In this thesis, I explore how political corruption gets celebritized by the action/in-action of the state of Pakistan. Although the state has long been claiming to have stringent controls against political corruption, however, over the years, the country has become a vessel for more political corruption instead. By promoting a national interest-based narrative, the state runs two parallel political systems (one seemingly run by the politicians while the other controlled by the establishment) hence doubling political corruption and making the accounting and accountability systems doubly vulnerable to misappropriations. I theorise the relations between political corruption and the state using Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical concepts, focusing on two political corruption cases, the Asghar Khan case and the Mehran Bank scandal. I make three contributions in this regard. First, I contribute to the literature on political corruption and accounting by contending that political corruption in developing countries takes the form of an institution in itself (a field) that continuously extends its boundaries over time. Second, I develop a theoretical framework that shows how political corruption (field) develops and how it violates accounting controls and accountability systems (causing sufferings). Moreover, when it comes to public attention (through hysteresis), how the state response (using social magic) turns this corruption into no-corruption causing no harm to corruption (partial revolutions) and hence its perpetuation (conatus) in the system becomes inevitable. Finally, I contribute to the literature on political corruption and accounting by proposing that such actions of the state, especially with its art of calling for positive emotional responses (national interest) from the public, not only prolong political corruption but also celebritize it in Pakistan. Thus while promising to end political corruption, the state does precisely the opposite
