Hore, Peter

Smith, Edward A., Jr.

English

U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons

Naval War College ReviewVolume 54Number 2 Spring Article 142001The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of theCold WarEdward A. Smith Jr.Peter HoreFollow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-reviewThis Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contactrepository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.Recommended CitationSmith, Edward A. Jr. and Hore, Peter (2001) "The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War," Naval War CollegeReview: Vol. 54 : No. 2 , Article 14.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/14BOOK REVIEWSPARALLEL THINKINGHore, Peter, ed. The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War. Maritime Strategic StudiesInstitute Paper 2, March 1999. 109pp.Over the past decade, the U.S. Navy hasundergone a profound shift in its strategyand thinking. This collection of thought-ful essays written by senior Royal Navyofficers between 1992 and 1998 makes itclear that soul-searching by naval think-ers has not been confined to the UnitedStates. Eric Grove’s foreword, tracing theevolution of British naval thought overthis period, and Captain Edwin Atkinson’sessay, “The Influence of Sea Power uponPeace,” demonstrate how closely thethinking, assessments, and recommenda-tions being made in the United Kingdomparalleled those made in the U.S. Navy’s“. . . From the Sea” process. It is certainlyan interesting commentary on the eternalverities of naval thinking that what Grovecalls an “intellectual revolution” occurredwithout any formal exchange betweenthese two very different groups, each ofwhich was engaged in an “in house” effort.The real value of these essays, however,lies not in the history of post–Cold Warnaval thought but in what they say abouta continuing revolution in naval thinkingon both sides of the Atlantic—especiallythe efforts to stretch declining force levelsto deal with extended commitments. Aparticularly salient essay in this regard isVice Admiral Alan West’s “1919–1991:The Need for a United Kingdom GrandStrategy.” West’s forthright analysis ofBritain’s failed attempt to adapt to a newstrategic environment after World War Ipoints to the lack of a coherent national“grand” strategy, to destructiveinterservice rivalries, and to militaryplanning driven by costs alone. The lackof a grand strategy in particular left Brit-ain unable to make any meaningfultrade-off between the limited means ac-corded the military in the interwar yearsand the far-reaching commitments thatBritish forces were directed to meet.Compounding the problem was the pol-icy makers’ assumption that Britain “willnot be engaged in any great war duringthe next ten years,” a fiscally convenientdictum that persisted well into the 1930sdespite evidence to the contrary and thatultimately left Britain unprepared forwar. All of this should have a familiarring to today’s readers. Indeed, it is thecurrency of these problems that gives thisessay its greatest impact.Of equal, if different, significance is a se-ries of essays by Brigadier Robert Fry,5/14/01Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:06 PMColor profile: DisabledComposite  Default screen1Smith and Hore: The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold WarPublished by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001Vice Admiral J. J. Blackham, and AdmiralSir Peter Abbott, written between 1995and 1998. These provide perceptive Brit-ish insights on the changing maritimedimension of our post–Cold War worldand the increased roles for maneuversand forward presence in shaping a newstrategic environment. These are exactlythe kinds of issues with which the U.S.armed forces are now struggling.The essays’ chief drawbacks are theirbrevity and what they do not say. The in-sights presented are clearly worthwhileand for that very reason deserve expan-sion. For example, what were the work-ing-level debates that undergirded theflag officers’ presentations? The fact thatthe essays cover the seven-year period upto only three years ago would indicatethat the issues raised with regard to thechanging role of naval forces in the newcentury are still as far from being fully re-solved in the Royal Navy as they are inthe U.S. naval service. This suggests roomfor both an equivalent American publica-tion and another Maritime StrategicStudies Institute paper, as both naviescontinue the process of rethinking navalpower that collectively began in 1991.EDWARD A. SMITH, JR.Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)Washington Studies and AnalysisThe Boeing CompanyArlington, VirginiaBerkowitz, Bruce D., and Allan E. Goodman. BestTruth: Intelligence in the Information Age. NewHaven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 2000. 203pp. $22.50The U.S. intelligence community, as itcurrently exists, is fundamentally flawedand must be remade. With this openingpremise, Bruce Berkowitz, a senior con-sultant at RAND Corporation, and AllanGoodman, former dean of theGeorgetown University School of ForeignService, present their blue-print for the future of Ameri-can intelligence.According to the authors, atrio of factors threatens toleave the intelligence commu-nity ineffective and irrelevant.First, it is no revelation thatthe end of the Cold War hasleft the intelligence commu-nity without a single clear threat as a fo-cus for its analytic efforts. The pastemphasis on the Soviet Union offered in-telligence analysts historical continuity.Change tended to be evolutionary; forexample, one generation of Soviet sub-marines offered insights into the next.Today, however, nations and nonstateactors have unprecedented access totechnology and information and with it anew capability to organize and operaterapidly across borders. These develop-ments create the prospect of an “instan-taneous threat” against the United Statesfrom entirely unexpected sources.Second, if Carl von Clausewitz was cor-rect in defining intelligence as “every sortof information about the enemy and hiscountry,” fundamental changes in infor-mation management must create funda-mental changes in intelligence. Berkowitzand Goodman observe that the intelli-gence community was created on an1 4 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E WA book reviewer occupies a position of special re-sponsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set incontext, describe strengths, and point out weak-nesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes aheavy obligation which it is his duty to dischargewith reason and consistency.ADMIRAL H. G. RICKOVER5/14/01Monday, May 14, 2001 3:33:07 PMColor profile: DisabledComposite  Default screen2Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 14https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/14

The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War

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The Genesis of Naval Thinking since the End of the Cold War

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