Lemay, J-C

Mauduit, J-C

Van Cauter, M

English

UCL Discovery

NEW  ARTICLEScience A achés in a post-COVID-19 World:Taking Stock of the CrisisBy Jean-Christian Lemay, Jean-Christophe Mauduit, and Maxime Van Cauter - 01/22/2021The response to the current COVID-19 crisis has been driven by governments, which have largelyfocused their policy efforts within their domestic sphere. This national focus has also characterized themobilization of science to address the pandemic. Governments have mostly relied on their ownscientific institutions and experts to inform their internal policies and impose new regulations, albeitnot without spectacular failures.1, 2 However, the pandemic demands international action, being aglobal issue by definition. Incidentally, for many years, states and regions – especially in Europe, NorthAmerica and Asia – have established strong anchors in foreign territories via their science diplomacynetworks.3 These science a aché networks have many different functions, including but not limited toa racting talent and funding, facilitating bilateral research collaborations, and influencing the policyecosystem in which they are deployed.4, 5 While international agencies like the World HealthOrganization (WHO) and non-state actors such as transnational scientific networks, foundations, andothers have sprung into action, in some cases the efforts of states’ own international scientific networkshave not been up to par.This article relies on the experience of authors who are part of the science a aché networks of Québec(JCL) and Wallonia-Brussels (MVC) and informal discussions with other networks (JCM). By reflectingon our experiences and those of colleagues, we aim to start a conversation about the roles andresponsibilities of science a aché networks during two distinct time frames: the crisis (short-term) andthe recovery period (long-term) that follows. Since the analysis and subsequent recommendations areinevitably limited to our own observations, we also argue for the need for a comprehensive analysisthat would collate insights from a broader range of science a achés. Science a aché networks in crisis: preparedness and governance issuesThe pandemic caused the cancellation of many events such as forums, conventions, and conferences.Science a achés usually rely heavily on such events to connect with a wide range of stakeholders,exchanging valuable information that feeds the national and international policy of the governmentsthey serve. These events were difficult to replace with online interactions. In addition, the ecosystemswithin which science a achés operate were also heavily disrupted by the outbreak,6 weakening thelinks to their local partners (government officials, academia, industry, entrepreneurs, supra-nationalbodies, international agencies, and others).In the early phases of the crisis, some networks, such as those of France (Réseau Français des A achéspour la Science et la Technologie) and the United Kingdom (UK Science & Innovation Network) weremobilized, pivoting away from their original activities to help respond to immediate needs. Theysupported massive repatriation efforts7 and advised their trade colleagues on medical technologies andthe potential of COVID-19-related innovations when health systems experienced equipment shortages.Given the logistical disruptions and the reorientation of work, there was also a disconnect betweenscience a achés from different countries operating within the same region, and who usually interactregularly at various occasions and exchange information. Only in a few instances known to the authorsdid science a achés meet informally online to exchange on the COVID-19 response of their ownnetwork.Logistical difficulties were compounded by a rapid decline of communication with colleagues backhome. These colleagues are in departments or agencies for international relations, science, oreconomics, and generally not those responsible for domestic science policy. Across multiple networks,science a achés around the world reported being left for days or weeks without a clear work agenda.8This lack of preparedness and structural governance issues will need to be addressed in any futureglobal emergencies and the post-COVID recovery.Policy leaders may have been too occupied directing the domestic scientific response to provide clearguidance to science a aché networks. International science a aché networks are already institutionallyseparated from the domestic science sphere and may be unfamiliar to policy leaders who think mostlyalong national lines. But even policy makers who are aware of these networks may not have consideredthem useful in helping respond to COVID-19, given that the urgency of a public health emergency mayhave seemed incompatible with the longer time frame of science which is usually the focus of theirwork. However, political decisions such as the creation of specific funding programs or targetedinvestments have important long-term consequences; to avoid lock-in effects and inefficiency, it iscrucial for the science a achés to be part of the process.In the wake of such a generalized uncertainty and governance issues, some a achés took the initiativeto connect online with their peers posted in different countries to understand how best to reorganizetheir activities and make their work more relevant to the governments they serve. For example, shortlyafter the initial COVID-19 outbreak, the six science a achés of Wallonia-Brussels contacted its scientificdiaspora across the globe, both to understand how they had been impacted by the crisis and how theymight play a role in the post-COVID recovery. Wallonia-Brussels International then began to publish aseries of interviews with such scientists on a weekly basis.9 Similarly, the science a achés of Québecorganized discussions around key medical