The Northern Ireland Assembly election of May 2022 was transformational, despite small shifts in the magnitudes of seats won by the two dominant blocs. John Garry, Brendan O’Leary and James Pow discuss the results

Garry, John

O’Leary, Brendan

Pow, James

English

LSE Research Online

Much	more	than	meh:	The	2022	Northern	IrelandAssembly	ElectionsThe	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	election	of	May	2022	wastransformational,	despite	small	shifts	in	the	magnitudes	of	seats	won	bythe	two	dominant	blocs.	John	Garry,	Brendan	O’Leary	and	James	Powdiscuss	the	results.On	5	May	Sinn	Féin	won	first	place	in	the	NI	Assembly	elections	–	bothin	first-preference	votes	(29%),	and	in	seats	won	(27	of	the	90	MLA	positions	in	play,	i.e.,	30%).	As	reported	acrossthe	world,	that	is	the	first	time	any	Irish	nationalist	party	has	headed	the	polls	in	region-wide	elections	in	NorthernIreland,	earning	Sinn	Féin	the	right	to	nominate	the	First	Minister.	In	1922,	the	Northern	Ireland	Parliament	hadvoted	to	secede	from	the	Irish	Free	State	under	Article	12	of	the	Anglo-Irish	Treaty.	Northern	Ireland’s	100thbirthday	has	therefore	coincided	with	the	reversal	of	its	founding	rationale.	A	novel	political	entity,	forged	to	securean	Ulster	unionist	and	Protestant	demographic	and	electoral	majority,	no	longer	has	either.The	Democratic	Unionist	Party	(the	DUP)	came	second	in	first-preference	votes	(21.3%),	a	significant	losscompared	with	what	it	had	won	in	2017	(28.1%).	But	the	DUP	lost	just	three	seats	compared	to	2017,	winning	25seats	(25/90	=	27.8%).	This	disproportional	outcome	occurred	because	its	candidates	benefitted	from	lower-ordervote-transfers	from	those	who	had	backed	the	über-hardline	Traditional	Unionist	Voice	(TUV),	which	hadcampaigned	with	“No	Sea	Border”	beside	its	name	on	the	ballot	paper,	and	won	7.6%	of	the	first-preference	vote.The	TUV	won	just	one	seat	(1/90=1.1%),	returning	its	party	leader,	because	its	candidates	received	very	fewtransfers	from	those	who	had	voted	for	other	unionist	parties’	candidates.The	Alliance	Party	came	third	in	first-preference	votes	(13.5%),	but	won	17	seats	(17/90	=	18.8%).	The	party	morethan	doubled	its	seat-share	compared	to	2017.	It	disproportionally	benefitted	from	lower-order	transfers	from	otherparties.	Its	success	was	partly	at	the	expense	of	the	Green	Party,	which	lost	the	two	MLAs	it	had	won	in	2017.Alliance	is	formally	neutral	on	the	question	of	whether	Northern	Ireland	should	remain	in	the	United	Kingdom	orreunify	with	the	rest	of	Ireland.The	headline-grabbing	achievements	of	Sinn	Féin	and	Alliance	should	not	obscure	the	DUP’s	robust	performancein	seats-won.	Despite	the	battering	the	party	took	to	its	standing	and	prestige	before	the	election	it	stopped	thebleeding	–	at	least	for	now.	StabilityOverall,	the	election	results	are	suggestive	of	stability,	and	of	incremental	rather	than	major	change,	despite	thetransformational	symbolism	of	Sinn	Féin’s	win.	