This dissertation is focused on investigating and leveraging side-channel leakage for hardware security. To help designers address and take advantage of electromagnetic (EM) side channels, two methods for locating the physical sources of EM side channels have been developed. Both methods are used to investigate how the EM side-channel sources change with frequency and program activity.
The second half of this dissertation introduces two methods that use side channels for component authentication. The same properties that make side channels such a threat, also make them useful for authenticating electronic components. The first method uses EM side channels for identifying integrated circuits (ICs) installed on a device. Focusing on components already integrated onto a device lets designers authenticate devices assembled by third parties. The second method uses the recently defined backscattering side channel for detecting recycled ICs. Unlike other types of side channels, backscattering is directly affected by the IC aging. Since the backscattering side channel is nondestructive and requires no additional circuitry on the IC, it is low cost. The effect of aging on the side channel is then investigated through simulation and experimentation.Ph.D
