Blomquist, William

English

Colorado Law

University of Colorado Law School Colorado Law Scholarly Commons Uncovering the Hidden Resource: Groundwater Law, Hydrology, and Policy in the 1990s (Summer Conference, June 15-17) 1992 6-16-1992 The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in Southern California William Blomquist Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/groundwater-law-hydrology-policy  Part of the Environmental Health and Protection Commons, Evidence Commons, Hydraulic Engineering Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, Natural Resources Management and Policy Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons Citation Information Blomquist, William, "The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in Southern California" (1992). Uncovering the Hidden Resource: Groundwater Law, Hydrology, and Policy in the 1990s (Summer Conference, June 15-17). https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/groundwater-law-hydrology-policy/17 Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.     William Blomquist, The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in Southern California, in UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN RESOURCE: GROUNDWATER LAW, HYDROLOGY, AND POLICY IN THE 1990S (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law 1992).  Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law Center) at the University of Colorado Law School.  THE EVOLUTION AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENTINSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIAWilliam BlomquistDepartment of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityIndianapolis, IndianaUNCOVERING THE HIDDEN RESOURCE:GROUNDWATER LAW, HYDROLOGY AND POLICY LAWIN THE 1990sNatural Resources Law CenterUniversity of ColoradoSchool of LawBoulder, ColoradoJune 15-17, 19921The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions inSouthern CaliforniaWilliam BlomquistDepartment of Political ScienceIndiana UniversityIndianapolis, IndianaI. IntroductionA. Various scholars and commentators either have raised thequestion of whether there is groundwater management inCalifornia, or have asserted that there is not. Theircritique is based primarily on the absence of a statewidegroundwater management statute or program.B. In fact, groundwater management does exist in California, butit occurs locally and therefore differs from one basin toanother, and has not yet been implemented in many basins.C. Local basin management programs, and the basin governanceinstitutions that design and implement them, have beendeveloped over time by local water users as water problemshave emerged and been understood. These efforts are not"comprehensive," but incremental and adaptive in keeping withthe nature and limits of human problem-solving.D. This paper describes the development and analyzes theperformance of groundwater management institutions in eightsouthern California basins. It raises and responds to thefollowing key questions:1. How did these institutional arrangements come about?2. What are their characteristics and features?3. How well do they perform?a. How well do they perform across several criteria?b. Are they worth it (relative to letting the basinsgo)?c. Does the single-agency, non-adjudicated basin workbetter than the multi-organizational, adjudicatedbasins?4. What can we learn from their relative successes andfailures?2II. The Lay of the Land: The paper includes eight cases in fourwatersheds, underlying most of the Los Angeles-Orange County-SanBernardino metropolis. Four basins are in the San Gabriel Riverwatershed in Los Angeles County: the Raymond, Main San Gabriel,Central, and West basins. One is in the Los Angeles Riverwatershed in Los Angeles County: the Upper Los Angeles River Area(ULARA). Two are in the Santa Ana River watershed: the OrangeCounty basin, and the Chino Basin in San Bernardino, Riverside, andLos Angeles counties. The remaining groundwater system is alongthe Mojave River in San Bernardino County.III. The Evolution of Basin Governance and Management ArrangementsA. Groundwater problems emerged in these basins at different timesand with differing degrees of severity, but three trendscontributed to the supply problems and the need to controlgroundwater demand in all of them.1. Development of lands for irrigated agriculture accountedfor the growth in groundwater use throughout southernCalifornia, and several basins were at or near overdraftby the time they began to urbanize in earnest.2. In most southern California basins, urbanization andpopulation growth did not increase total water use, butdid aggravate groundwater problems by reducing returnflows and natural replenishment.3. As large-scale water projects brought more expensiveimported water to southern California, water users facedthe problems of how to encourage pumpers to rely onimports to meet at least some of their needs, and whowould pay for the imported supplies.B. In the four groundwater basins of the San Gabriel Riverwatershed, these groundwater problems were addressed throughadjudication and limitation of rights to local water supplies,creation of districts to pay for supplemental water supplies,and (in three of the cases) imposition of a pump tax topurchase imported water for basin replenishment.1. In the relatively small Raymond Basin, the city ofPasadena took all other pumpers to court to define theirrelative rights to the local groundwater supplies. Theresulting judgment introduced the doctrine of "mutualprescription" into California groundwater law, definingall pumping rights as of equal priority and thenreducing them in total to the basin safe yield.2. West Basin water users faced problems of overdraft, lossof freshwater replenishment from Central Basin upstream,and saltwater intrusion from the ocean. They curtailedpumping with a "mutual prescription" type ofadjudication of pumping rights. They acquired access toimported water supplies through the formation of theWest Basin Municipal Water District and its annexationto MWD. They encouraged Central Basin pumpers to beginsimilar processes, and cooperated in the creation of theCentral and West Basin Water Replenishment District totaxpumping and operate a basin replenishment program tobenefit both basins. They developed an injection-wellbarrier