Stability	is	evident	in	four	features	of	the	election:Sinn	Féin	won	the	same	number	of	seats	as	it	did	in	2017	on	a	marginally	improved	first-preference	vote	total.There	was	evidence	that	both	Sinn	Féin	and	the	DUP	continued	to	appeal	to	be,	and	to	benefit	from	beingseen	as,	the	champions	or	tribunes	of	their	respective	blocs.Northern	Ireland	continues	to	have	two	similarly	sized	nationalist	and	unionist	blocs:	35-37	in	seats,	and	41-42%	of	the	first-preference	votes—after	adding	in	votes	for	known	nationalist	and	unionist	micro-parties	andcandidates.The	others,	the	‘non-aligned’	bloc,	remain	firmly	behind	the	two	major	blocs,	having	16.4	%	of	the	first-preference	votes,	but	they	won	20%	of	the	seats	because	of	Alliance’s	‘seat-bonus’.Incremental	change,	however,	is	reflected	in	three	distinct	features	of	the	election:Sinn	Féin	grew	further	at	the	expense	of	the	SDLP	within	the	nationalist	bloc,	which	overall	grew	slightlycompared	to	its	first-preference	vote	total	in	2017	(adding	in	the	micro-nationalist	and	republican	parties	andcandidates).The	DUP	faced	much	greater	competition	on	its	right	flank	(from	the	TUV)	and	from	its	comparatively	liberalBritish Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 1 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/rival,	the	Ulster	Unionist	Party	(UUP).The	‘other	bloc’	in	the	Assembly	is	now	dominated	by	one	party	–	Alliance.	It	has	become	the	tribune	of	theothers,	and	the	champion	of	changing	Northern	Ireland’s	consociational	arrangements.	Alliance’s	success	isalso	owed,	at	the	margin,	to	its	success	in	winning	transfers	from	the	soft	nationalists	and	soft	unionists,	theSocial	Democratic	and	Labour	Party	(SDLP)	and	the	UUP.	Alliance	is	over-represented	in	the	Assembly,	andthe	other	bloc	also	has	more	seats	than	its	first-preference	vote-share.	Such	data	will	form	part	of	predictablereplies	to	its	complaint	that	the	consociational	system	is	stacked	against	cross-community	parties.Cross-bloc	comparisonsThere	are	different	ways	to	classify	the	outcome	by	blocs.	By	seats	won	is	one	method.	Table	1	below	displays	theexpected	designation-choice	of	parties	or	MLAs	in	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly.	There	are	37	unionist	MLAs	(25DUP	+	9	UUP	+	1	TUV	+	Alex	Easton	in	North	Down	and	Claire	Sugden	in	Londonderry	East),	35	nationalists	(27Sinn	Féin	+	8	SDLP	MLAs),	and	18	others	(17	Alliance	+	People	Before	Profit’s	Gerry	Carroll	in	West	Belfast).Expressed	in	percentages,	the	Assembly	is	41.1%	unionist,	38.9%	nationalist,	and	20%	other.A	second	method	of	bloc-comparison	is	to	present	all	first-preference	votes.	Instead	of	taking	expected	designationin	the	Assembly	as	decisive	in	classifying	a	party	or	a	candidate,	observers	may	examine	parties’	and	independentcandidates’	formal	stance	on	the	national	question.	In	each,	the	question	to	be	answered	is	whether	parties	orcandidates	favour	Irish	reunification,	maintaining	the	Union,	or	are	they	neutral,	indifferent,	prefer	to	postpone,	orare	simply	uninterested	in	“the	national	question”	–	in	which	case	they	are	‘other.’	The	results	of	our	codings	are	inTable	2.A	few	words	on	party	codings	(see	Table	3).	Coding	the	UUP,	the	DUP,	the	TUV,	and	the	PUP	as	unionist	waseasy:	unionist	is	in	their	titles.	We	then	added	the	Conservative	Party	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the	Heritage	Party	tothe	unionist	bloc.	Classifying	the	SDLP,	Sinn	Féin,	Aontú,	and	the	Irish	Republican	Socialist	Party	(IRSP)	asnationalist	was	equally	easy.	These	parties	favour	Irish	reunification.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 2 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/But	we	also	coded	the	9,	798	first-preference	votes	for	People	Before	Profit	as	nationalist.	It	is	an	all-island	party,explicitly	favours	Irish	reunification,	and	explicitly	calls	for	“a	border	poll”	(its	words,	not	ours)	in	its	manifesto.	Wemade	this	coding	decision	knowing	that	in	the	past	the	party’s	MLAs	have	chosen	to	designate	in	the	Assembly	asother.	