technologies with important local actors.When time allowed, some networks began cataloguing the many initiatives and publications aroundCOVID-19 in the territories covered, as illustrated by the CORD19 Publications Dashboard10 developedby the Service for Science and Technology of the Embassy of France in the United States. This in turninformed the domestic crisis response as well as strategies for the recovery phase strategy pertaining todomestic research. A call to strengthen and reimagine the work of science a achés in the recovery phaseThe COVID-19 outbreak is a game changer, impacting the world as it is and as it will be perceived fromnow on. It has not only demonstrated the need for a be er universal response to global challenges, butalso that national policy responses cannot be implemented in isolation. In that context, science a achéscan be a cornerstone of the recovery process.First, science a achés have direct access to a large pool of expertise via their professional network ofcontacts and their physical posting in research- and innovation-intensive hubs. These includeacademics, professional researchers, engineers, and entrepreneurs whose work has been impacted bythe pandemic and who have had to pivot their professional activities towards addressing this globalchallenge. They represent a reservoir of expertise and inspiration for decision-makers back home.Similarly, science a achés are typically well connected to the local scientific diaspora originating fromtheir home country or region, which can be helpful in accessing local know-how and decision-makers.In the recovery phase, these pre-existing links may allow science a achés to connect with potentialpartners, as those in Québec, Wallonia-Brussels, and elsewhere have.Secondly, science a achés are usually well informed of existing programs, available funding, and otherongoing initiatives in the local or domestic ecosystems. Thanks to this unique vantage point, sciencea achés may be able to accelerate research collaborations between domestic and foreign researchinstitutions, as well as suggest the possible orientation (or re-orientation) of such programs. Forexample, science a achés aware of international programs targeting particular aspects of the socio-economic landscape of participating countries can link in their own country or region, saving the timeand funding that would otherwise go to developing home-grown programs from scratch.Third, science a achés can be a strategic asset for universities, research centers, and tech companies.Considering that the recovery will be shaped by innovation, knowledge transfers, andinternationalization of research, science a achés are well positioned to seek out human capital to fill theknowledge gaps in the job market back home. In addition, now that some companies and researchinstitutions are being backed by their governments in the fight against COVID-19, the science a achéscan help them map complementary technologies elsewhere and find synergies.Finally, science, technology, and innovation are highlighted in the recovery plans of many countriesand the European Union, as they will be mobilized to strengthen the life science sector and foster agreen recovery. It is important that those plans not only target the domestic science ecosystem, but alsomake use of the many opportunities offered by these existing international networks. Beyond COVID-19: future-casting the work of science a achés and key recommendationsThe adaptation and reorganization that have occurred so far have left untapped a large part of existinggovernmental science diplomacy potential. In order to be er leverage the science a aché networks infuture emergency situations, the post-COVID recovery period, and any other such crises and recoveriesin the future, we put forward the five recommendations below for policy-makers to consider.1. Train science a achés in crisis management. So that all networks (science a achés, their supportteams, and the broader domestic science policy community) are integrated into the collectiveresponse, decision-makers could hold annual simulated emergency exercises11 to ensure that theinterlinkages and channels of communication are functioning properly as well as to stress-test theresilience of science a aché networks. The information gathered during such exercises could helpthe networks be activated more quickly and efficiently when crises do arise. In addition, thescience a aché networks of multiple governments could also generate agreed upon shared normsand procedures, a “global crisis clause’’ enabling be er emergency response capacities. 2. Increase collaboration between the science policy community and the science a aché networks.Early, seamless coordination and information exchange between domestic policy makers andscience diplomats could help identify valuable opportunities for collaboration and developappropriate funding schemes. The policy makers need to be er inform the science a achés of theneeds of the domestic research ecosystem, highlighting and funding the projects that could mostbenefit from international collaboration, while the science a achés can provide feedback regardingpotential opportunities and report back on the science policy responses in their territories. Jointactivities, such as the emergency exercises suggested above, and more direct communication linesamong the science a aché networks, their support team and the science policy decision-makerscould increase collaboration.3. Strategically coordinate the different services of the diplomatic missions. During a crisis and in therecovery phase, the roles of the scientific, trade, a raction of investment, and public affairsdivisions can overlap significantly. Properly coordinating efforts then becomes even moreimportant. In diplomatic missions, the science a achés answer to two