to block saltwater intrusion.3. Central Basin water users faced problems of overdraft,loss of freshwater inflow from the San Gabriel Valleyupstream, and saltwater intrusion. They first acquiredaccess to imported water supplies through the creationof the Central Basin Municipal Water District and itsannexation to MWD. They then initiated a suit againstupstream pumpers to guarantee flows of the San GabrielRiver through Whittier Narrows to Central Basin. Theycooperated with West Basin users in the creation of theCentral and West Basin Water Replenishment District tooperate a basin replenishment program and a saltwaterintrusion barrier. Finally, they curtailed pumpingwithin Central Basin with a "mutual prescription" typeof adjudication.4. Main San Gabriel Basin water users faced problems ofoverdraft, and pressure from downstream users to gain4access to imported water supplies and restrain theirdependence on local water supplies. They responded bycreating an Upper San Gabriel Valley Municipal WaterDistrict that annexed to MWD, then settling with thedownstream users over rights to San Gabriel River flowsthrough Whittier Narrows, and finally by adjudicatingpumping rights among Main San Gabriel Basin users.C. The city of Los Angeles had asserted a "pueblo water right" tothe water supplies of the Los Angeles River and to thegroundwater supplies of the ULARA that feed the flows of theLos Angeles River. The growing San Fernando Valley cities ofBurbank, Glendale, and San Fernando relied increasingly on thegroundwater supplies of the valley. Eventually, the fourcities were involved in an attempt to adjudicate pumpingrights throughout the ULARA. The trial judge attempted tofollow the "mutual prescription" approach of the San GabrielRiver basins, but his decision was reversed by the CaliforniaSupreme Court in 1975. The subsequent division of ULARAwaters was finalized at the trial court level in 1979.D. In the Mojave River watershed, a water agency was formed in1959 to acquire access to State Project water that was due tocross the region in 1972. The agency board, a group ofupstream pumpers, and some water rights attorneys andengineers attempted to put together a "mutual prescription"type of adjudication of pumping rights along the river, inanticipation of the arrival of imported water supplies. Theattempted adjudication failed after ten years, leaving muchenmity among pumpers in the area and little prospect forfruitful cooperation.E. In the lower area of the Santa Ana River watershed, OrangeCounty water users have been active in taking collectiveaction tO protect and enhance local water supplies since the1930s. Upper area water users, such as those in the ChinoBasin, did not organize basin governance and managementarrangements until later, and to some degree at the stimulusof actions taken in Orange County.1. Orange county water users created the Orange County Water• District in 1933 to assist with litigation against some• upstream water users. Since then, the district has beeninvolved in two other adjudications against upstreamusers, but Orange County water users have neveradjudicated and limited their own pumping rights.Instead, they innovated basinwide replenishment fundedby a pump tax. Later, the Orange County Water Districtalso constructed a saltwater intrusion barrier projectbased on a modification of the designs used in theCentral and West basins.2. Chino Basin pumpers did adjudicate pumping rights, butnot until the California Supreme Court had ruled in theULARA case in ways that cast serious doubt on the"mutual prescription" solutions devised in the SanGabriel River watershed. Accordingly, the Chino Basinallocation of pumping rights had to be tailored to fitthe limitations of the Supreme Court decision, as wellas the particular circumstances of the basin, which wasjust beginning a rapid transition from agricultural tourban land uses. The resulting institutionalarrangements are among the most complicated inCalifornia and perhaps anywhere in the United States.F. Institutional development in these basins can be viewed as anevolutionary process, not in the biological sense of randommutations, but in the cultural sense of "path-dependence" andadaptation. The institutional designs from one basin to thenext built upon and were shaped by decisions taken in theprevious i basins, while at the same time considerable tailoringwas involved in fitting the institutional arrangements to theparticular circumstances of each basin and watershed.IV. Summary of the Basin Governance and Management Arrangements: Beforeanalyzing their performance on several criteria, we should brieflyreview the basin governance and management arrangements currentlyin place in the seven managed basins.A. The San Gabriel River watershed features four adjudicated	 /Thbasins and an adjudicated river system.1. Raymond Basin is governed by a management board composedof pumpers' representatives. Pumpers hold fixed,transferable rights under the provisions of the 1945judgment. Rights total the basin safe yield, and thereis no basin-wide replenishment program.2. West Basin pumping rights are allocated under the 1961judgment and are fixed and transferable. The Centraland West Basin Water Replenishment District imposes atax on all pumping and directs the basin replenishmentand saltwater intrusion barrier programs.3. Central Basin pumping rights are allocated under the 1965judgment and are fixed and transferable. The Centraland West Basin Water Replenishment District imposes atax on all pumping and directs the basin replenishmentand saltwater intrusion barrier programs.4. Main San Gabriel Basin pumping rights were determined inthe 1973 judgment, and are allocated as shares of thebasin's operating safe yield. The operating safe yieldis set each year by the Main San Gabriel BasinWatermaster, a 9-member board composed of pumpers' anddistricts' representatives which also regulates basinwater storage and monitors compliance with the judgment.5. The waters of the San Gabriel River are allocated betweenthe upper and lower areas of the watershed by a formulaestablished in a 1965 judgment. The upper areaguarantees the lower area a minimum inflow of usablewater each year. A 3-member San Gabriel RiverWatermaster, composed of upper area and lower arearepresentatives, oversees operations under the judgment.B. CLARA