Downey, Michael L.

English

University of Denver

Water Law Review Volume 14 Issue 2 Article 31 1-1-2011 SRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010) Michael L. Downey Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr Custom Citation Michael L. Downey, Court Report, SRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010), 14 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 456 (2011). This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. WATER LAWREVIEWstreams' flow in the 1960's and support its conclusion that the currentIIFS flow was more than in the 1960's. Additionally, the WaterCommission did not err in relying on USGS data or establishing theamended IIFS for the windward streams. The Water Commission alsodid not err in failing to include the unpermitted water in the amendedIIFS because the Water Commission could support its conclusion thatthe current IIFS flow was greater than in the 1960's.Accordingly, the court vacated PMI's water use permit andremanded the case for further proceedings consistent with theopinion.Kelly MillerIDAHOSRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010) (holding that theAppellants had not established a right to the City's water through priorappropriation and could not acquire a right by prescription).Bruce and Jared Bedke ("Appellants") paid the City of Oakley("City") to use water from its pipes. However, Appellants claimed thatthey owned two distinct rights to the water. Appellants claimed thatthe first right had a priority date of 1955 and the second right had apriority date of 1964. Appellants used the water continuously fromthose appropriation dates until 1991. At that time, the City cut andcapped the pipe and proposed a new agreement for the use of thewater with Appellants. Appellants did not sign the agreement.Appellants then ceased payment and use of one of the alleged rightsbut continued use and payment of the other. In 2004, the IdahoDepartment of Water Resources recommended disallowing both ofAppellants' rights. Appellants objected, arguing that they had met allthe requirements for establishing water rights. The City responded tothe objection, arguing that the basis for Appellants' alleged rights wastheir act of taking water from the city pipe, which was a claim to rightsthat actually belonged to the City.A Special Master heard the dispute and rejected Appellants'argument. The Special Master recommended disallowing Appellants'rights and an award of attorney's fees to the City. Appellants appealedthe Special Master's recommendation. On appeal, the District Courtfor the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho ("district court") rejected thechallenge to the Special Master's recommendation as untimely andadopted the Special Master's recommendation of attorney's fees. Thedistrict court later rejected Appellants' motion to reconsider.Appellants then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court ("court").Appellants raised several issues on appeal. First, Appellants arguedthat the district court erred when it rejected the challenge to theSpecial Master's recommendation of disallowing the water rights as456 Volume 14COURT REPORTSuntimely. The court disagreed, holding that the district court did notabuse its discretion when it did not find cause to justify an extension oftime for confusion because the procedural instructions were clear.Second, Appellants argued that the district court erred in adoptingthe recommendation of the Special Master to disallow the Appellants'water rights. In Idaho, the doctrine of prior appropriation requiresthat a party divert water and put it to beneficial use in order to takeownership of a water right. Any diversion work must belong to the oneclaiming a right. Appellants argued that they established water rightsby appropriating spring water from the same spring as the City. TheAppellants' theory was that they appropriated water from the springthrough the City's diversions works (the pipes), the water thencomingled with the City's water, and Appellants reclaimed it when theyremoved the water on the other end. Appellants had not constructedany points of diversion of their own; they were reliant on the City'sdiversions. Nonetheless, Appellants argued that a point of diversion isnot necessary, citing to Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 502(Idaho 2007), where the court upheld water rights without a physicaldiversion. However, the court rejected this argument, holding thatJoyce Livestock created a narrow exception in which an actual point ofdiversion was not necessary for in stream livestock watering on thetheory that livestock were diverting the water directly to themselves.This exception did not apply to Appellants because they were notclaiming in stream livestock watering use. Accordingly, becauseAppellants could not demonstrate that they had diverted the springwater, the court held that the district court did not err in disallowingAppellant's water rights.The court then addressed the Appellants' alternative theory, whichwas that the Appellants' had acquired a prescriptive right to the water.In Idaho, a private party cannot acquire an interest in property held bya municipality through adverse possession or prescription. Therefore,the court ruled that Appellants could'not acquire a prescriptive rightto the City's water. In addition, the court reasoned that Appellants'use of the water was with the City's permission, as evidenced byAppellants' voluntary payment of fees in exchange for use of the waterbefore 1991. Thus, the court held that Appellants did not acquire aprescriptive right to the water.Finally, the court reviewed the award of attorney's fees, findingthat Appellants' claims were frivolous. Appellants did not cite anylegal theory to support their claim that they could establish a rightthrough the diversion works of another party or for the claim that theyacquired a prescriptive right to the City's water. The court also addedattorney's fees for all costs related to defending the appeal.Michael L. DowneyIssue 2 457

SRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010)

https://digitalcommons.du.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1583&context=wlr

SRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010)

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