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阶段融资情境下不同债务契约激励效应的实验研究
Authors
万迪昉
罗进辉
蔡地
Publication date
28 October 2011
Publisher
Abstract
如何设计合理的金融契约以增强对创业企业家和风险投资者双方的激励是公司金融研究领域的一个重要话题。运用实验室经济学方法,并结合创业企业阶段融资的现实特点,构建了标准债务契约、简单可转债契约以及可赎回可转债契约三种实验环境,分析了上述三种金融契约对企业家和投资者激励效应的差异。实验结果表明,对于企业家而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的努力水平最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。对于投资者而言,在可赎回可转债契约下投入的初始资金比例最高,在简单可转债契约下最低,标准债务契约下居中。进一步地分析还发现,在控制了外部环境的影响时,可赎回可转债契约下,项目得到继续投资的概率最高,企业家和投资者双方的收益最高,社会福利最大
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Last time updated on 16/06/2016