As the influence and pervasiveness of the State has increased, there has been a growing concern that governments and their advisors should be held accountable, not only for the regularity of their actions, but also for the wisdom of their decisions and their management of scarce resources. What is required are procedures for demanding accountability for the legality of expenditure as well as for departmental efficiency and for programme effectiveness.
The role of the Auditor-General is examined in the light of these requirements. It is argued that his effectiveness will depend on how broadly his mandate is defined, both in terms of the number of agencies audited and the degree of sophistication of the techniques employed; his independence from the administration; and his ability to publicise his findings and communicate his criticisms to Parliament.
It is suggested that the ability of the Auditor-General to develop a wide-ranging efficiency and effectiveness audit has been constrained by restrictive norms about the role of the legislature in the analysis of executive programmes; staffing and analytical impediments; and because such an audit would fundamentally alter the distribution of power between competing political actors. This leads to the conclusion that a fully efficient and accountable public sector may only be possible if governments can be convinced that this would be in their own interests
