsive to the other. In total, 199communication exchanges between the SIMCELLand the DoD operations were captured andanalyzed. An individual communication exchangeconsisted of as many contacts as necessary tocomplete a transaction (i.e., pass the information,ask the question, make the request, or provide theresponse). Captured communications wereanalyzed and found to fall into five generalcategories. Table 1 identifies the overallpercentage of communications associated witheach of the general categories.Table 1. Communications CategoriesCateaow PercentageAgent sampling 16Plume concentrations & projections 09Protective actions, health &safety 20Scene, suspect, operational issues 50Ambulance & paramedics 05Argonne’s analyses also revealed a closecorrelation between questions asked and answersprovided between both the civilian authorities andthe DoD operations cell. However, somesignificant delays occurred in a few of the DoDresponses to information requested by the civilian .authorities. This gave the disproportionateappearance that DoD was not being responsive tocivilian information needs. As indicated in Table 1above, 50’?40of the mmmunications exchanges .between the SIMCELL and the DoD operations celldealt with the scene, suspects, and operational ~issues related to the scenario.B. SIMCELL Staff InterviewsIn addition to mllecting mmmunications betweenthe SIMCELL and the DoD Operations Cell duringthe ACTDS, Argonne conducted post-ACTDinterviews with the SIMCELL staff and circulatedquestionnaires. The discussions within theSIMCELL and the results of the questionnaires and -interviews following the final demonstrationindicated that the concerns of the SIMCELL staffwent beyond the use of the new technologies.Great interest was shown in the larger challenge ofresponding to a biological terrorism incidentwithout any prior intelligence warnings or advancereadiness preparations. The subjects mentionedmost often in discussions, questionnaires, andinterviews are listed below● Concepts of operations of the milita~responders and their command controlelements, and how these concepts will fit withthe concepts of operations of state and localfirst responders.. The use of the Incident Command System(ICS) and communications between DoDresponders and civilian first responders.,.,●●●●●●●Interagency cooperation at the federal level,especially communications between DoDresponders and the Lead Federal Agency(LFA).Staffing of the DoD command element, asrepresented by the DoD operations cell.Opportunities for civilian first responders totrain with DoD responders and to acquire thenew technologies for their own use.Quality and timeliness of hazard analysisinformation and its application to protectiveaction decision-making.Proficiency training for DoD responders.Limitations of the new technologies.Availability of DoD assistance for unexpectedevents.IV. LESSONS LEARNEDIn general, civilian officials demonstrated how theywould use DoD assets, specifically the TEU andCBIRF capabilities, to help them manage theaftermath from a domestic biological terrorismincident. They also learned how these units andthe DoD chain of command could assist them, aswell as state and local first responders. Otherspecific lessons learned include●●●●●●DoD responders understood their role insupporting the LFA and other civil authorities.Relationships among DoD organizations tosupport the LFA were not well defined.DoD command elements and organizations didnot have integrated plans nor concepts ofoperations.DoD response interfaces were not aligned withthe ICS.Hazard analysis products, chiefly plumeprojections, did not support civilian decision-making.The DoD operations cell could not adequatelytrack events, requests, and commitments thatinvolved civilian officials.V. RECOMMENDATIONSThe ACTD clearly enabled users to learn about thenew technologies. As value added, theassessment of the data collected from theSIMCELL perspective led to the followingrecommendations for improving DoD support tocivilian officials who manage the consequences ofa domestic biological terrorism incident. DoD command elements, the TEU, and theCBIRF should continue to develop integrated●●●●●●●Concept of Operations and plans to provideconsequence management support to civilianauthorities.Integrating state and local responders intoDoD biological collection, detection, andidentification operations should be considered.The DoD, in consultation with civilian technicalrepresentatives, should develop the capabilityto provide timely, relevant (i.e., responsive anduseful), and comprehensive hazard analysesproducts to support the civilian protectiveaction decision-making process.A centralized national capability should beestablished for biological hazard plotting andanalysis to expedite delive~ of these sewices.DoD organizations that support civilian officialsshould incorporate an electronic informationmanagement system into their operation.Arrangements should be made to dispatch “milita~ detection and identification elementsexpeditiously, in advance of the deployment ofthe main body of DoD biological incidentresponders.The TEU and CBIRF should mnduct regular, .basic training in biological incident responsejointly with their immediate commandelements.A regular schedule of tabletop and full-scalefieldexercises of DoD and civilian capability tohelp manage the consequences of domesticbiological terrorism should be established.ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThis work was supported under a militaryinterdepartmental purchase request from theU.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,Force Structure, Resources and AssessmentDirectorate, through the U.S. Department ofEnergy contract W-31-I 09-Eng-38.BIBLIOGRAPHYT. Baldwin, G. Yantosik, W. Gasper, L. Lather, D.Newsom, Final Report for the ConsequenceManagement Advanced Concept TechnologyDemonstration (91 l-Bio), Argonne NationalLaboratory, March 2,1998.91 l-Bio Consequence Management ACTD FinalReporf, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense (Advanced Technology), 1999.Thesubmitted manusaipt has Men maw! by the Uniwraityof Chkago 8sOperatorofkgome NaW 1.abof8tofy~Argonn#) underCmtmct No.W-31-109-EN(R3 With lhe U.S. Departmentof Efmqly. The U.S. GOvm?mmtrataha *itself,md Olhera acung on ib MM ● paid’up, I’KalOxckslve, blwcabla WwktwdeIicemse in add tie to rsprodm, pfOpUE duivative work% dhbibutocqk tohpublic,andpmfonnpubliclyanddisplaypublkly, by orm bahaKc4Iha Govmunmt.—., . .... . . .. . .. -—r,- ..— —. .— - .— —-—-———- ———

Lessons learned from U.S. Department of Defense 911-Bio Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.

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Lessons learned from U.S. Department of Defense 911-Bio Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations.

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