Our	judgment	is	reinforced	because,	despite	its	formal	cross-community	appeal,	the	PBP’s	electoral	strength,such	as	it	is,	is	confined	to	republican	heartlands:	its	prime	competition	is	with	Sinn	Féin.The	other	bloc	was	also	relatively	straightforward	to	code.	Alliance	and	the	Greens	are	the	largest	parties	in	thisbloc:	the	former	is	neutral	on	the	Union;	the	latter	does	not	prioritise	reunification,	though	it	is	an	all-island	party.The	same	applies	to	the	micro-socialist	entities:	the	Workers’	Party,	the	Socialist	Party,	and	the	Cross	CommunityLabour	Alternative	(CCLA).	Now	some	brief	words	on	the	coding	of	independents,	where	the	trickiest	questions	were	expected	to	arise;	afterall,	they	call	themselves	independents.	O’Leary	and	Pow	independently	coded	each	independent	candidate	asnationalist	or	unionist	or	other,	judging	each	of	them	by	their	election	statements,	if	available,	or	by	information	onthe	web.	Two	unionist	independents	are	uncontroversial:	Easton	(North	Down)	and	Sugden	(Londonderry	east).	Weeasily	agreed	that	Hynds	in	Lagan	Valley	and	Moran	in	South	Antrim	were	independent	unionists.	We	classified	fourindependents	as	nationalists:	Quigley,	ex-SDLP,	in	Londonderry	East,	a	former	SDLP	councillor	who	left	the	partyover	abortion,	McCloskey	in	Foyle,	who	has	firm	republican	convictions	but	is	anti-abortion,	Gallagher	in	westTyrone	who	is	palpably	a	republican,	and	DeSouza	in	Fermanagh	and	West	Tyrone	(a	slightly	more	difficultdecision).	All	the	remaining	independents	were	classified	as	other	without	equivocation	on	the	part	of	either	coder.The	gap	between	the	top	two	blocs	by	party-candidates	was	3,842	in	favour	of	nationalists.	In	total,	however,	aftercoding	and	adding	in	the	first-preference	votes	for	independents,	the	unionist	bloc	had	a	net	advantage	of	6,416votes	(less	than	a	percentage	point).	Unionist	hegemony	is	over,	the	unionist	plurality	survives	by	a	thread.A	power-sharing	government:	now,	later,	or	not	at	all?According	to	the	rules	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement,	as	modified	at	St	Andrews,	the	party	that	gets	the	most	seatsis	entitled	to	nominate	the	First	Minister	in	the	power-sharing	executive.	Although	the	First	and	deputy	First	Ministerare	legally	equal,	if	the	DUP	refuses	to	nominate	a	deputy	First	Minister,	executive	formation	cannot	be	completed.If	executive	formation	does	proceed,	then	most	of	the	rest	of	the	executive	will	be	filled	by	the	d’Hondt	rule:	seetable	4	below.	The	SDLP	will	not	be	entitled	to	any	portfolios.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 3 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/According	to	current	legislation,	Northern	Ireland	has	seven	departments	headed	by	a	minister,	to	be	filled	by	thed’Hondt	rule.	If	all	parties	take	the	portfolios	to	which	they	are	entitled,	then,	as	the	last	row	of	table	4	shows,	therewill	be	three	nationalist	ministers,	three	unionist	ministers	(two	DUP,	one	UUP),	and	one	Alliance	minister,	allocatedthrough	d’Hondt.	But,	if	we	add	the	two	First	Ministers,	and	the	Justice	Minister,	who	is	elected	by	cross-communityconsent	and	almost	invariably	an	Alliance	nominee,	the	final	executive	composition	would	be	as	follows:	Sinn	Féin4,	DUP	3,	UUP	1,	and	Alliance	2	ministries.	Differently	put,	there	would	be	four	nationalists,	four	unionists,	and	twoothers	in	the	cabinet.	