Heitman, Helmoed-Romer

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FORUM-THE VULNERABILITY OF THE SEAMS ANDJOINTS OF ADJACENT FORMATIONSHelmoed.Romer HeitmanThe seam between the zones of influence. ofadjacent formations is one of the weakest parts ofany defence. Its weakness results from thesituation of divided command which almostinevitably exists there. Thus any attack onto thejoint and/or along the seam will cause and enjoy afar greater measure of command and controlconfusion among the defenders - not least of th,eorder, counter-order variety - than would oneelsewhere.This problem of the defence is aggravated underconditions of mobile or columnar operations.Primary factors operating here are the lack ofcontinuous close personal contact between theneighbouring formations; a natural reluctance topatrol too close to inter-formation boundaries forfear of accidental clashes with friendly forces andthe equally natural tendency of forces engaged incolumnar operations to cluster along their centralaxis .•This potential weakness in a defence is naturallyequally well known to an attacker. As a result,much energy is often expended in an effort tolocate and identify the joints and seams of adefence. Once this has been achieved and otherfactors allowing, the attacker will then tend toconcentrate on one of these weak points,attacking onto a joint and/or along a seam with hisSchwerpunkt. Well handled and maintaining ahigh rate of advance, such an attack can sweepforward in a self-created bubble of virtualimmunity for some time - often at least to the fulldepth of the seam being exploited. Should thisamount to the full depth of the defence, theresults can be readily imagined."In southern Africa this problem of the defencereaches a dimension all its own: A major featureof the topography here is quite simply the relativescarcity of readily visible and identifiable topo-graphic features. Coupled with the fact of awide-meshed road net. this leads to a notunnatural tendency to see prominent roads asideal inter-formation boundaries - they do, afterall, meet one of the most important requirementsof boundaries per se: they are easily recognisableand identifiable both on the map and on the58ground. Another factor to consider is that theforce: space ratio in any likely conventional orsemi-conventional conflict in this region will tendto push the antagonists into a columnar style ofwarfare." •These very same factors - the relative lack ofreadily identifiable topographic features, thewide-meshed road net and the tendency tocolumnar operations - will tend to force theattacker to:1. Move his 'Schwerpunkt' along a primary road.and2. Carefully scrutinise all roads in the area of hisadvance in order to assess their manouvre andlogistic potential.Thus we find a situation where, as often as not,we will have deliberately - if unknowingly -placed the weakest part of our defence where, atbest, the enemy's reconnaissance cannot fail tolocate it. At worst, the enemy's 'Schwerpunkt'will in any event be intended to move through thatarea. It will be readily apparant that we thus findourselves possessors of a very dangerous habitindeed, one that we will do well to rid ourselvesof.Having said that, it is difficult to suggest viablealternatives to our existing tendency to use roadsas boundaries. One might lie in a return to themore frequent use of pickets in this role and/orplacing boundaries several kilometres to one sideof the road. But even having selected a moresensible boundary, this will still be the weakestpoint of the defence, even if not as readily visibleto the attacker as before. We must, therefore,begin serious consideration of ways in which toreduce the vulnerability of the seam area of thedefence.One possibility here might lie in the creation of aform of 'sandwich strip' between formations.Such a strip could then be controlled by lightarmoured forces under the command of the nexthigher headquarters for the normal course ofevents. Liaising continuously with both of theneighbouring formations, this force could effec-tively close the surveillance gap.Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 11, Nr 3, 1981. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.zaThe actual countering of an attack on the seamarea would ideally devolve upon one of theneighbouring formations according to prior ar-rangement or, preferably, by SOP. This wouldalso have to make provision for the assignedformation then automatically assuming operatiof)-al control of those of its neighbour's unitsadjacent to the enemy penetration/advance. Suchan automatic system coupled with a continuousconsideration of the changing factors involvedcould go some way towards reducing the dangerinherent in the enemy's identification andexploitation of joints and seams.Another possibility would be to provide for atactical headquarters to assume responsibility forsuch a penetration. This headquarters would thenhave to assume temporary command of the unitson either side of the seam being exploited as wellas having a part if the next higher command levelsreserve assigned to it. Ideally, it would fall directlyunder that level, leaving the formations on eitherside of the penetration to carryon with theirprimary tasks, albeit minus some of their units.At first glance, however, systems such as thoseoutlined above may appear perhaps a littlecomplicated. They are therefore put forward heremerely as a stimulus for further thought in thisdirection. * * * *A related problem lies in the lesser butnevertheless also present and worrying tendencyto 'balcony out' one formation's sector in front ofpart of the neighbour's. While this no doubt is onlydone when it is on sound tactical grounds, italways represents an added source of complica-tion and potential danger. One need merelyconsider the potential of a driving attack acrossthe front of the parent formation at an angle andon to the 'balcony'. This would not even need tobe intentional to be disastrous. The elements inthe 'balcony' would be deprived of support andwould be driven back into the neighbouringformation's sector - in all probability interming-led with the leading enemy elements. The59resultant confusion - chaos would be more apt- can be readily imagined.The only solution here is to keep boundariesvertical wherever at all possible - even at thecost of apparent advantages to be gleaned from a'balconied' structure of the defence. This would,after all, be in accordance with the most importantof all the principles of war - keep it simple.Where 'balconying' is unavoidable, such a'balcony' should then at least be given sufficientdepth to allow for a truely mobile response toattack. Also constant liaison and a system ofSOPs will be needed to cover the variouseventualities - much more so than in the normalcourse of events.In time of war, our inter-formation boundaries -seen by him as joints and seams in our defence.- will be the subject of constant interest andfascination to the enemy. We should find them atleast equally interesting, not least now. in time ofpeace. Then it may be possible to reward hisinterest with a surprise or two. If we do not nowbegin to concern ourselves with the problems ofthe seam, there will be no surprises for either sidein the rapidity of the enemy's advance.• Normally a mobile defence might be expected to be less vulnerableto a penetration along one of its seams. This would, however bedependant upon excellent surveillance, flexible command andlogistics and a reasonably tight high capacity road net. Failing these,it would in all probability prove difficult in the extreme to regroup andmanoeuvre swiftly enough to effectively counter a fast movingpenetration.•• This was, more often than is perhaps realized, the 'secret' behindsome of the German army's successes. The Soviets, too, put mucheffort into the locating and identifying of joints and seams in theGerman defence.••• Resulting, therefore, in very deep, almost totally unprotectedflanks and an open rear area.•••• Careful consideration' of the potential problems of the seam inCOIN OPS should also repay the effort put into it. That, however,is beyond the scope of this paper.Note:Inter-unit seams, too, are vulnerable. Here, however, more frequentpersonal contact can considerably reduce the potential danger. Theexploitation of such seams is also more readily countered by the parentformation.Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 11, Nr 3, 1981. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za

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The vulnerability of the seams and joints of adjacent formations

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The vulnerability of the seams and joints of adjacent formations

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