This article probes performance and mechanisms of the Maoist economy from 1950 to 1980, a period commonly regarded as a turning point that ushered in a bumpy but new path for China’s new economic fortune, including industrialisation and modernisation. Mao and his government have often been regarded as a developer and moderniser for China. This study questions it. To that end, the Maoist economy is re-conceptualised, re-examined, and re-assessed with qualitative and quantitative evidence including empirical modelling. The key findings suggest that the Maoist economy was a closed one with industrial dependence on agriculture in an urbanrural zero-sum. In the end, despite the official propaganda agriculture declined, industrial workforce stagnated, and the population was poor. This gloomy performance justified the post-Mao reforms and opening up, a game changer that put China on a very different trajectory of growth and development
