Mishra, Ajit

English

We consider a model of enforcement where the Principal relies on the Supervisor for information on the Agents. We argue that optimal policies must consider both collusion and extortion possibilities. Both collusion and extortion can be prevented by mechanisms resembling appeals process. However, if appeals involve a net cost for the agents, then optimal enforcement policy may involve over-enforcement or under-enforcement

University of Dundee Online Publications

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 184:Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion

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Collusion under asymmetric information,

Corruption, extortion and evasion,

Harassment, corruption and tax policy,

Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the role of Collusion

Incentive Reforms in Developing Country Bureaucracies, Annual World bank Conference on Developm

Marginal deterrence in enforcement of law,

http://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/ws/files/109207/DDPE_184.pdf

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 184:Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion

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University of Dundee Online Publications

University of Dundee Online Publications