Splitt, Ronald

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North Dakota Law Review Volume 33 Number 1 Article 9 1957 Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense Ronald Splitt Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr  Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Splitt, Ronald (1957) "Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 9. Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol33/iss1/9 This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. RECENT CASESthe state court. The Supreme Court said in StefaneUi v. Minarda that itwould not interfere in state criminal proceedings to suppress evidence ille-gally obtained because of the special delicacy of the adjustment to be pre-served between federal equitable power and state adminstration of its ownlaw.20Another argument against the decision laid down in this case is that itplaces additional restraints on federal law enforcement officials, thus makingthe apprehension of criminals more difficult. It has been argued that, as inthe instant case, it would have the effect of releasing upon society criminalsthat are known to be guilty.21Despite the rather weak authority for the decision reached in .this case, it issubmitted that the results flowing from the decision should be beneficial. Somefeel that existing law does not provide sufficient protection from the arbitraryand illegal acts of law enforcement officers.22 On the state level, suits againsta policeman are generally fruitless because of his financial condition, and themunicipality that hired the policeman is not liable because of governmentalimmunity.2 3ROBERT L. ECKERT.CONTRACTS - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE. - Inan action for specific performance of a contract for a sale of land brought bythe vendee against the administratrix of the deceased vendor, the defense ofintoxication of the vendor at the time of the execution of the contract wasasserted. The District Court entered judgment for the plaintiff vendee anddenied defendant's motion for trial de novo. On appeal, the Supreme Courtol North Dakota held that the judgment of the lower court was correct indenying the defense of intoxication on the basis of the evidence presented.Christianson v. Larson, 77 N.W.2d 441 (N. D. 1956).The early common law theory which provided that intoxication was no de-fense to the validity of a contract' has undergone a transformation so thattoday most states hold that a contract entered into by a party "excessively"intoxicated is voidable as to him. - What is meant by "excessive" intoxicationhas apparently not been precisely defined, but the common conception is thatthe intoxication must be so great as to deprive one of reason and understand-ing, thus rendering him incapable of comprehending the nature and conse-quences of his act.3 This excessive intoxication to be effective as a defense mustoccur at the time the contract was executed. 4 The time within which excessive19. 342 U. S. 117 (1951).20. Id. at 120.21. Comment, 42 Mich. L. 1Rev. 910 (1944) (Such decisions tend to "handicap lawenforcement . . . and are . . . contrary to the public interest . . .")22. Orfield, Criminal Procedure From Arrest to Appeal, 28-31 (1947).23. Id. at 28, 29.1. 2 Kent Comm. 451 (10th ed. 1860); Buch v. Breinig, 113 Pa. 310, 6 Ati. 86(1886) (dictum).2. E.g. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N.D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim,14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905); In re Thorne's Estate, 344 Pa. 503, 25 A.2d 811(1942); Ex parte Bums, 194 Wash. 293, 77 P.2d 1025 (1938).3. Martin v. Harsh, 231 III. 384, 83 N.E. 614 (1907); Keedick v. Brogan, 116 Neb.339, 217 N.W. 583 (1928); Renfeldt v. Brush-McWilliams Co., 45 N. D. 224, 176 N.W.838 (1919); Harlow v. Kingston, 169 Wis. 521, 173 N.W. 308 (1919).4. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); Simpson, Contracts 293(1954).1957]NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEWintoxication may be averred in order to nullify the contract varies. 5 A NorthDakota statute requires that a contract must be rescinded promptly upon dis-covery of facts giving rise to a right of recission. 6 Failure to disaffirm within a".reasonable" time after acquiring such knowledge is deemed an election toaffirm it. What constitutes a "reasonable" time is not definite but dependsupon the facts of the particular case.8 The North Dakota Supreme Court hassuggested that the morning after the contract was entered into is a reasonabletime, 9 while a period of seven years was considered too long.1° A party washeld not guilty of laches when he failed to rescind almost a year after dis-covery of fraud and when no rights of third parties intervened and he hadreceived no consideration."There is a presumption that a signed contract is valid." This requires theparty asserting intoxication as a defense to assume the responsibility and bur-den of .proving it. 3 There must be clear and convincing proof of excessiveintoxication before the court will sustain this defense. 4 The degree of in-toxication is a question of fact," and the evidence is usually established bythe testimony of witnesses, but their testimony is subject to the final deternli-nation by the jury.'6The holding in the principal case conforms to the general rule that theremust be concrete and conclusive proof of excessive intoxication. The merefact that the party attempting to rescind was known to have been a habitualdrunkard will not give rise to a right to rescind,17 unless he was excessivelyintoxicated at the execution of the contract.' 8 In the instant case the Admin-istratrix failed to establish such proof and was required to execute the deed asa contractual obligation of the deceased.' 9RONALD SPLITT.CRIMINAL LAW - NATIONAL MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT ACT - CONSTRUCTIONOF "STOLEN." - Appellant was convicted under the Dyer Act for havingappropriated to his own use and driven across a state line, an automobilebailed to him by the conditional vendee for the purpose of returning it to theconditional vendor. The conviction was affinned on appeal by the UnitedStates Circuit Court of Appeals which held that the word "stolen" as used in5. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942)(dictum).6. N. D. Rev. Code § 9-0904 (1) (1943).7. Frankish v. Fed. Mortg. Co., 30 Cal. App.2d 700, 87 P,2d 90 (1939); Hauge v.Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924); Spoonheim v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380,104 N.W. 845 (1905).8. Mann Chevrolet Co. v. Associates' Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1942).9. Hauge v. Bye, 51 N. D. 848, 201 N.W. 159 (1924).10. Spoonhein v. Spoonheim, 14 N. D. 380, 104 N.W. 845 (1905).11: Deasy v. Taylor, 39 Cal. App. 235, 178 Pac. 538 (1919).12. Bradley v. Industrial Commission, 51 Ariz. 291, 76 P.2d 745 (1938); IndemnityIns. Co. v. Macatee Ins. Co., 129 Tex. 166, 101 S.W.2d 553 (1397). See also CrutcherLaboratory v. Crutcher, 288 Ky. 709, 157 S.W.2d 314, 319 (1942).13. Lyon v. Jackson, 132 N.E.2d 779 (Ohio 1955). See also Brugman v. Brugman,93 Neb. 408, 140 N.W. 781 (1913).14. Emerson v. Shirley, 188 La. 196, 175 So. 909 (1937); In re Null's Estate, 302Pa. 64, 153 At. 137 (1930).15. Taylor v. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).16. Cardinal v. Cardinal, 131 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Jones v. Selman,109 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).17. Snead v. Scott, 182 Ala. 97, 62 So. 36 (1913).18. Taylor %. Koenigstein, 128 Neb. 809, 260 N.W. 544 (1935).19. Francis v. Ferguson, 246 N. Y. 516, 159 N.E. 416 (1927); In re Fullmer, 319Pa. 192, 197 Atl. 545 (1935); In re Murphy, 191 Wash. 180, 71 P.2d 6 (1937).[VOL. 3

Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense

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Contracts - Specific Performance - Intoxication as a Defense

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