groundwater is divided among parties according to theprovisions of a 1979 judgment. Those pumping rights are nottransferable. The judgment is administered by an individualCLARA Watermaster appointed by the court, and assisted by aWatermaster Advisory Committee composed of pumpers'representatives.C. The Santa Ana River watershed contains some adjudicated andsome nonadjudicated basins.1. Orange County groundwater supplies have not beenadjudicated. Pumpers do not have defined ortransferable pumping rights. The Orange County WaterDistrict monitors basin water conditions and operates abasin replenishment program funded by pump taxes. Thereplenishment program replaces pumping in excess of thebasin's safe yield with imported replenishment water.The district also operates the basin's saltwaterintrusion barrier program.2. Chino Basin pumpers are divided into pools according towhether their pumping is for overlying agricultural use,overlying nonagricultural use, or appropriative useunder the terms of the 1978 judgment. Appropriatorshave transferable pumping rights defined as shares inthe basin's operating safe yield. Overlyingnonagricultural pumpers have fixed, nontransferablepumping rights. Overlying agricultural pumpers haveaggregate nontransferable pumping rights. The ChinoBasin Watermaster, assisted and advised by a WatermasterAdvisory Committee composed of pumpers' representatives,sets the basin's operating safe yield and monitorscompliance with the 1978 judgment.3. The waters of the Santa Ana River are allocated betweenthe upper and lower areas of the watershed by a formulaestablished in a 1968 judgment. The upper areaguarantees the lower area a minimum inflow of usablewater each year. A 5-member Santa Ana River Watermaster,composed of upper area and lower area representatives,oversees operations under the judgment.8V. Institutional performance in the seven managed basins is comparedusing seven performance criteria.A. The seven performance criteria are: compliance, effectiveness,efficiency in basin management costs, efficiency in resourceuse, equity in the allocation of costs to benefits, equity inthe allocation of pumping rights, and adaptability.B. Comparisons of the basins show high levels of performance onall criteria, with some differences in efficiency and equity.1. Compliance rates have been so high that no water usershas been sanctioned for violating rules, even in thebasins where management has been in place for almost 50years.2. All basin management programs have been effective inhalting depletion and further degradation of watersupplies.3. Basin management costs are low compared with thereplacement cost of groundwater supplies. The lowestcosts per acre-foot are in Raymond Basin, the highest inOrange County.4. Basin management has preserved the groundwater basins,transferred their use from lower- to higher-valued uses,and taken advantage of their value as water storage anddistribution facilities. Just replacing their storagecapacity would be extraordinarily expensive. Basinpreservation has been a good bargain for southernCalifornia.5. For the most part, the pumpers are the greatestbeneficiaries of the basin management programs, and theybear the costs of those programs. The basin managementprograms show little evidence of "rent-seeking" behavioror subsidization.6. Adjudication drove out many small pumpers, but itimpossible to say how many, because the urbanizationprocesses that were simultaneously underway in theadjudicated basins were also reducing the number ofsmall pumpers, and the number of small pumpers has9continued to decline since adjudication. Orange County,as the only nonadjudicated basin in this study, has thelargest number of small pumpers. On the other hand,Orange County pumpers do not have defined, transferablepumping rights, so small pumpers also cannot exchangetheir pumping rights for anything of value.7. All basin governance structures and management programshave proved adaptable to changed conditions and to newideas about basin management. In some cases, basingovernance structures or management programs have beenmodified in response to new ideas or developments. Inmost cases, adaptability was built into basin governanceas a design element.VI. Analysis and Discussion: Why do southern California water usersprefer this "chaos"A. What can we learn from the failures and shortcomings? Most ofthe failures and shortcomings in these basins relate to eitherthe attempt to impose an institutional "formula" for basinmanagement or the attempt to move too fast toward basinmanagement without building a consensus about the nature andseverity of water supply problems. The biggest shortcomingsof the basin management programs themselves are the failure inmost instances to adequately define rights to basin storage,and in some cases to allocate transferable pumping rights.B. The basin governance and management arrangements work as wellas they do because they exhibit the strengths of polycentric,self-governing systems. They take advantage of specializationand differences in the appropriate scale of organization fordifferent tasks. They are regarded as fair and worthy ofcompliance because they were designed and implemented by thewater users themselves. They are closely tailored to theindividual physical, legal, and economic circumstances of eachbasin. And they have generated substantial amounts ofinnovation, experimentation, and learning about basinmanagement.10C. These results reinforce the difficulties of approachinggroundwater management through a single statewide, regulatoryapproach, No statewide management program could accommodatethe differences among basins, but more importantly, the goalof a "comprehensive" program is unattainable: it presumes thathuman beings already know everything there is to know aboutgroundwater basins and their management. What is neededinstead is an institutionally-rich system that sets severalminds to work on problems in Several places, and allows goodideas to emerge even at the risk of allowing some bad ones tobe tried' as well.

The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in Southern California

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The Evolution and Performance of Groundwater Management Institutions in Southern California

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