The	Alliance	will	have	2/10	portfolios,	a	proportion	above	both	its	first-preference	vote	shareand	its	seat-share,	so	it	can	hardly	complain	that	the	system	works	against	the	party	in	this	respect.If	the	parties	succeed	in	their	eventual	negotiations	on	government-formation,	they	might,	of	course,	choose	toagree	to	modify	the	number	of	ministers	in	the	executive,	but	that	would	require	legislation	at	Westminster,	as	thecurrent	number	of	ministerial	departments	is	fixed	by	law,	and	we’re	a	long	way	from	that	possibility.Matters	of	ProtocolThe	DUP’s	message	to	the	UK	government,	as	well	as	to	the	electorate,	has	been	that	unless	the	Protocol	isscrapped,	or	significantly	amended,	the	DUP	will	prohibit	the	creation	of	an	executive.	It	says:	it’s	either	the	Protocolor	the	executive	but	not	both.Although	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	has	no	legislative	power	over	the	Protocol,	the	MLAs	just	elected	wouldhave	a	vote	at	the	end	of	2024	on	whether	to	discontinue	key	elements	of	the	Protocol.	The	Unionist	parties	arestrongly	opposed	to	the	Protocol,	but	their	combined	seat	share	is	significantly	short	of	the	Assembly	majorityneeded	to	discontinue	the	relevant	Protocol	articles:	just	37	MLAs	out	of	90.The	Johnson	government	simply	cannot	interpret	the	Assembly	elections	as	indicating	that	a	majority	in	NorthernIreland	is	against	the	Protocol.	Exactly	the	contrary	is	the	case.	Judging	by	both	first-preference	votes	and	seatsthe	majority	that	favours	a	functional	Protocol	has	increased	compared	to	the	previous	Assembly.	And	unionists	arenot	of	one	mind	on	the	Protocol:	many	in	the	UUP	favour	a	more	moderate	approach,	reform	rather	than	abolition.Possible	referendum	on	Irish	reunification?British Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 4 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/Examining	the	combined	seat	share	of	nationalist	parties	is	also	important.	It	provides	a	very	rough	proxy	of	theextent	of	support	for	a	united	Ireland	–	though	some	Alliance	voters,	many	Greens,	and	most	People	Before	Profitsupporters	would	vote	for	Irish	unification	in	the	event	of	a	referendum	on	the	subject.	While	Sinn	Féin	retained	its27	seats,	the	SDLP	had	a	poor	election,	declining	from	12	to	8	seats,	losing	votes	to	both	Sinn	Féin	and	Aontú,	amicro-nationalist	party	that	is	against	abortion	(the	SDLP	regards	it	as	a	matter	of	conscience	for	each	MLA).	Thecombined	nationalist	first-preference	vote,	at	41.4	%	by	our	coding,	is	marginally	behind	the	unionist	vote-share.The	Secretary	of	State	for	Northern	Ireland	is	unlikely	to	be	obliged	to	interpret	the	Assembly	elections	as	indicatinga	groundswell	of	support	for	Irish	unity.	We	are	therefore	not	likely	to	see	an	imminent	holding	of	a	referendum	onthe	question.	That	will	be	deferred	until	at	least	the	next	Assembly.Another	election?It	is	quite	possible	that	this	May’s	election	will	be	looked	back	upon	as	the	first	Assembly	election	of	2022.	Unlessthe	UK	government	and	the	EU	make	an	agreement	on	the	running	of	the	Protocol	and	the	DUP	declares	itselfcontent	with	that	agreement,	we	may	be	headed	toward	prolonged	negotiations	to	establish	a	functioning	executive.The	parties	have	six	months	to	try	to	do	so,	at	which	point	the	UK	government,	according	to	current	legislation,would	call	a	fresh	election.	