Monitoring Compliance: The Design of Monitoring Institutions in International Cooperation.

Abstract

This dissertation offers a theoretical framework for understanding the choice of monitoring institutions made by nation states under international treaties and agreements. Some international agreements adopt centralized monitoring institutions such as inspection systems, while others rely on decentralized measures such as reporting requirements. To explain the variation, I offer a formal model wherein states can choose a monitoring institution from a menu of options: a) no information-gathering system, b) a self-administered reporting system, or c) a third-party verification system. Using this model, I identify the conditions under which states choose one monitoring system over the others. The model features relevant political, economic, and technological factors that contribute to the choice of monitoring institutions in order to provide a comprehensive and complete picture of regulatory decisions. I particularly focus on the political and economic conditions that influence the choice of monitoring institutions. One of the main research findings concerns the negative effect of asymmetric compliance environments. Whether the political and economic situation of a potential cooperation partner is favorable or unfavorable for compliance clearly impacts the preferences of other partners in their choice of monitoring institutions. The asymmetry in compliance environments creates a demand for information as well as the opportunity to establish a centralized monitoring institution, but it simultaneously generates sharp distributional conflicts among member states—conflicts that may in turn inhibit adoption of a centralized monitoring mechanism. The theory I develop in this regard revisits the central tenet of received cooperation theory about the informational role of international institutions and shows how and why international institutions may be constrained in performing their informational role. The theory of asymmetric compliance environments is tested with newly assembled datasets of three issue areas of post-WWII international cooperation: regional trade agreements, regional fisheries agreements and arms control agreements. Empirical findings indicate informational needs as well as distributional conflicts surrounding the design of monitoring systems across the three issue areas. With its theoretical and empirical content, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the informational role and information-gathering dynamics of international organizations and the politics involved therein.Ph.D.Political ScienceUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/58423/1/hyeranjo_1.pd