Biondi, Andrea

In some crucial sectors of EU policies, only a supranational model is able to deliver efficiency, transparency and equality of position between the different parties, in particular between the Member states and the EU institutions and between the Member states themselves. It could, surprisingly, also be conducive to the preservation of vital national interests and foster virtuous and fair economic policies. Further, it will be argued that a model of direct supranational administration does not need to equate to a model of full centralization. Differentiation and delegation can, and actually should, exist and function within clearly pre-established parameters. There are several areas which demonstrate and verify that it is sometimes worth leaving it to the EU. The chosen test case analysed here is the EU regulatory process on state aid control, an area extremely important for British economic policy. This chapter will be structured around two main themes. The first will try to sketch how the unique system of state aid control in Europe is providing an important tool to ensure a competitive level playing field between Member states and between undertakings; the second, is how such a system, properly employed, allows the development of coherent business and industrial policies. In particular, public spending channelled ‘through EU levees’ can be utilised to develop more responsible and eventually more socially useful economic practices

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State Aid, government spending and the virtue of loyalty

https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/57683167/Chapter_17_Biondi_26_July_1_.pdf

State Aid, government spending and the virtue of loyalty

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