So	as	the	parties	open	discussions	to	try	to	reach	an	agreement	on	executive	formation,their	negotiations	will	be	conducted	with	half	an	eye	to	how	party	positions	are	likely	to	play	with	the	electorate	in	sixmonths’	time.The	DUP	may	feel	obliged	to	maintain	a	hard-line	position	because	they	perceive	their	main	electoral	threat	to	bethe	staunchly	anti-Protocol	TUV,	which	enjoyed	an	increase	in	vote	share	in	this	election	(though	it	only	retained	itsone	seat).	If	so,	the	electoral	count	centres	may	have	to	gear	up	for	a	late	autumn	return.While	Sinn	Féin	and	Alliance	leaders	will	be	very	happy,	the	DUP’s	leadership	has	many	questions	to	answer.	Oneis	most	important	to	the	party	itself:	the	vote	assessment.	How	confident	is	the	DUP	that	if	it	forces	another	electionwithin	the	next	six	months	that	it	will	do	as	well	then	as	it	has	just	done?ReformsThere	will	be	proposals	aplenty	to	change	the	existing	consociational	design,	as	there	have	been	ever	since	1998.Some	of	these	will	be	fanciful	and	violate	both	the	letter	and	the	ethos	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement.	However,	ifthe	others	had	surpassed	either	the	nationalist	or	the	unionist	blocs	in	support	(either	in	votes	or	seats)	there	wouldhave	been	a	much	stronger	case	for	reconsidering	and	reforming	the	rules.	The	existing	cross-community	decision-rules	weigh	the	votes	of	nationalist	and	unionist	MLAs	more	than	those	of	others.What	is	true	is	that	Alliance	could	conceivably	have	come	second	in	seats	won,	but	not	have	been	entitled	tonominate	to	the	deputy	First	Minister	position	–	though	it	would	have	been	entitled	to	nominate	the	First	Ministerhad	it	come	first	in	seats.	That	problem	could	be	solved	by	changing	the	rules	so	that	the	two	first	ministers	are	alsoallocated	by	the	d’Hondt	rule	and	by	equalising	their	titles	(eliminating	the	‘deputy’	designation).	Such	a	rule	changecould	be	accompanied	by	another.	The	Justice	Ministry	should	be	filled	in	the	normal	way	as	other	ministries,	by	thed’Hondt	allocation	rule.	It	is	anomalous	that	a	nationalist	can	become	First	Minister	but	effectively	cannot	be	theminister	in	charge	of	the	administration	of	justice.	What	clearly	will	continue	to	command	reformist	attention	is	theunilateral	legal	ability	of	the	leading	party	of	either	major	bloc	to	stop	government	formation.______________________Note:	The	authors	are	investigators	on	the	ESRC	funded	Northern	Ireland	Assembly	Election	Study	2022.About	the	AuthorsJohn	Garry	is	Professor	of	Political	Behaviour	at	Queen’s	University	Belfast	and	leads	TheDemocracy	Unit	at	Queen’s	University	Belfast.		British Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 5 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/Brendan	O’Leary	is	Lauder	Professor	of	Political	Science,	University	of	Pennsylvania,	HonoraryProfessor	of	Political	Science,	Queen’s	University	Belfast,	and	Fulbright	Fellow	to	GalwayUniversity	2021-22.	James	Pow	is	Lecturer	in	the	School	of	History,	Anthropology,	Philosophy	andPolitics,	Queen’s	University	Belfast.			Featured	image	credit:	Talleyrand6,	CC	BY-SA	4.0,	via	Wikimedia	CommonsBritish Politics and Policy at LSE: Much more than meh: The 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Page 6 of 6		Date originally posted: 2022-05-11Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2022-northern-ireland-assembly-elections/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

Much more than meh: the 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly elections

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Much more than meh: the 2022 Northern Ireland Assembly elections

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