Mishra, Ajit

English

This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible enforcers in an agency framework. We examine how supervisor’s choice of effort and honesty are influenced by incentives (penalty and reward schemes) and organizational structure. We consider both vertical hierarchies (corrupt supervisor monitoring another) and horizontal structures where more than one corrupt supervisor monitor the agent. The latter tend to induce less corruption but need not welfare dominate the vertical hierarchies. The organizational structure matters most when there are constraints on rewards and penalties

University of Dundee Online Publications

and Muthoo (99) study the problem in a tax evasion and audit

Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies”,

Corruptible Law Enforcers: How should they be compensated?”,

Corruption and Decentralization of Infrastructure Delivery in Developing Countries”, mimeo,

Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”,

Corruption, Extortion and Evasion”,

Enforcement, Efficiency and Corruption”,

Ex Ante and Ex Post Collusion in Hierarchies”, mimeo,

Hierarchy: the Economics of managing”,

On Controlling Crime with Corrupt Officials”,

Tax Enforcement with a Hierarchy of Corrupt Auditors”,

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 112:Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement

http://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/files/103775/DDPE_112.pdf

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 112:Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement

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University of Dundee Online Publications

University of Dundee Online Publications