hierarchical lines: the headof mission and the headquarters. On the ground, synergies between embassy services depend to alarge extent on the head of the missions’ ability to promote them. A lesson from the COVID-19crisis is that the response of the scientific a achés must also involve optimal coordination in thefield with all the other components of the post.4. Broaden geographic reach and functions. Science a achés are usually deployed in cities that areinstrumental to the home government that they serve, but their geographic coverage could betemporarily expanded during crises to other cities, regions, or even countries. Their functionscould also be broadened to interface with aid and development agencies, relevant NGOs, andother charitable organizations. In addition, in emergencies, they could provide information tonations that do not have science a aché networks (e.g., activating the “global crisis clause”).Indeed, research results and technologies that could be crucial to a particular subset of othercountries should be shared quickly through such collaborative networks.125. Increase cross-country collaboration and communication across networks. This does not have totake away the competitive, nationally driven nature of these networks, but sharing importantinformation about science and technology and best practices across the networks of multiplecountries may lead to opportunities that would have been otherwise missed. Such collaborativebehavior has been illustrated by the “science & technology diplomatic circles” that already exist inseveral cities. These need to be expanded. The government offices of Québec and Wallonia-Brussels in New York launched the “Science & Technology Diplomatic Circle New York” duringthe lockdown, a joint initiative which will benefit all of the city’s diplomatic missions.When governments face major emergency situations like the COVID-19 crisis, the range of acceptablepublic policies, the so-called “Overton window,” broadens.13 The unprecedented challenge that theworld is facing with the COVID-19 crisis is providing a unique opportunity to rethink science a achénetworks, helping decision-makers leverage them be er in future crises so they can be er help thesubsequent economic recovery in ways that serve both national and international interests. We hopethat this article will act as a stepping stone for a more comprehensive empirical study of the response ofthe many different science a aché networks, taking into account their differences in size andoperations, to analyze and put forward best practices in the post-COVID-19 recovery and futureemergencies. AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to Professor Pierre-Bruno Ruffini for enlightening discussions and suggestions that significantlyimproved this manuscript. Endnotes1. E. William Colglazier, “Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Catastrophic Failures of the Science-Policy Interface,” Science& Diplomacy, April 9, 2020, www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2020/response-covid-19-pandemic-catas... ; E. WilliamColglazier, “America’s Science Policy and Science Diplomacy After COVID-19,” Science & Diplomacy, June 28, 2020,www.sciencediplomacy.org/editorial/2020/americas-science-policy-and-science-diplomacy-after-covid-192. Erman Sozudogru, “Coronavirus: Government Advisory Groups Should Include a Wider Range of Experts,” TheConversation, May 13, 2020, h ps://theconversation.com/coronavirus-government-advisory-groups-should-include-a-wider-range-of-experts-1377343. Peter D. Gluckman et al., “Science Diplomacy: A Pragmatic Perspective from the Inside,” Science & Diplomacy 6, no. 4(December 2017), www.sciencediplomacy.org/sites/default/files/pragmatic_perspective_scien....4. Pavlina I elson and Jean-Christophe Mauduit, “Science & Diplomacy: How Countries Interact with the Boston InnovationEcosystem” (DiploFoundation, 2019), www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2019-06/Boston_Science_Diplomacy_AAAS_D....5. Pierre-Bruno Ruffini, Science and Diplomacy (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017).6. Kelly Servick et al., “Updated: Labs Go Quiet as Researchers Brace for Long-Term Coronavirus Disruptions,” Science, March16, 2020, www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/updated-labs-go-quiet-researchers-brace-....7. Private communications with France and UK science a aché networks.8. Private communications across several networks.9. Wallonie-Bruxelles International, “Le Laboratoire des Idées: Entretien avec Gaétan de Rassenfosse,” May 19, 2020,www.wbi.be/fr/news/news-item/laboratoire-idees-entretien-gaetan-rassenfosse.10. Office for Science and Technology of the French Embassy to the United States, “CORD19 Publications Dashboard,”h ps://france-science.com/en/cord19-publications-dashboard-2.11. Marga Gual Soler, “A Personal Reflection on Science Diplomacy & COVID-19,” International Science Council, April 5, 2020,www.ingsa.org/covidtag/covid-19-featured/gual-soler-april.12. Arnar Breevoort, Giovanni A. Carosso, and Mohammed A. Mostajo-Radji, “High-Altitude Populations Need SpecialConsiderations for COVID-19,” Nature Communications 11, no. 1 (July 1, 2020): 3280.13. George Dibb, “How Coronavirus Smashed the Overton Window,” Medium, May 21, 2020, h ps://medium.com/policy-postings/how-coronavirus-smashed-the-overton-w....  TOPICS: Relationship Building, Diplomacy for ScienceREGIONS: Americas, Europe

Science Attachés in a post-COVID-19 World: Taking Stock of the Crisis

https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10120252/1/Science%20Attache%CC%81s%20in%20a%20post-COVID-19%20World_%20Taking%20Stock%20of%20the%20Crisis%20_%20Science%20%26%20Diplomacy.pdf

Science Attachés in a post-COVID-19 World: Taking Stock of the Crisis

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