Ben Worthy and Mark Bennister compare Boris Johnson and Silvio Berlusconi, writing that the former was removed from office for the same reasons as the latter, particularly their involvement in several scandals and their inability to do anything in the face of economic crisis

Bennister, Mark

Worthy, Ben

English

LSE Research Online

Goodbye	Britain’s	Berlusconi?	Comparing	BorisJohnson’s	premiership	to	Silvio	Berlusconi’sBen	Worthy	and	Mark	Bennister	compare	Boris	Johnson	and	Silvio	Berlusconi,writing	that	the	former	was	removed	from	office	for	the	same	reasons	as	the	latter,particularly	their	involvement	in	several	scandals	and	their	inability	to	do	anything	inthe	face	of	economic	crisis.He	was	a	great	communicator	and	election	winner.	He	had,	it	was	said,	the	Midastouch,	and	could	reach	out	to	voters	beyond	the	normal	range	of	a	politician.	Hisinformal	style,	risqué	jokes,	and	off-colour	comments,	which	often	tipped	into	racism	and	offence,	gave	him	theflavour	of	an	‘outsider’.	Despite	coming	to	power	amid	deep	crisis,	his	sunny	optimism	promised	change.	Love	himor	hate	him,	and	plenty	did	both,	he	dominated	all	political	discussion.	One	star-struck	journalist	praised	his	‘energy’and	saw	in	his	‘unprecedented	majority’	a	‘huge	opportunity	to	proclaim	his	vision’.	Yet	he	ran	aground	amidgrowing	economic	crisis	and	wave	after	wave	of	personal	and	moral	scandals,	as	his	retreat	from	reality	andseeming	pathological	lying	grew	more	pronounced.The	politician	was,	of	course,	Silvio	Berlusconi,	three	time	Italian	Prime	Minister,	and	the	star-struck	journalist	was	ayoung	Boris	Johnson	visiting	his	villa.	Johnson	wrote	gushingly	about	Berlusconi’s	charisma	and	popularity,	butdoubted	whether	he	could	translate	all	of	that	into	political	change.As	others	have	pointed	out	before,	Johnson	resembled	Berlusconi	in	many	ways.	Now,	at	the	end,	the	parallels	arerather	remarkable.	Did	Boris	Johnson	and	Brexit	actually	‘Berlusconify’	Britain?	The	two	leaders	are	exemplars	of	acertain	type	of	unconventional	‘celebrity	politician’.	Both	governed	in	crises	they	helped	to	create,	whether	Britain’sBrexit	or	Italy’s	Tangentopli	corruption	scandal.	Electorally,	Johnson	and	Berlusconi	tied	together	–	sometimes	byforce	of	their	own	personality	–	unwieldly	voter	coalitions	across	the	north	and	south	of	their	countries.	Theirpersonality	and	style	dominated	political	debate,	while	their	rather	woolly	philosophy	mixed	traditional	hard	rightpolicy	and	big	spending	projects.	They	even	shared	an	obsession	with	promising	bridges	that	never	got	built,whether	Berlusconi’s	‘Messina	Straits’	suspension	bridge,	or	Johnson’s	non-existent	bridges	to	France	or	NorthernIreland,	the	latter	of	which	would	run	over	1	million	tonnes	of	‘unexploded	munitions,	plus	chemical	weapons	andradioactive	waste’.Their	style	was	enabled	by	the	system	itself.	Berlusconi	and	Johnson	stand	as	extreme	examples	of	heavilypresidentialised	and	personalised	leaders	within	parliamentary	systems.	Such	leaders,	while	not	actually	beingpresidents,	follow	the	‘logic’	of	behaving	like	them. In the UK, there has long beendiscussion of the dominance of ‘presidential’ prime ministers, and asuccession of leaders were seen to dominate the executive, theirparties, and electoral competition. In Italy, until the late 1980s, primeministers were little more than caretakers until a slew of institutionalreforms, alongside electoral and media pressure, transformed the officeby the 1990s. Berlusconi actually tried to create a more presidential system in 2006,while Johnson and his supporters clearly believed he had some form of personalmandate from the people.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Goodbye Britain’s Berlusconi? Comparing Boris Johnson’s premiership to Silvio Berlusconi’s Page 1 of 3		Date originally posted: 2022-07-18Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/goodbye-britains-berlusconi/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/Silvio	Berlusconi	and	Boris	Johnson	were	‘presidentialised’	in	a	particular	way,	as	personalised	leader	acting	as	a‘communicator	in	chief’	or	‘mediatised	leader’.	It	was	this	supposed	communicative	power,	tied	to	electoral	success,which	allowed	the	two	leaders	to	dominate.	At	the	core	of	their	communication	strategies	and	political	style	was	aclaim	that	they	were	‘radical’	‘outsiders’	and	populists,	anti-elitists	who,	somehow,	embodied	‘The	People’.	Thispower	was	the	essence	of	their	election	victories,	as	each	election	became	about	them.	And	win	they	did.Berlusconi	won	in	1994,	again	in	2001	and	unexpectedly	bounced	back	in	2008.	Johnson	was	the	key	to	winningthe	Brexit	referendum	and	the	2019	majority	was	his	victory.Both	leaders	used	their	power	to	promise	radical	reform	and	change,	whether	a	new	‘Italian	miracle’	or	‘levellingup’.	