At the crossroads of insolvency and securities law lies the question as to whether defrauded shareholders should rank equally with unsecured creditors in cases involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour. Important questions arise at this juncture concerning the efficiency, certainty, transparency and fairness of the treatment of such claims in insolvency situations. In Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1, the High Court chose not to apply a rule said to be germane to insolvency cases involving fraudulent or misleading conduct inducing share purchase known as the rule in Houldsworth’s Case. The “rule” said to have been developed in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 had up until the High Court’s decision been used to interpret legislative provisions concerning shareholder claims, resulting in problematic determinations in the context of modern developed markets.
While it is submitted the High Court was justified in choosing not to apply the rule in Houldsworth’s Case and thus allowing shareholders to claim as unsecured creditors, the rule may still prove good law in certain cases. Indeed, the referral of the High Court’s decision to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee for review may result in legislative change which reverts to the traditional treatment of shareholders in such circumstances. Accordingly this dissertation engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on defrauded shareholder claims in the UK and Australia to demonstrate that the decision in Houldsworth and subsequent interpretation and application of the “rule” therein suffer from deep flaws, and have been productive of relative injustice. It is argued that it is necessary to put the current uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Houldsworth in Australia beyond doubt through legislative abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth’s Case. As the result of such abrogation would represent a significant policy shift in Australian corporate law, the merits and difficulties of the resulting position will be addressed by this dissertation. It will be argued that a policy of shareholder parity with unsecured creditors best meets the goals of insolvency and securities law regimes while contributing to the sustainability of a fair and efficient market, and investor participation in it