Kaynar, Ayşegül Kars

English

<intR>²Dok

Penning a New Narrative of Turkey as aMilitary NationAy#egül Kars Kaynar 2022-10-05T15:18:51Amid heated discussions over the upcoming elections, one of the largest set ofprosecutions in the history of the Turkish Republic has been completed this year. Inthe aftermath of the military coup of July 15, 2016, which claimed the lives of 250people in a single night and triggered a state of emergency rule that endured twoyears, over 100.000 investigations had been carried out and 289 trials were openedagainst the perpetrators. As of May 2022, all 289 cases are concluded in the courtsof first instance. Appeal procedures of the roof trials are also close to an end. Thecourts proved to be a constitute element of this new constellation of powers in thepost-2016 era, re-adjusting the narrative of Turkey as a military nation.Trial Retribution Was not Prompt, but ThoroughThe procedures were organized into two roof trials, General Staff Roof trial andAk#nc# Airbase trial; the first one concerning the planning and organization of thecoup, the latter dealing with civil-military cooperation in the coup making. The courthanded its decision on the General Staff Roof trial in June 2019, sentencing a total of126 defendants to life in jail, while acquitting 33. In July 2022, the case was finalizedwith the decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the life sentences of fourdefendants and to approve the rest. In Ak#nc# Airbase trial, the court handed 75 lifesentences and 19 jail sentences between 12 and 16 years in November 2020. Thecase was approved by the Court of Appeal in June 2022.Given the highly political nature of the matter in dispute, one expected a swiftretribution from the courts in line with the victor. Nevertheless, the coup attemptcases neither started nor finalized in a short span of time. The first hearings of thetwo main trials started only ten months after the coup bid and lasted three to fiveyears at first instance. As of July 2021, the number of trials whose appeal processwas completed in the higher courts was 83; meaning that only 28 percent of thecases could be closed in five years. The absence of special tribunals and retroactiveusage of law, on the other hand, did not avert injustice as the suspects sufferedfrom severe violations of due process and illegalities such as leaking of informationto pro-government press, torture, and ill-treatment. Actually, manifest bias of thecourt boards against the suspects let these trials to be seen as sham. Just to give anexample, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor spoke to the media and assured thepublic that the prosecution process was only a procedure and those involved in themaking of coup would get aggravated life sentences. They did. Among nearly 7500charged, the courts sentenced 3,000 defendants to life in jail. Of these, 1761 wereformer military officers including 109 generals, state-owned Anadolu News Agencyreported.- 1 -Post-2016 Narrative of a Nation in ArmsThe coup attempt case is significant in many respects. For a country that was ruledby military juntas following two successful coups in September 1980 and May 1960,experienced strong military interventions in 1971, 1997 and 2007, and consequentlyclassified as a military democracy for decades, life sentences on soldiers wereunprecedented. Convicting these former military officers, the courts also radicallyaltered the narration of civil-military relations in official history.The official narrative of the relation between army and the nation has two intertwinedelements. First, the military and military virtues are inseparable from Turkishness,which is captured by the terms “military nation” or “nation in arms”. The military isperceived as the symbol of nationhood and national pride.1) Second, their relationis hierarchically designed, so that the army tutors the nation and guards the nationalideals and interests. The armed forces do not only defend the homeland, but also theRepublic and the constitution.2) However, the July 15 coup attempt, exercised largelyby parts of the military challenged this relationship.The government’s narrative on the July 15 coup attempt sees the putschists as aninstrument of western powers – primarily of the US – and that their action shouldin fact be considered as an act of foreign invasion. Therefore, when the PresidentErdo#an appealed the people on the night of the instigation to take the streetsagainst the putsch, he revived the ethos of resisting to an invasion. In the same vein,the coup bid is believed to fail because of popular resistance. The nation is said tohave stood against and thwarted the coup attempt and protected the Republic andits institutions at the cost of their lives. Not the military, but the people as natural bornsoldiers without a uniform faced off and defeated traitors in military uniform.Othering the Gülen-Terrorists from the TAFThe victory of the nation over the traitors in military uniform and its emergence asthe savior of homeland reversed the tutelary relation between the army and thenation. The nation’s guardianship over the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was backedby legal and constitutional civilianization reforms of the government between 2016and 2018. Notably, the Chief of the General Staff was placed under the Ministryof National Defense, controlling mechanisms of the President and the Ministry ofNational Defense over the TAF was enlarged, the Supreme Military Council is nowdominated by civilians, and