Chalkley, Martin

Khalil, Fahad

English

The Outcomes Movement, also referred to as the “third revolution in medical care” has focused attention and resources on assessing the effectiveness of medical treatments. Outcomes research aims at determining the nature of effective treatment regimes for medical conditions. Equipped with such information, health care purchasers will be better able to regulate suppliers of health services. In this paper, we consider whether payments conditioned on treatment delivered or on health outcome obtained makes better use of the information provided by outcomes research. We show that consumers can help third party purchasers allevaite incentive problems due to asymmetric information. We find that, if patients in deciding whether to be treated, are responsive to the treatments offered payment-by results may be preferred. We further find that where health care suppliers operate not-for-profit, there is an incentive for purchasers to specify payment-by results

University of Dundee Online Publications

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 125:Third party purchasing and incentives: the "Outcome Movement” and contracts for health services

A Theory of Incentives

Agency for Health Care Policy and Research

Assessment and accountability: The third revolution in medical care,

Contracting for health services when patient demand does not re‡ect quality,

Contracting for health services with unmonitored quality,

Government purchasing of health services,

Grey zones of clinical practice : Some limits of evidence based medicine,

Health care payment systems: Cost and quality incentives,

Hospital reimbursement incentives: An empirical analysis,

Input versus output incentive schemes,

Input versus output monitoring,

Optimal health insurance and provider payment,

Outcomes management: A technology of patient experience,

Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement: Cost sharing and supply,

Rate-setting by diagnosis related groups and hospital specialization,

Recent theory and evidence on competition in hospital markets,

Regulation and the provision of quality to heterogenous consumers: The case of prospective pricing of medical services,

Separating the true e¤ect from gaming in incentive-based contracts in health care,

The outcomes movement - will it get us where we want to go?,

Toward a theory of nonpro…t institutions: An economic model of a hospital,

Towards an evidence-based National Health Service,

UK Clearing House on Health Outcomes

Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care,

Using markets to allocate pollution permits and other scarce resource rights under limited information,

Using subjective risk adjusting to prevent patient dumping in the health care industry,

What physicians know,

http://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/files/109015/DDPE_125.pdf

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 125:Third party purchasing and incentives: the "Outcome Movement” and contracts for health services

Abstract

Similar works

Full text

Available Versions

University of Dundee Online Publications

University of Dundee Online Publications