They	also	used	it,	in	high	populist	style,	to	divide	their	opponents,	a	rather	unexpected	coalition	of	left-wingsnobs	and	immigrants	according	to	Berlusconi,	or	Remainers	and	enemies	of	the	people’s	will	to	Johnson.	Bothleaders	tried	to	reach	across	and	beyond	their	parties	with	highly	personalised	promises:	who	can	forget	Johnsonhimself	promising	to	‘Get	Brexit	Done’	by	driving	a	JCB	through	a	polystyrene	wall?	Berlusconi	went	even	further,and	signed	a	five-point	‘contract	with	the	Italian	people’	live	on	television	with	five	promises,	promising	to	not	runagain	if	he	didn’t	achieve	at	least	four.Despite	their	presidential	style	and	sweeping	mandates,	Johnson	and	Berlusconi	are	seen	as	failures.	Neither	oftheir	extensive	political	reforms	happened.	Berlusconi’s	‘presidential’	plans	were	defeated	in	a	2006	referendumand	Johnson’s	great	Democracy	Commission	just	slowly	fizzled	out.	You’ll	be	surprised	to	know,	dear	reader,Berlusconi	failed	to	meet	his	five	contractual	promises	but	then	failed	to	leave	politics.	Even	Johnson’s	greatestachievement,	of	‘Getting	Brexit	Done’,	may	not	be	as	final	as	his	January	2020	gong	banging	made	it	appear.	Arecent	poll	found	51%	believed	Brexit	was	‘not	done’	as	oppose	to	just	21%	who	believed	it	was.	Whether	Brexit	is‘finished’	may	vary	if	you	are	in	London,	Dover,	Edinburgh	or	Belfast.	Levelling	up,	too,	remains	more	of	a	Wikipediaentry	than	a	policy.The	problem	was	that	their	presidential	style	rested	on	weak	foundations.	First,	their	communication	skills	were	theirweakness	as	well	as	their	strength.	Their	outlandish	promises	created	a	yawning	gap	between	what	was	said	andwhat	happened	and	their	sunny	dispositions	hid	an	unwillingness	to	make	decisions	or	face	unpleasant	facts.Johnson,	when	confronted	with	COVID-19,	simply	froze,	and	a	later	report	concluded	that	the	government’s	lack	ofresponse	mixed	‘fatalism’,	groupthink,	and	an	ignorance	of	practice	elsewhere.	His	hesitation	on	lockdowns	andfailure	to	protect	care	led	to	thousands	of	unnecessary	deaths.Second,	the	coalitions	on	which	their	presidential	style	rested	proved	fragile	and	volatile.	Berlusconi’s	shiftingcoalition	and	Johnson’s	alliance	between	Red	Wall	and	traditional	MPs	began	to	fall	apart	as	their		popularitywaned.	Coalition	allies	and	backbenchers	turned	on	their	‘presidents’.	While	Berlusconi	was	genuinely	popular,Johnson’s	support	was	even	more	fragile,	being	relative,	not	absolute.	Theresa	May	was	more	popular	thanJohnson	ever	was,	and	his	unpopularity	plumbed	depths	May’s	never	reached.Thirdly,	Johnson	and	Berlusconi’s	style	sowed	further	division.	Both	regularly	attacked	the	judges,	politicians	orjournalists	who	dared	question	or	challenge	the	‘Peoples	Will’	they	embodied	as	leader.	Their	attempts	to	evadeand	undermine	democratic	norms	and	rules	generated	opposition	from	courts,	investigators,	opponents	and,	finally,from	those	around	them.	Courts	regularly	struck	down	policy,	whether	it	was	Johnson’s	Prorogation	or	Rwandaflights,	or	Berlusconi’s	conflict	of	interests.Most	of	all,	the	focus	on	personality	and	personal	power	made	everything	about	them,	which	bought	victory	but	alsoscrutiny.	Both	leaders	were,	in	the	eyes	of	many,	liars	and	corrupt.	They	entered	power	with	huge	questions	overtheir	suitability	to	govern	and,	once	in	office,	they	corrupted	those	around	them	(see	Johnson’s	50	biggest	scandalsor	the	extensive	‘controversies	surrounding	Silvio	Berlusconi’	page).	Formal	investigations,	journalistic	inquiries	andquestions	rolled	around	their	premierships	and	came	to	dominate	them,	revealing	a	toxic	mix	of	personal,	political,and	financial	impropriety.	The	continual	scandal	eroded	the	trust	of	the	public	and	alarmed	their	allies.	Theirpresidential	style	and	personalised	politics	were	the	roots	of	their	success,	but	also	the	cause	of	their	undoing.__________________About	the	AuthorBritish Politics and Policy at LSE: Goodbye Britain’s Berlusconi? Comparing Boris Johnson’s premiership to Silvio Berlusconi’s Page 2 of 3		Date originally posted: 2022-07-18Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/goodbye-britains-berlusconi/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/Ben	Worthy	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Politics	at	Birkbeck,	University	of	London.		Mark	Bennister	is	Associate	Professor	in	Politics	at	the	University	of	Lincoln.			Photo	by	Annie	Spratt	on	Unsplash.British Politics and Policy at LSE: Goodbye Britain’s Berlusconi? Comparing Boris Johnson’s premiership to Silvio Berlusconi’s Page 3 of 3		Date originally posted: 2022-07-18Permalink: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/goodbye-britains-berlusconi/Blog homepage: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/

Goodbye Britain’s Berlusconi? Comparing Boris Johnson’s premiership to Silvio Berlusconi’s

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Goodbye Britain’s Berlusconi? Comparing Boris Johnson’s premiership to Silvio Berlusconi’s

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