Includes supplementary material. Please contact [email protected] for access.When the Islamic State used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to target coalition forces in 2014, the use of UAVs rapidly expanded, giving weak states and non-state actors an asymmetric advantage over their technologically superior foes. This asymmetry led the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to spend vast sums of money on counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS). Despite the market density, many C-UAS technologies use expensive, bulky, and high-power-consuming electronic attack methods for ground-to-air interdiction. This thesis outlines the current technology used for C-UAS and proposes a defense-in-depth framework using airborne C-UAS patrols outfitted with cyber-attack capabilities. Using aerial interdiction, this thesis develops a novel C-UAS device called the Detachable Drone Hijacker—a low-size, weight, and power C-UAS device designed to deliver cyber-attacks against commercial UAVs using the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication specification. The experimentation results show that the Detachable Drone Hijacker, which weighs 400 grams, consumes one Watt of power, and costs $250, can interdict adversarial UAVs with no unintended collateral damage. This thesis recommends that the DOD and DHS incorporates aerial interdiction to support its C-UAS defense-in-depth, using technologies similar to the Detachable Drone Hijacker.DASN-OE, Washington DC, 20310Captain, United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited
