Washington must recognize that its allies, including those in the security forces, are often the source of counterinsurgency problems as well as the heart of any solution. The author argues that the ally\u27s structural problems and distinct interests have daunting implications for successful U.S. counterinsurgency efforts. The nature of regimes and of societies feeds an insurgency, but the United States is often hostage to its narrow goals with regard to counterinsurgency and thus becomes complicit in the host-nation\u27s self-defeating behavior. Unfortunately, U.S. influence often is limited as the allies recognize that America\u27s vital interests with regard to fighting al-Qa\u27ida-linked groups are likely to outweigh any temporary disgust or anger at an ally\u27s brutality or failure to institute reforms. Training, military-to-military contacts, education programs, and other efforts to shape their COIN capabilities are beneficial, but the effects are likely to be limited at best.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1727/thumbnail.jp