judicial autonomy of the armed forces was terminated.The courts played a critical role in the modification of the military nation cult bydetaching those in the dock from the military. In the indictments3), the putschistswere introduced not as military officers, not even proper members of the armybut those of Islamist Gülenist Community, an old ally of the government who hadalready been designated a terror organization by the time of the coup attempt.Accordingly, the putsch took place in the form of Gülenist Terror Organization actingthrough his militants nested in the TAF. Before courts, the July 15 incident was- 2 -officially called “the Coup Attempt of Gülenist Terror Organization/Parallel StateStructure”, portraying it as an attempt not by the military members but by terrorists,who captured military ranks and acted in line with the aims of this terror organization.In that way, the courts gave the remaining cadres of TAF a chance to dissociatethemselves from the putschists.Additionally, the courts created the image that they were just a servant of the gallantnation. Since the nation was the real owner of the victory against the putschists, itsdesires would shape the courts’ decisions. The crowd was allowed to gather outsideof the court halls, harass the defendants while they entered the buildings, and voicetheir demands concerning the court judgment. Those familiar with the broad strokesof the developments will remember the scenes of public enthusiasm before thecourt halls in Sincan Prison Compound in Ankara, where the General Staff Roof trialtook place: people were chanting for reenactment of death penalty, holding postersand demanding a new single dress code for coup plotters. After they had protectedthe national will and democracy against the coup makers on the night of July 15,the people were then ensuring that the so-called terrorist were getting what theydeserved. In this context, state sponsorship of the gatherings before the court hallsis noteworthy: Transportation to and from the court halls was provided mainly bymunicipalities free of charge. In the summer days, municipalities pitched tents infront of the court halls to comfort the audience while it waited outside, and procuredfood and beverage.Fading Hopes for CivilianizationAfter July 15, the military hierarchy was reshaped by executive decree-drivenpurges. During the state of emergency rule 15,021 military personnel were removed.Even afterwards, another 4,562 soldiers were sacked until June 2020. The disregardfor procedural safeguards caused profound human rights violations. The mostcommon of these infringements concerned the post-coup mass detentions and thefollowing pre-trial detention practice. Recently, the European Court of Human Rights(ECtHR) ruled in September 2022 for 230 detained judges on the cases of Atamanand Others v. Türkiye, Bayram and Others v. Türkiye, Gele# and Others v. Türkiye,and Ulusoy and Others v. Türkiye that applicants’ rights to liberty and security wereviolated due to the lack of reasonable suspicion and the longevity of their pre-trialdetention within the frame of Article 5 of the Convention. Actually, the ECtHR hasarrived at similar decisions for about 430 more applicants since 2019 on the usageof pre-trial detention measure by the domestic courts,4) which clearly attests to thewidespread use of unlawful practices in coup attempt prosecutions.While all this was happening, the government continued to work in partnership withthe TAF. In the immediate aftermath of the coup attempt, the TAF launched threeunilateral military operations in Northern Syria and four in Northern Iraq. In January2020, it deployed armed forces to Libya, followed by Azerbaijan, Qatar and theEastern Mediterranean. As a consequence, effectiveness of military operations inforeign policy has increased, while frustrating expectations of a civilianization ofpolitics at the same time. The courts proved to be a constitute element of the new- 3 -power shift in the post-2016 era. While reprehending the suspects as terrorist andtraitors, the July 15 coup attempt case managed to scapegoat and ostracize those inthe dock. In that way, the courts provided the TAF with an exit from humiliation andrestored the unity between the army and the nation under the supreme power of thegovernment, basically of its leader.References• Sarigil, Zeki (2009): “Deconstructing the Turkish military’s popularity”, ArmedForces & Society 35(4):709-727, DOI:10.1177/0095327X08322566• Gürsoy, Yaprak (2012): “The changing role of the military in Turkish politics:democratization through coup plots?”, Democratization 19 (4), 735-760, DOI:10.1080/13510347.2011.623352• Indictment of #zmir Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office dating October 21, 2016,no. 2016/2090; and indictment of Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office datingMarch 21, 2017, no. 2017/10698, 240.• The case Ba# vs Turkey, application no. 66448/17, 3 March 2020; the caseErdal Tercan vs Turkey, application no. 6158/18, 29 July 2021; the caseAlparslan Altan v. Turkey, application no. 12778/17, 16 April 2019; the caseTuran and Others v. Turkey, application no. 75805/16 and 426 others, 23November 2021.- 4 -

Penning a New Narrative of Turkey as a Military Nation

https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/mir_derivate_00013610/Penning_a_New_Narrative_of_Turkey_as_a_Military_Nation.pdf

Penning a New Narrative of Turkey as a Military Nation

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

<intR>²Dok