The difference between revelation and natural reason seems to be as obvious as it is indestructible. Despite this conventional view, Eric Voegelin claims that this difference must be "swept aside" and "cleared away" as it obscures the sphere of original meaning and manifestation and posits the divine as an object. According to Voegelin, through recourse to the ancient philosophers Plato and Aristotle, we can discover that there is no natural reason at all but instead: "reason is firmly rooted in revelation." Obviously, this requires a reinterpretation of revelation. It can neither be equated with the content of the Holy Scripture nor should it be confined to the manifestation of God in Jesus Christ. Rather, claims Voegelin, we ought to think of it as a primordial attraction, a movement drawing into the search for truth and the ground of reality. Such an approach may raise objections and provoke accusations of either subordinating philosophy to theology or misusing the language. As I attempt to show in the article at hand, Voegelin insists on revelation because it designates the original manifestation of the ground, and both faith and philosophical elucidation are two modes of responding to this appearin
