邱杨茜，厦门大学经济学院助理教授；叶展，厦门大学经济学院博士研究生。【中文摘要】公司债券定价一直是影响公司债券市场发展的核心问题，随着越来越多的上市公司实施高管股权激励，股东、高管和债券人之间的关系和利益冲突变得更加复杂。以2007—2015年我国A股上市公司在沪深证券交易所发行的公司债作为样本,进行高管股权激励对公司债发行定价的影响研究。研究结果表明:我国上市公司高管股权激励水平与其发行的公司债信用利差显著正相关;产品市场竞争程度以及大股东控制权的增加显著提高高管股权激励水平对公司债信用利差的正向影响;面对较高的债务融资成本，上市公司会通过调整高管股权激励水平以避免债务融资条件恶化。
【Abstract】Corporate bond pricing has always been a core issue affecting the development of the corporate bond market,and as more and more listed firms implement executive equity incentives,the relationship and conflicts of interest between shareholders,executives and bondholders become more complex.Using a sample of corporate bonds issued by the Chinese A-share listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,this paper investigates the impact of executive equity incentives on the initial pricing of corporate bonds.The results show that,the equity incentives intensity is positively associated with the credit spread of corporate bonds,and this relationship increases with the imporvement of product market competition and the control rights of large shareholders. Furthermore,in the face of high debt financing cost, listed firms will adjust the intensity of equity incentives to avoid the deterioration of debt financing conditions
