Akrasia and the Elusive Self

Abstract

The concept of akrasia, or weakness of will, involves knowingly acting against what one judges best. This seems like a paradox of irrationality. However, I argue akrasia implies a notion of the self as a single, agentive mental object which persists across time, has a particular character, and is the subject of experience. This notion corresponds to the “folk” notion of the self invoked in everyday self-experience. However, the folk notion of the self is not only unnecessary for self-experience, it is also the source of the air of paradox surrounding akrasia. The novel view of the self introduced herein—the Multiple Occupant (MO) theory of the self—not only vindicates everyday self-experience, but also resolves the paradoxical nature weakness of will. Furthermore, the theory is suitable not only for establishing the diachronic unity of a self (even one that can act akratically) over time, but for establishing the disunity of a self in cases of dementia, Dissociative Identity Disorder, and Alzheimer’s disease

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