Berden, Carolien

Croes, R.

Kemp, R.

Mikkers, Misja

Shestalova, V.

Svitak, Jan

van der Noll, Rob

English

The Dutch government introduced managed competition to the health care sec-tor in 2006. In this regulatory framework insurers compete for enrollees andproviders compete for contracts with insurers. The resulting contracts are de-termined by bargaining, which outcome depends on the relative position of theprovider. In this paper, we compare how commonly used market power indi-cators predict bargaining outcomes. We combine 2013 transaction data withbilateral contract data. Our empirical models explain the relative dierences inhospitals' revenues while controlling for dierences in the complexity of patients.Four indicators are used: the logit competition index (LOCI), willingness-to-pay(WTP), Elzinga-Hogarty market share and a rule-of-thumb market share. Wend that WTP and LOCI perform best empirically

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Hospital Competition in the Netherlands:An Empirical Investigation

https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/30034784/DP2019_008.pdf

Hospital Competition in the Netherlands:An Empirical Investigation

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